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ARCHIVING THE CITY 




OLATOKUNBO ADEOLA ENIGBOKAN 
 




The topic of this dissertation is the development and exploration of alternative methodologies for 
understanding and relating to everyday urban experience. The project is a psychogeographical 
exploration of methodologies used in contemporary art and architectural practice to create 
street-level “urban interventions.” For the purposes of this study, urban interventions are defined 
as actions, performances, installations and objects created by artists, and or activists and 
sometimes architects, and inserted into, or responsive to, everyday urban environments, usually 
taking place outside of official art spaces, such as museums and galleries. In most cases these 
interventions are unexpected, express a “do-it-yourself” aesthetic and have not been 
commissioned by any governmental or private entity. This dissertation in Environmental 
Psychology discusses creative transdisciplinary methods of engaging urban experience, 
focusing on urban interventionist art and architectural practice in Moscow and New York over 
the past few decades. Drawing upon archival records, attendance and participation at public 
exhbitions of artworks and talks, selected urban interventions are subjected to 
psychogeographical analysis, in addition to thematic analyses of the discourse surrounding the 
artworks. While some of these interventions have been situated within various genealogies of 
modern and contemporary art history and criticism, these practices are placed within a 
genealogy of urban theory rooted in psychogeography and historical geography. As such, the 
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focus here is on selected urban interventions that creatively combine cartographic and design 
practices with archival practice, and that engage with a distinct sense of urban temporality. The 
various examples of urban interventions provided throughout this dissertation present a 
provocation to develop alternative ways of talking about and researching urban experience 
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Figure 1: Making the Passageway Gallery, Metro Proletarskaya, 
Moscow. Photos courtesy Vystavka v perekhode 
 
40 
Figure 2: Image from the Passageway Gallery, Metro Proletarskaya, 




Figure 3: Participants in DIY action in the Voikovskaya district of 
Moscow creating a giant chessboard out of a discarded road barrier; 
led by Strasbourg-based urban hacktivist Florian Riviere, in 








Figure 5: A DIY swing in the Voikovskaya district of Moscow created 



















   








Craftsmanship is at the center of yourself and you are personally involved 
in every intellectual product upon which you may work. 
– C. Wright Mills 
 
 
Before I arrived in Moscow, there were many strands of my thoughts, my methods, my 
understanding, unconnected. I had been drifting—in books and theories about architecture and 
(non)violence; about the effects of war and planning on our urban lives; about the difference 
between envisioning the future, and anticipating what is yet to come; between preparing for 
emergency and emerging through catastrophe. The link between these drifts was formed for me 
by practices of archiving—collecting and storing things, even habits and gestures, sedimented 
knowledge—understood as an everyday form of interaction between citizens, living and dead, 
and the design and architecture that shape their experience of the city. Specifically, I was drawn 
towards cities caught in moments of transition and transformation: I made an ethnographic 
study of the design, construction and marketing of vast new luxury towers in historical sections 
of Tel Aviv; an archival exploration of Alvin Baltrop’s elegiac photography of the crumbling New 
York City piers between 1975 and 1986; collaborated with artist and architect Jana Leo on an 
installation-archive-account of her own rape, in her Harlem apartment, during the 
neighborhood’s more brutal moments of gentrification in the early 2000s. As an artist, I designed 
and conducted a series of street-level ‘interventions’ into urban space, inserting interactive 
objects, and participatory performances into the course of everyday life in New York City 
neighborhoods. And all the while I maintained a weblog, itself an archive of various archival 
practices spanning the fields of architecture, art and social science. 
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Each of these investigations or explorations into transitional moments in urban areas was 
accompanied by close reading of texts spanning philosophy, psychology, history, anthropology, 
sociology and theory of art and architecture, with the intention of following threads, and weaving 
the transdisciplinary connections necessary to understand the way people go about constructing 
their urban lives. These readings took me through the side-alleys and back roads of the social 
sciences, through William James’ (1890/2007; 2000) theorization of the problem of the one and 
the many, Felix Guattari’s (1995) attempts to think subjectivity beyond the subject, Alfred Gell’s 
(1998) search for an anthropological theory of visual art and distributed personhood, Walter 
Benjamin’s own sojourn to Moscow in the 1920s (1986, 1996, 1999b), and his resulting theories 
of art, authorship and time in the city (Benjamin 2005), and Foucault’s notions of ‘genealogy’ as 
a history of the present and art as a way of living (Foucault 1984, 2003). Readings in urbanism 
put me on the trail of phantasmagoric urban experience, beyond the “material stuff of life” (Pile 
2005), and the urban theory generated out of lives lived in cities like New York, Chicago, 
London and Berlin, towards notions of urban living originating out of what could, until recently, 
be considered backwaters of urbanism: cities of the Global South and the former Soviet Union 
(see: Abbas 1998, Simone 2004a, 2004b, Rao 2009, Hirt 2013). Following these off-center 
theoretical paths opened up encounters with theories and practices of architecture and 
conceptual and performance art that in turn pointed me in the direction of alternative 
methodologies for engaging and exploring urban experience. 
 
When the offer materialized to be a resident artist and urbanist in Moscow from October 2011 
until August 2012, I jumped at the opportunity to test and develop some of these alternative 
methodologies for understanding urban experience. Moscow is a city in the throes of a long-
term transition from a center of the sprawling yet closed Soviet Socialist empire, towards “world 
city” status, opening itself to the vagaries of neoliberal capitalism and its all-powerful markets. 
Additionally the city has a rich history of art, socio-psychological theory and influential urban 
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design and planning, spanning the decades of Soviet rule, and encompassing the city’s ongoing 
transformation since the end of the Soviet era (Kolossov and O’Loughlin 2004; Golubchikov and 
Badyina 2006, Hirt and Stanilov 2009). All of these circumstances contribute to particular local 
expressions of “the urban experience,” which may hold the potential to both challenge and 
expand traditional theories of the urban everyday, based on life in cities of Western Europe and 
the United States. The period of my stay in Moscow coincided with a series of massive street 
actions expressing popular discontent with the country’s current regime, which involved 
reclamations of public space for political purposes on an order that had not been witnessed in 
the capital during the preceding twenty years. This politically charged climate drew me towards 
the activities of artists and activists involved in creative responses to the widespread discontent, 
which focused not simply upon public demonstrations, but made closer examinations of, and 
aesthetic and ethical responses to, the conditions of living in the Russian city today. Could these 
collections of artists and activists be proposing, through their ad hoc experiments, ways of 
understanding and engaging urban experience that upend existing notions of what is possible to 
know and to do in the city? My research explores this question from the starting point that at the 
very least, this emerging work presents implications for psychogeographical urban theory and 
practice, which are impossible for me, as an artist, urbanist and environmental psychologist, to 
ignore. 
 
So the topic of this dissertation is the development and exploration of alternative methodologies 
for understanding and relating to everyday urban experience. The project is a 
psychogeographical exploration of methodologies used in contemporary art and architectural 
practice to create street-level “urban interventions.” For the purposes of this study, urban 
interventions are defined as actions, performances, installations and objects created by artists, 
and or activists and sometimes architects, and inserted into, or responsive to, everyday urban 
environments, usually taking place outside of official art spaces, such as museums and 
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galleries. In most cases these interventions are unexpected, express a “do-it-yourself” aesthetic 
and have not been commissioned by any governmental or private entity. This dissertation in 
Environmental Psychology discusses creative transdisciplinary methods of engaging urban 
experience, focusing on urban interventionist art and architectural practice in Moscow and New 
York over the past few decades. These urban interventions, are subjected to 
psychogeographical analysis, in addition to thematic analyses of the discourse surrounding the 
artworks. While some of these interventions have been situated within various genealogies of 
modern and contemporary art history and criticism, this dissertation places these practices 
within a genealogy of urban theory rooted in psychogeography and historical geography. As 
such, the focus here is on selected urban interventions that creatively combine cartographic and 
design practices with archival practice, and that engage with a distinct sense of urban 
temporality. The various examples of urban interventions provided throughout this dissertation, 
some being pivotal examples of the genre, and others of my own design, present a challenge to 
more mainstream ways of talking about and researching urban experience within the social 
sciences. In taking up projects, which can be called “urban interventions” within the arts and 
architecture, this dissertation asks: 
 
1. Might the emergent field of contemporary art and conceptual architecture known 
as "urban intervention(ism)" hold theoretical significance for psychogeographical 
urban research? If so, in what ways? 
 
2. Could a study of urban intervention(ism) contribute to a deeper understanding of 
the nature of urban experience? If so, in what ways? 
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3. Could engagement with urban interventionism precipitate the development of 
alternative styles of knowledge production, which transcends entrenched 
disciplinary boundaries? If so, in what ways? 
 
In addressing these questions, the methodological approach: 
 
critiques selected urban interventions created by artists over the past decade to 
understand the methods by which they are or might be productive of 
psychogeographical and archival knowledge about urban experience. 
 
draws artistic urban interventionist practice into a discursive genealogy of 
psychogeographical methods for engaging urban experience, in such a way as to 
expand contemporary discourse on urban experience within the social sciences that 
tends not to include art practice as generative of fields of knowledge about the urban 
world. 
 
pulls from the researcher’s own experience as an artist creating urban interventions in 
Moscow, Saint Petersburg and New York in a radically empiricist (James 1996, Jackson 
1989) and autoethnographic (Ellis et al. 2011, Jones 2002) mode. The aim of this 
method is two-fold: to provide the reader with practical details of conceptualizing and 
producing urban interventions that traverse the boundaries between social science and 
art, and to situate these practices within a broader transdisciplinary context. 
 
discusses the aesthetic and ethical implications of this transdisciplinarity for urban 
research. 
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experiments with an artistic approach to presenting knowledge created in and about the 
city. 
 
In the series of discussions that follow, I will provide an account of theoretical and 
methodological bases for the research approach outlined above. Each discussion walks the 
reader along the same paths that I have taken to arrive at the psychogeographical and 
urbanistic conceptions and the approach to archival art/research practice, that combine to lay 
the groundwork for the explorations contained within subsequent chapters. 
 
TALKING ABOUT EXPERIENCE 
 
Life is confused and superabundant, and what the younger generation 
craves is more of the temperament of life in its philosophy, even though it 
were at some cost of logical rigor and of formal purity.  
                                                            – James 1996:39 
 
[Experience] is made of that, of just what appears, of space, of intensity, of 
flatness, brownness, heaviness, or what not.  
–Shadworth Hodgson,  
cited in James 1996:27 
 
Lived experience overflows the boundaries of any one concept, any one 
person, or any one society. 
                                                              --Jackson 1989:2 
    
     
My dissertation focuses upon how city dwellers experience their surroundings. In this project 
“experience” refers to the affective dimensions of everyday life. “Experience” is the realm of 
perception and sensation, made available in the encounter between body and world, or body 
and city. I am particularly concerned with picking up threads of discourse in psychology, 
anthropology, urban theory and philosophy that attempt to address the quality or character of 
affective experience of urban areas. “Affective experience,” broadly defined, refers to the range 
of emotional and sensory interactions, attitudes and postures that accrue in the course of 
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everyday life. Affective experience is not always localized to the body or psyche of individuals, 
but often, like contagious viruses, render porous the seemingly rigid boundaries between 
citizens, such that we may speak of “moods,” “feelings,” and “habits,” shared by the residents of 
a given area (Stewart 2007). For anthropologist Kathleen Stewart, “ordinary affects are public 
feelings that begin and end in broad circulation, but they’re also the stuff that seemingly intimate 
lives are made of” (2007:2). Considering such “ordinary affects,” allows us to recognize another 
register of everyday urban life, lived in the shadow of conventional senses of subjectivity and 
scale. Affective experience does not immediately imply intelligibility, or understanding, but rather 
resists tried and true methods and established epistemologies for making sense of the world. 
What is valuable about such experience, for social research, is that it often makes tangible and 
immediate the powerful, and seemingly distant forces and ideologies that shape and structure 
our socio-environmental relations: 
Ideologies happen. Power snaps into place. Structures grow entrenched. 
Identities take place. Ways of knowing become habitual at the drop of a hat. But 
it’s ordinary affects that give things the quality of a something to inhabit 
and animate. Politics starts in the animated inhabitation of things, not way 
downstream in the various dreamboats and horror shows that get moving… 
There’s a politics to being/feeling connected (or not), to impacts that are shared 
(or not), to energies spent worrying or scheming (or not), to affective contagion, 
and to all the forms of attunement and attachment. (Stewart 2007: 15-16 
emphasis added) 
 
Becoming attuned to this experiential register of everyday life points us towards the 
transpersonal dimensions of human-environmental interactions, where affects spread like 
contagions and efface socio-spatial or ideological boundaries—a register impossible to address 
without blurring traditional distinctions between subject and object.  
 
In his famous essay addressing the existence of ‘consciousness,’ psychologist William James 
proposes an understanding of ‘pure experience,’ which is fundamentally relational. James 
suggests that experience is made of the (often unpredictable) interaction between ‘real’ or 
verifiable external facts, along with hidden memories, objects of imagination, projections, shared 
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histories and personal biographies (1996). This interaction between externally verifiable facts, 
and the phantasmagorical aspects of experience, challenges notions of experience based on a 
singular or individual consciousness, and points instead to the fundamentally in-between, 
transpersonal, or “double” aspect of experience—every experience is made up of the here and 
the not-here; the me and the not-me:  
 
The things in the room here which I survey, and those in my distant home of 
which I think, the things of this minute and those of my long-vanished boyhood, 
influence and decide me alike, with a reality which my experience of them directly 
feels. They both make up my real world, they make it directly, they do not have 
first to be introduced to me and mediated by ideas which now and here arise 
within me…. This not-me character of my recollections and expectations does 
not imply that the external objects of which I am aware in those experiences 
should necessarily be there for others. The objects of dreamers and hallucinated 
persons are wholly without general validity. But even were they centaurs and 
golden mountains, they still would be ‘off there’ in fairyland and not ‘inside’ 
ourselves. Munsterberg cited in James 1996:20 emphasis added 
 
This relational character of experience proposed by James and his colleagues contradicts 
Cartesian notions of space, in which every room can be plotted on a coordinated grid, and in 
which all objects can be definitively mapped, as well as notions of linear and chronological time, 
in which the past remains ever in its proper place. Instead, James’ “World of Pure Experience” 
asks us to pragmatically accept the multiple character of space-and-time-as-experience, as 
subjects who are simultaneously ‘me,’ and ‘not-me,’ perceiving of ourselves across time and 
space, while able to conceive of experience even as it happens. At this point, it may be 
necessary to better define who or what this project takes to be the “subject” of affective 
experience.  
 
Affect, when interpreted as feeling or emotion originating within a given “consciousness,” is 
often relegated to the scale of the individual or subject. In this way, talk of affect becomes the 
purview of those psychiatrists, psychologists and phenomenologists who concern themselves 
with the analysis (and cure) of the (human) subject. However, within my project affective 
   
   
9 
experience is not conceptualized as being simply about feeling and emotion contained within 
the psyche or body of the individual subject, but instead focuses on the energies generated in 
the friction between people, places and things. This energy may or may not originate within 
bodies, living or non-living, (Deleuze 2003); may or may not be made of the material histories of 
places and things and the ghosts of these existences (Straight 2007, Gordon 1997); may or may 
not be generated in the exertion of force to establish equilibrium common to family systems, for 
example the bonds created between mother and infant within this inherent instability (Elkaim 
1997, Stern 1985); may concern the movements, physical or political, inherent to everyday life, 
which tend to crystallize into the shapes of lives or works of art (Stewart 2007, Massumi 2002). 
Whatever the case, this approach to thinking about affective experience is no longer concerned 
with the individual as the subject of feeling or emotion. In short, this project accepts a 
redefinition of subjectivity that extends subjecthood beyond the discrete individual, and 
highlights the importance of affect as a generation of transpersonal relationality. An extended 
quote from the work of psychoanalyst and ecologist Felix Guattari might elucidate these points: 
 
Whether one considers contemporary history, machinic semiotic productions, the 
ethology of infancy, or social and mental ecology, we witness the same 
questioning of subjective individuation, which certainly survives, but is wrought by 
collective assemblages of enunciation. At this stage, the provisional definition of 
subjectivity I would like to propose as the most encompassing would be: ‘The 
ensemble of conditions which render possible the emergence of individual 
and/or collective instances as self-referential and existential Territories, adjacent, 
or in a delimiting relation, to an alterity that is itself subjective.’ We know that in 
certain social and semiological contexts, subjectivity becomes individualized; 
persons, taken as responsible for themselves, situate themselves within relations 
of alterity governed by familial habits, local customs, juridical laws, etc. In other 
conditions subjectivity is collective—which does not, however, mean that it 
becomes exclusively social. The term collective should be understood in the 
sense of a multiplicity that deploys itself as much beyond the individual, on 
the side of the socius, as before the person, on the side of the preverbal 
intensities, indicating a logic of affects rather than a logic of delimited sets 
(Guattari 1995, pp10-11, emphasis added).
1 
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For Guattari, the stakes of re-defining subjectivity as the conditions of possibility for the 
emergence of “territories” are immense. An expanded concept of subjectivity no longer accepts 
experience to be phenomena proper to the individual, as an atomic unit within a field of social 
relations. This approach lets go of the dialectical relation between “individual” and “society,”—a 
dialectic that has served to relegate affective experience to the level of individual—and instead 
focuses upon “individual” as a particular instantiation of a relations between “collectivities” and 
“multiplicities” and various forms of “otherness” (alterity)—relations which have their own 
historicity. Implied is the understanding that all of these elements remain in flux, and are 
irreducible to any all-encompassing notion of “the social.” In other words, Guattari’s invocation 
of subjectivity turns this project towards the complexities of affective experience, as what 
emerges in the friction between bodies, living and non-living, before the personal, between 
elements always-in-motion, within the socius, and not merely what is thought to originate in “the 
individual,” (or in the individual’s relation to social form) in the form of feeling and emotion.  
 
 
MAKING RADICAL EXPERIMENTS 
 
The notions of affective experience that inform this project all call for an approach to conducting 
and presenting research that recognizes and embraces the porosity of the borders between self 
and other, between subject and object, between knower and known. For William James, “the 
peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, which their ‘conscious’ 
quality is invoked to explain, is better explained by their relations—these relations themselves 
being experiences—to one another” 1996:25. This relationality, in which experiences run 
together in “streams” that flow both within and beyond the boundaries of personality and 
rationality, becomes the foundation of the method of “radical empiricism.” 
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To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any 
element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that 
is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that connect 
experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation 
experienced must be counted as ‘real’ as anything else in the system. James 
1996:42 
 
Focusing on the relational qualities of experience is a pointed challenge to rationalistic, or less 
‘radical’ empirical approaches that attempt to place experience in a conceptual hierarchy of 
orders of knowledge about the world. Radical empiricism accepts experience at “face value, 
neither less nor more,” which means “to take it just as we feel it, and not to confuse ourselves 
with abstract talk about it, [inventing] conceptions in order to neutralize [experience] and to 
make [it] again seem rationally possible” James 1996:49. Taking our experiences at face value, 
as James suggests, requires us to cut across the rational devices by which we tend to theorize 
social relations within the social sciences. Anthropologist Michael Jackson (1989), through a 
close reading and translation of James into the language of ethnographic practice, finds that a 
focus on lived experience calls attention to “the interplay rather than the identity of things,” in 
ways that have serious consequences for received orders and hierarchies of knowledge: 
 
Lived experience accommodates our shifting sense of ourselves as subjects and 
as objects, as acting upon and being acted upon by the world, of living with and 
without certainty, of belonging and being estranged, yet resists arresting any one 
of these modes of experience in order to make it foundational to a theory of 
knowledge. Such an all-encompassing conception of experience avoids 
narrowing down the field of experience to either the subject or the object, theory 
or practice, the social or the individual, thought or feeling, form or flux. (Jackson 
1989:2 emphasis in original) 
 
To work within a field defined not by classification and boundaries, but by the propensity of 
seemingly fixed objects towards flow and dissolution, is to accept that the knowing (or 
researching) subject is also always a participant in the experience, and at no point stands 
outside of it. In fact, according to Jackson (1989), “there is no constant substantive ‘self’ which 
can address constant substantive ‘others’ as objects of knowledge” (3). The radically empiricist 
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approach accepts this constant dissolution of self and other, taking the interexperience, the 
interaction between researcher and research object, as the main subject of research: 
 
Our habit of excluding the lived experience of the observer from the field of the 
observed on the grounds that it is a ‘regrettable disturbance’ is… a stratagem for 
alleviating anxiety, not a rule of scientific method. A radically empirical method 
includes the experience of the observer and defines the experimental field as one 
of interactions and intersubjectivity. Accordingly, we make ourselves 
experimental subjects and treat our experiences as primary data. (Jackson 
1989: 4 emphasis added) 
 
Jackson’s interpretation of radical empiricism as methodology allows us to notice the close 
connection between experience and experiment. When speaking of experience as the subject of 
research, we tend to refer to it as a thing, a noun, something ‘out there’ to be taken up and 
observed as a phenomenon outside of the self. However, when the researcher is also 
understood to be the subject of experience, experience emerges in its verb form. We 
researchers no longer simply observe the experiences [of others]: We experience things.  
 
Making the subtle shift from experience-as-noun (something that happened, usually to someone 
else, like another person’s memory, for example), to experience-as-verb (the visceral actions of 
being alive) puts us in the mind of making experiments: testing or trying things out (for the first 
time), meeting with or participating in some (life-changing) event, or even being converted, as in 
a religious sense. Experience-as-verb is practical, and implies time and duration, possibly even 
regular or measured repetition, until one is able to say one is “experienced,” or has “learned 
from experience.” It is here that “experiment” emerges as an aspect of experience-in-action, a 
state of moving, adjusting, trying, repeating, in which there is a larger sense of encounter with 
the unknown and unexpected.2 In fact, the very measured precision of a scientific experiment in 
a “controlled” environment, for example, is intended to make space in which the scientist may 
be brought face to face with what he or she has not previously known, which then allows him or 
her to better isolate and explain any possibly unexpected or extraordinary occurrence. To work 
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with and through experience, requires an experimental practice of some sort, a way of learning 
by trial, encounter with, or exposure to, what was previously unknown. According to Jackson 
(1989): 
Experience, in this sense, becomes a mode of experimentation, of testing and 
exploring the ways in which our experiences conjoin or connect with others, 
rather than the ways they set us apart. In this process we put ourselves on the 
line; we run the risk of having our sense of ourselves as different and distant from 
the people we study dissolve, and with it all our pretensions to a supraempirical 
position, a knowledge that gets us above and beyond the temporality of human 
existence. (Jackson 1989: 4) 
 
For me, approaching the topic of (urban) experience is always about method, especially 
developing an experimental method through which I may reflect on my own practice and the 
practice of others, artists and social scientists. Radical empiricism, as a philosophical and 
methodological disposition to engage experience, is necessarily experimental, in the sense of 
acknowledging, in theory and practice, how the very acts of exploring and participating in the 
field of study shapes, and even constitutes that very field. It may be important here to note, as 
does Martin Jay (2005), that in the case of William James, the first radical empiricist, the 
experimental exploration of a world of pure experience could not be limited to the traditional 
bounds of the academic inquiry, but extended far beyond: 
 
Experience was the paradoxically foundationless foundation that provided an 
answer, or at least sparked the persistent questioning that drove [William James’] 
work for much of his career. Translated into his personal life, this quest meant a 
willingness to open himself up to practices that more cautious scientists would 
have found anathema—experiments with the occult and the paranormal, dubious 
mind cures, hallucinogenic drugs, and the like… Always more than a mere 
professional, academic philosopher, he risked entering the public realm to 
espouse unpopular political opinions and promote causes like mind-care reform 
(Jay 2005: 276-277) 
 
The spirit of the exploratory experiment was a key part of James’ personal and professional 
interest in pure experience, and within his own life he charted a course through “the multiplicity 
of experiences… [believing that] more experiences—varied, novel, risky—had the potential to 
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yield a portrait of himself as knower, perceiver, interpreter, actor” (Simon 1998 cited in Jay 
2005: 277).   
 
Studies of experience expose the researcher to the uncertainty, anxieties and even ecstasies 
that accompany the move away from the explanatory modes that accompany much work in the 
social sciences. In exchange for accepting this ambiguous position, the researcher exposes 
him- or herself to the affective intensities, that flow through the taken-for-granted habits of 
everyday existence. The method of radical empiricism, finds cognate practices in the field of 
anthropology, and the more subversive versions of ethnographic method. While anthropologists 
like Michael Jackson (1989) conceptualize their studies of ‘Other’ cultures with reference to 
James’ radical empiricism, some, like Victor and Edith Turner (1982), interrogate their own 
research practices through designing radical experiments that render porous the boundaries 
between psychology, anthropology, art and performance studies. In fact, the Turners’ 
ethnographic experiments are foundational to the theory and method of “performance 
ethnography,”3 and the related “autoethnography,”4 ways of developing and addressing 
alternative forms of knowing about the world as experienced, beyond traditional empiricism 
(Adams & Holman Jones 2008; Atkinson 2004; Conquergood 1998 & 2002; Denzin 2003; Ellis 
et al. 2011; Jones 2002).  
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Turners undertook a series of pedagogical experiments 
with their students at the University of Virginia, the University of Chicago and New York 
University, in order to explore the methodological ramifications of taking experience seriously: 
 
… while it may be possible for a gifted researcher to demonstrate the coherence 
among the “parts” of a culture, the models he presents remain cognitive. 
Cognizing the connections, we fail to form a satisfactory impression of how 
another culture’s members “experience” one another. For feeling and will, as well 
as thought, constitute the structures of culture—cultural experience, regarded 
both as the experience of individuals and as the collective experience of its 
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members embodied in myths, rituals, symbols and celebrations. For several 
years, as teachers of anthropology, we have been experimenting with the 
performance of ethnography to aid students’ understanding of how people in 
other cultures experience the richness of their social existence… [W]e’ve taken 
descriptions of strips of behavior from ‘other cultures’ and asked students to 
make ‘play-scripts’ from them. Then we set up workshops—really playshops—in 
which the students try to get kinetic understandings of the ‘other’ sociocultural 
groups (Turner & Turner 1982: 33-34). 
 
While many of the experimental “plays” written and performed by the Turners’ students were 
based upon ethnographic fieldwork and monographs describing cultures other than their own, 
the most poignant of the experiments were the ones in which students acted out ritual 
performances based on their own sociocultural experiences. Of particular interest is the 
performance of one group of graduate students at the University of Chicago, in which they 
designed an elaborate ritual interrogating the anxieties that infused their everyday lives within 
the university system. 
 
[The ritual] was divided into three stages, each occupying a different space. Each 
participant brought along a cardboard box in which he/she had to squat, 
representing his/her constricted, inferior social status. There were episodes, of a 
sado-masochistic character, representing registration, in which the actors were 
continually referred between different desks, monitored by sinister lhadamanthine 
[sic] bureaucrats, who continually found fault with the registrants. Another scene, 
using multimedia, portrayed a typical student, being harangued from a lectern by 
an ‘anthropology professor’ spouting technical gobbledygook (actually excerpts 
from published texts), while he was typing his dissertation to the accompaniment 
of a series of rapid slides of familiar architectural details of the University of 
Chicago. Finally he “died,” and was solemnly buried by a group of his peers clad 
in black leotards. The scene then shifted from a room in the students’ activities 
hall to a yard in the campus, where the constraining boxes were placed so as to 
resemble a kind of Mayan pyramid which strongly resembled the new Regenstein 
Library, scene of many painful graduate attempts at study. The whole group 
danced around the pyramid, which was set on fire. This ‘liminal period’ was 
followed by a final rite in another room of the hall, where student papers that had 
been unfavorably commented upon by faculty were cremated in the grate; the 
ashes were then mixed with red wine, and two by two the students anointed one 
another on the brow with the mixture, symbolizing ‘the death of bad vibes.’ 
Finally, all joined together in chanting ‘Om, Padne, Om,’ representing a 
‘communitas of suffering.’ This production involved music, dancing, and miming, 
as well as dialogue. Many of the participants claimed that the performance had 
discharged tensions and brought the group into a deeper level of mutual 
understanding. It had also been ‘a lot of fun’ (Turner & Turner 1982: 40). 
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Reading the Turners’ account of their students’ ritual examination of their own abject 
experiences as graduate students, we are struck by the attention to detail written into the 
performance script. The ‘actors’ perform minute and repetitive tasks, not particularly driven by 
an overarching plot. The play evokes several different spaces within the university system in 
order to unearth the residue of affective material embedded therein, and requires that particular 
actions be performed in relation to these spaces in order to dislodge this sedimented affect. The 
absence of plot of “goal” of the performance, taken with the student-performers’ attention to 
environmental detail, reveals the ritual to be more than a simple protest of their lowly position 
within the university hierarchy, or even of the bureaucratic regime that governs their lives as 
students, or the small humiliations that accompany the public performances of knowledge 
routine to academic life. Rather, the ritual might be read as an artistic experience designed to 
evoke and articulate the affective dimensions of everyday life for a graduate student—a level of 
experience that is often unremarked and unexplored within academic literature—and to make 
this affective dimension consciously available to the graduate students themselves. By 
designing one set of experience to better explore another, the students are experimenting with 
and expanding the methodologies typically available within the social sciences, and in the 
course of this exploration, are producing an alternative form of knowledge about their own 
affective experiences as graduate students, that might have otherwise remained unavailable to 
them as a group, and to the university as a whole. This assertion is borne out by the Turners’ 
account of the aftermath of the event, during which participants expressed that the performance 
had “discharged tensions and brought the group into a deeper level of mutual understanding” 
(Turner & Turner 1982: 40). Before long, the “discharged tensions” dislodged by the ritual 
appeared to find their way into the community at large, like “affective contagion”  (Stewart 2007). 
In the weeks following the ritual, a series of small fires spontaneously broke out in several of the 
university buildings prominently featured in the ritual performance, as sites of the students’ 
torture and humiliation (Turner and Turner 1982: 40). These mysterious burnings led to a critical 
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discussion, between (a very perplexed) university administration and the Turners, about their 
methods of teaching and about the effects of their use of such experimental techniques. One is 
not surprised that the kinds of knowledge made available by the ritual caused concern within the 
administration of such a venerable institution as the University of Chicago, a spiritual home of 
the American social sciences. After all, the notion that scholarship ought to be based upon 
(controlled) empirical observation and subsequent data analysis, whether quantitative or 
qualitative, dominates academic pedagogy and practice in the social sciences (Conquergood 
2002). The ideology that rules the social sciences tends to privilege “knowing that,” and 
“knowing about,” forms of knowledge that can be gleaned from a great and carefully guarded 
distance from the object (Conquergood 2002; Haraway 1991). This ideology operates within the 
policed boundaries of the (Judeo-Christian, and Western) hermeneutic tradition, in which all 
knowledge must be made from text, made into legible text, or be forgotten, ‘cleaned’ or 
eliminated.5 In a powerful discussion of the potentials of “radical research,” Dwight 
Conquergood (2002), presents an alternative to this textual knowledge: 
 
This propositional knowledge is shadowed by another way of knowing that is 
grounded in active, intimate, hands-on participation and personal connection: 
‘knowing how,’ and ‘knowing who.’ This is a view from ground level, in the thick of 
things. This is knowledge that is anchored in practice and circulated within a 
performance community, but is ephemeral. (146). 
 
Know-how/know-who are indicative of alternative ontologies, which exist in the shadows of the 
textual, and whose ephemerality keep them outside of the purview of the hermeneutic 
interpretative paradigms. 
What gets squeezed out by this epistemic violence is the whole realm of 
complex, finely nuanced meaning that is embodied, tacit, intoned, gestured, 
improvised, coexperienced, covert—and all the more deeply meaningful because 
of its refusal to be spelled out. Dominant epistemologies that link knowing with 
seeing are not attuned to meanings that are masked, camouflaged, indirect, 
embedded, or hidden in context. (Conquergood 2002: 146) 
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By contrast the students’ method of knowledge production—or maybe better to call it a method 
for the release of knowledge sedimented within the layers of everyday routines—addresses 
affective experience directly, by developing a hybrid methodology that combines 
autoethnography, social theory and performance art to create a parallel experience that acts as 
both the instrument for probing the unspoken, and the vessel for catching and eventually 
spreading this knowledge into a wider sphere of action, the outcome of which might be as 
dangerous and unpredictable as a series of small, mysterious fires. 
 
 
UNEARTHING (sedimented, and subjugated) EXPERIENCE 
 
As evidenced by the graduate students’ fiery ritual, affective experience, as energy expressed 
and embedded within the practice of everyday life, is not a simple sort of “data.” It does not lend 
itself easily to control and manipulation by the researcher, and can very easily exceed the 
parameters set by the research project itself. In fact it is this excessiveness that often alerts the 
researcher, and other participants in the experience, to its presence. Considering the students’ 
ritual, we can imagine affective experience as ‘sedimented,’ or ‘subjugated’ forms of knowledge, 
captured in between the layers of life-as-lived, until they may or may not be released. These 
concepts, of the sedimented and the subjugated, are key to recognizing the ways in which 
experience can be productive of “other” forms of knowledge. Notions of the sedimentation and 
subjugation of certain forms of knowledge emerge most strongly for me within the 
archaeological and archival practices of both Michel Foucault and Walter Benjamin. Both men’s 
special attention to forming a critique of the conventions by which knowledge (about ‘the past,’ 
within ‘the present’) is produced is instructive, and combined, these critiques can form a second 
methodological basis for addressing affective experience, alongside radical empiricism. The 
following discussion of some aspects of the writings of both men, along with related works within 
the social sciences, will help to clarify the forms of knowledge with which we will be most 
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concerned within this dissertation, and the archaeological and archival methods that may be 
applied to unearth them. 
 
A historian by training, Foucault takes up the prodigious task of questioning the evidentiary 
foundation of his own methodology: the archive. In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), 
Foucault re-defines archives away from an institutional storage facility for documents with which 
the historian may stitch together “the truth” about a particular time or place. He imagines the 
archive as discursive system, rather than a neutral collection of potential facts and artifacts. The 
question is no longer what was said or done at a given time, but rather what was possible to say 
or do at a given time. Foucault turns our attention to how the boundaries of possible statements 
shape discourse itself—shape even the very terms upon which the researcher launches his or 
her investigation. This approach is oriented towards the connections between power and the 
production of knowledge, in which the archive itself, and any work involving archives—creating 
them, searching them—are discourses of and on power. By investing the archive itself and all of 
the “documents” therein with their own histories, and demonstrating that they are always already 
embedded within complex discursive fields and power relations, Foucault allows us to see how 
knowledge (about ‘the past’) becomes sedimented, and how this very quality of sedimentation 
helps to determine what we are able to say, or do (in ‘the present’). The archaeology of 
knowledge, then, is an excavation of discourse, in a search for the rules organizing seemingly 
disparate and unconnected statements, which point us towards the places, usually unmarked 
and taken for granted, in which power congeals. As such, researchers working in a Foucauldian 
mode are often drawn to the documents margins, the marks and scratches, which reveal, the 
palimpsestic history of the document itself. As anthropologist Ann Laura Stoler (2009) observes 
of her own work within the Dutch colonial archives: 
 
… Dutch colonial archival documents serve less as stories for a colonial history 
than as active, generative substances with histories, as documents of their own. 
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What was written in prescribed form and in the archives margins, what was 
written oblique to official prescriptions and on the ragged edges of protocol 
produced the administrative apparatus as it opened to a space that extended 
beyond it. Contrapuntal intrusions emanated from outside the corridors of 
governance but they also erupted—and were centrally located—within that 
sequestered space. Against the sober formulaics of officialese, these archives 
register the febrile movements of persons off balance—of thoughts and feelings 
in and out of place. In tone and temper they convey the rough interior ridges of 
governance and disruptions to the deceptive clarity of its mandates (Stoler 2009: 
1-2). 
 
Stoler’s description of the archive as filled with documents that hold complex histories of their 
own, complicates the task of the researcher, moving her beyond making a mere determination 
of the bias within a document and its suitability as historical ‘evidence.’ Instead, the research 
must pay attention to “archival form:” 
 
By archival form I allude to several things: prose style, repetitive refrain, the arts 
of persuasion, affective strains that shape ‘rational’ response, categories of 
confidentiality and classification, and not least, genres of documentation. The 
book’s focus is on archiving-as-process rather than archives-as-things. Most 
importantly, it looks to archives as condensed sites of epistemological and 
political anxiety rather than as skewed and biased sources (Stoler 2009: 20, 
emphasis added) 
 
Stoler’s extension of Foucault’s method turns the researcher into one who is not seeking out 
‘facts’ but is instead listening for rhythms, and watching for pattern, repetition and rupture in the 
‘rational’ order of things. The researcher is no longer trying to develop an explanatory and 
‘complete’ historical narrative, but maintains instead an improvisational disposition towards the 
material, bringing about heightened awareness, both for the researcher, and his or her 
audience, of the complex and competing rhythms that make up every archival form.  
 
What if the concepts and methods suggested by Foucault’s archival archaeology, were turned 
towards the excavation of affective experience, in sites beyond the traditional archive? 6 Could 
the city itself be considered a kind of archive? The latter question is taken up by anthropologist 
Vyjayanthi Rao (2009), in her discussion of the Indian city as a rich site for anthropological 
study. Relying upon Georg Simmel’s notion of the “metropolis as medium,” or “totality of effects, 
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which transcend their immediate sphere,” Rao asks us to think of the city as “a form of media, 
which saturates the life of its residents” (374). Rao suggests that once the city is understood as 
media, we may perceive its ‘archival form:’ 
In the understanding of metropolis as medium, which engenders social 
exchanges, the archive becomes an emergent notion, a principle of ordering 
stimuli upon which future transactions are imagined and made present rather 
than given a notion of the past that has been deemed significant and marked for 
preservation. This sense of the city-as-archive is always in conflict, sometimes 
productively and sometimes corrosively, with the city-as-archive that emerges in 
acts of preservation and strategies to inscribe space with particular social and 
political understandings. (Rao 2009:374) 
 
In this formulation, the city becomes a base or principle of both history and memory, in which 
experiences are collected and recollected, according to principles may be particular to each city. 
The city-as-archive is a site for intervention by the researcher, but not simply as a textual 
palimpsest. Rao’s city-as-archive is not a container for historical text, to be read “along the 
grain” as Stoler’s colonial documents. Instead, Rao’s archive is oriented towards the city as a 
generator of perpetual stimuli and media effects, with the archive “providing a means of 
recording and including the fluidities of urban informality as vital information” (Rao 2009: 381, 
emphasis in original). As such, the city-as-archive is open to the constant disruptions of the 
present and the emergent, tracking the ever-shifting dynamics of everyday life in urban areas. 
This methodological shift in the conception of the archive brings us into an understanding of the 
past as a “history of the present” (Rao 2009: 381).  
 
Rao’s city-as-archive resonates strongly with the theories of Walter Benjamin, whose archival 
practice, honed in Berlin, Moscow and Paris during the 1920s and 30s, calls our attention away 
from the traditional textual archive, towards an expanded urban ‘mediascape,’ in which the city’s 
changing temporality can be tracked through the discarded traces of everyday life. Benjamin’s 
work on the Paris Arcades of the late nineteenth century, for example, took the form of a 
collected archive of discarded objects like toys and pamphlets as well as an indexed collection 
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of excerpts from books (Benjamin 2007). For Benjamin, the importance of these discarded 
objects was not simply that they provided evidence of some event or existence of the past, but 
that they acted to engage the interested researcher in an education of the senses: “to educate 
the image-making medium within us, raising it to a stereoscopic and dimensional seeing into the 
depth of historical shadows” (1999a: 458). Benjamin named his method for working with such 
objects “literary montage,” as a way of capturing the affinity that his method had with the then 
new practice of filmmaking. Besides suggesting an urban research methodology that could rival 
filmmaking, Benjamin’s memory-work also resonates with Foucault’s invocation of archaeology, 
except with an added emphasis on excavating experience: 
 
Language has unmistakably made plain that memory is not an instrument for 
exploring the past, but rather a medium. It is the medium of that which is 
experienced, just as the earth is the medium in which ancient cities lie buried. He 
who seeks to approach his own buried past must conduct himself like a man 
digging. Above all, he must not be afraid to return again and again to the same 
matter; to scatter it as one scatters earth, to turn it over as one turns over soil. 
For the “matter itself” is no more than the strata which yield their long-sought 
secrets only to the most meticulous investigation… It is undoubtedly useful to 
plan excavations meticulously. Yet no less indispensable is the cautious probing 
of the spade in the dark loam.(Benjamin 2005: 576) 
 
In this visceral analogy, Benjamin present us with an image of research as an archaeology of 
the self, casting the researcher as a main character in whatever (hi)story he is constructing. 
Inside the researcher, lie whole cities, waiting to be excavated, layer by sedimented layer. Even 
when the artifacts found or collected appear to be evidence of a bygone civilization, medium is 
always memory, activated in the form of what is found through the particularity of the search, 
and the singularity of searcher’s own experience:  
 
Epic and rhapsodic in the strictest sense, genuine memory must therefore yield 
an image of the person who remembers, in the same way a good archaeological 
report not only informs us about the strata from which its findings originate, but 
also gives an account of the strata which first had to be broken through. 
(Benjamin 2005: 576) 
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As earth is scattered, the landscape of knowledge is reshaped, and the digger must adjust to 
the shifting ground beneath her feet. In this vision, research is cast as an unstable and 
destabilizing activity, equivalent to probing a spade into dark loam. Comparing Benjamin’s 
archaeology to Foucault’s the former appears a messier kind of excavation. While Foucault’s 
method points us to the archive as a technique for producing knowledge with a history that must 
be unearthed, Benjamin asks us to recognize research as a digging through archives of the self, 
in which no item can be ignored, or discarded: a technique that brings us face to face with the 
ultimate unknowns: what we have hidden from ourselves. My own research practice emerges at 
the intersection of these two differing archaeologies. On the one hand, I take the archive not as 
a pre-existing, ahistorical space but as a powerful technique for ordering and explaining the 
urban world, which requires constant examination. On the other hand, archiving becomes a 
creative practice—productive of a particular researcher—even as it excavates, making and 
remaking the city of experience through the mundane activity of everyday life. 
 
 
THE ART OF MAKING (UP) ARCHIVES 
 
The artist is the one who is capable of making a sensation, which does not mean being 
sensational, like television acrobats, but rather, in the strong sense of the term, putting 
across the level of sensation—that is, touching the sensibility, moving people—analyses 
which would leave the reader or spectator indifferent if expressed in the cold rigor of 
concept and demonstration.  
You should be a sort of technical advisor to all subversive movements. 
--Pierre Bourdieu (sociologist) in conversation 
with Hans Haacke (artist)  
                     Bourdieu and Haacke 1995: 23-8 
 
In his well-known essay “On Intellectual Craftsmanship,” C.Wright Mills, suggests that the 
sociologist ought to keep a journal, or “file,” in which there is joined the personal experience and 
professional activities, studies underway and studies planned” (2000: 196).  The practice of 
keeping such a file would train the social researcher to use his or her experience as a guide, to 
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become alert to ways in which the meandering intensities of everyday life intersect with the 
intellectual work of systematic reflection. This file would be the very picture of intellectual 
craftsmanship: a living archive that follows the unique flows of one social researcher, inflecting 
his or her work with the indelible flavor of life experience. At the same time, this file, or personal 
archive, becomes the site of struggle for control over one’s own experience: 
 
To say that you can “have experience,” means, for one thing, that your past plays 
into and affects your present, and that it defines your capacity for future 
experience. As a social scientist, you have to control this rather elaborate 
interplay, to capture what you experience and sort it out; only in this way can you 
hope to use it as a guide and test your reflection, and in this process shape 
yourself as an intellectual craftsman. (Mills 2000: 196) 
 
For Mills, the consummate social scientist is the one who can capture and subordinate 
experience and its excesses. Such a researcher is like an efficient hunter: moving mimetically 
with the flow of experience, tracking it carefully, all the while creating a profile of experience 
itself that can be used to control it, and eventually to permanently freeze its unruly movements, 
skin it, and clean it, into knowledge fit for scientific consumption: 
 
By serving as a check on repetitious work, your file also enables you to conserve 
your energy. It also encourages you to capture ‘fringe-thoughts’: various ideas 
which may be by-products of everyday life, snatches of conversation overheard 
on the street, or, for that matter, dreams. Once noted, these may lead to more 
systematic thinking, as well as lend intellectual relevance to more directed 
experience. (2000:196) 
 
Here we see the file as the most important tool for hunting and capturing experience: more than 
a simple repository of odd facts and notions, this archive is able to train instinct, to create in the 
researcher a compulsion for recording and collecting. It comes to be the physical incarnation of 
a curious habit of mind. In this essay Mills asks the reader to consider the researcher’s mind as 
an open field and endless source of the wild game of experience. As such, this field must be 
carefully watched and tended. It must even learn to watch itself:  
 
You will have often noticed how carefully accomplished thinkers treat their own 
minds, how closely they observe their development and organize their 
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experience. The reason they treasure their smallest experiences is that, in the 
course of a lifetime, modern man has so little personal experience and yet 
experience is so important as a source of original intellectual work. To be able to 
trust and yet to be skeptical of your own experience, I have come to believe, is 
one mark of the mature workman. This ambiguous confidence is indispensable to 
originality in any intellectual pursuit, and the file is one way by which you can 
develop and justify such confidence. (2000: 197) 
 
And so the file, or archive—in the way it trains the hunting instinct of the researcher to capture 
experience in order, through the application of healthy doses of skepticism, to turn its parts into 
‘science,’ or a controlled sort of knowledge—operates as a complex technique of surveillance, 
more than just a tool for the organization of loose bits of information. Mills’ method of archive-
as-subject-surveillance contributes to the sort of writing, often a kind of phenomenological 
realism, which has come to be associated with legitimate knowledge production in the social 
sciences. What is presented as knowledge, through this social-scientific archival practice, is not 
the ‘animal of experience’ itself, alive and roaming, but its stilled shadow, and what is most 
interesting about the affective experience of the researcher’s hunt is often left out, forgotten in 
the archive.   
 
In his essay “Ilongot Hunting as Story and Experience” (1986), anthropologist Renato Rosaldo 
makes a critique of both ethnoscientific and ethnographic realism, arguing that neither mode of 
studying and interpreting experience “makes central the stories people tell themselves about 
themselves, and this crucial omission robs a certain human significance from anthropological 
accounts” (1986: 97-98). As an alternative to this omission, Rosaldo calls for researchers to pay 
closer attention to storytelling as a technique of engaging experience, presenting “novelistic 
realism,” as a way of gathering together the sensations collected in everyday life, which 
resonates more closely with the rich narrative traditions of the Ilongot hunters whose 
experiences he studies. The Ilongot use of storytelling as archival practice bears a striking 
contrast to the sociological filing techniques presented by Mills. If ‘hunting’ is a way of tracking 
experience, then we should note here that the Ilongot teach a very different style of hunting, 
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emphasizing improvisation and the ability to respond to unexpected encounters in the field. 
Where typical ethnoscientific or ethno-realist accounts of Ilongot hunting might privilege 
taxonomic, or monographic details, presenting the hunt as an everyday practical of economic 
subsistence, Ronaldo argues instead that “the significance Ilongot men seek in hunting derives 
more from cultural notions about what makes a story (and lived experience) compelling” (1986: 
98). In this respect Ilongot storytelling can be thought of as a creative archival practice, in which 
the stories the hunters tell about themselves (as opposed to Mills’ files) are collections of details 
that are neither taxonomic, nor monographically coherent, but that aim, first and foremost, to be 
evocative in their arrangement. In this way of making and using archives, the details of 
(affective) experience are not necessarily subordinate to narrative alignment, or overarching 
explanations: 
Although they find certain tales to be better told than others, Ilongots claim that 
listing the place-names where somebody walked is just as much a story (and 
indeed cannot be omitted from any true story) as a more fully elaborated 
narrative. Perhaps, this indigenous viewpoint can be placed in sharper relief by 
juxtaposing minimal Ilongot narratives and history's conventional threefold 
division into the annals, the chronicle, and history proper. Ordered only by 
chronological sequence rather than by narrative logic, Ilongot hunting stories 
resemble the supposedly lowest order of historical texts; that is, they 
resemble annals, not chronicles, and certainly not history proper. Yet precisely 
where historical studies see differences of kind, Ilongots perceive only 
differences of degree. Indeed, I shall argue that this ethnographic evidence 
suggests that history's threefold division, particularly insofar as it is 
hierarchical and evolutionary, derives more from parochial modern canons 
of narrative excellence than from the realities of other times and places. In 
this respect, we can lump together the errors of presentism and ethnocentrism 
(Rosaldo 1986: 106-7, emphasis added). 
This dissertation examines the relationship between creative archival practices and the ability to 
shape the stories that we tell ourselves about ourselves, especially as these creative archival 
practices turn into urban interventions, which might generate alternative forms of knowing and 
shaping the city. In my search for such experimental practices, I look beyond the social sciences 
to the world of conceptual art, and sometimes architecture. As I try to understand the ways that 
our perception and understanding of urban experience, as social scientists might be enhanced 
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by extending our theoretical and methodological frameworks, I find myself in a similar position 
as Raymond Williams (1965/2011), at the start of his great study of the role of ‘the creative 
mind’ in Britain’s sociocultural transformation during the last century:  
We ‘see’ in certain ways—that is, we interpret sensory information according to 
certain rules—as a way of living. But these ways—these rules and 
interpretations—are, as a whole, neither fixed, nor constant. We can learn new 
rules and new interpretations, as a result of which we shall literally see in new 
ways… In each individual, the learning of these rules, through inheritance and 
culture, is a kind of creation, in that the distinctively human world, the ordinary 
‘reality’ that his culture defines, forms only the rules that are learned… [B]ut the 
individuals who bear these particular cultural rules are capable of altering and 
extending them,  bringing in new or modified rules by which an extended or 
different reality can be experienced. Thus, new areas of reality can be ‘revealed’ 
or ‘created,’ and these need not be limited to any one individual, but can, in 
certain interesting ways, be communicated, thus adding to the set of rules carried 
by the particular culture. (36-37) 
For Williams, creativity specifically refers to the individual or group ability to simultaneously 
perceive ‘reality’ and the rules and interpretations of which it is made, along with the skill to alter 
and extend reality—to create alternative realities—through tinkering with rules and 
interpretations, and the inclination to communicate the results of this tinkering to a variety of 
audiences. Williams’ interest in tampering with ‘reality’ informed his interest in art practice as a 
“means of transmitting our experience in so powerful a way that the experience can literally be 
lived by others” (1965/2011: 44). As he goes on to suggest, “[art] is more than a metaphor; it is 
a physical experience as real as any other” (1965/2011: 44). Williams’ observations about art, 
echoes the Ilongot use of storytelling, not simply as a way to convey ‘practical’ information about 
the hunt, but rather as a spatial-archival technique which evokes in the listener a corresponding 
experience of the hunt itself.  
My own project is concerned with archival practices and psychogeographical urban 
interventions that make available for sensation and perception, the “rules and interpretations” 
that govern our sense of what constitutes our contemporary urban realities, at the same time as 
they subvert, or reinvent them. 
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DISSERTATION CHAPTER ABSTRACTS  
Chapter 1—Introduction 
Sets out the theoretical questions guiding this dissertation. Gives brief preview of each of the 
coming chapters. 
 
Chapter 2—Delai Sam: Social Activism as Contemporary Art in the Emerging Discourse of 
(DIY) Urbanism in Russia. 
This chapter addresses Research Question 1: 
Might the emergent field of contemporary art and conceptual architecture known as "urban 




Delai Sam, or “Do It Yourself,” is a deeply rooted phenomenon in Russian life. However, as a 
form of contemporary art, this phenomenon has taken on an activist tenor in post-socialist urban 
Russia. Founded in 2010, the Delai Sam Festival of Urban Actions represents a politicized 
approach to DIY urbanism in today’s Russia, in which artists, designers, activists and scholars 
are joining together to develop alternatives to official visions for the design and planning of their 
cities. This article critically examines the discourse of the first few Delai Sam festivals in 
Moscow and Saint Petersburg, and related urban interventions, to understand how these 
actions are both situated within their local context, and linked discursively to global trends in art 
and urban activism. DIY actions like Delai Sam open windows into the convergence of art and 
social activism, the aesthetic and the political, currently taking shape within the global city. 
 
Chapter 3—Unraveling the City: A Psychogeographical Experiment at the edge of Moscow 
This chapter addresses Research Question 2: 
Could a study of urban intervention(ism) contribute to a deeper understanding of the nature of 
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urban experience?  
 
This chapter addresses the artistic experiments of Moscow-based artists the Collective Actions 
group (CA), who gathered participants to make excursions out of the city in order to take 
meditative walks and perform mysterious tasks. These Trips out of Town (Poezdki za Gorod), 
sometimes translated as Journeys out of the City, or Trips to the Countryside, can be understood 
as designed responses to the claustrophobic spaces of Soviet Moscow. What alternative forms of 
spatial knowledge are produced through this modest action? How could engaging in meditative 
walks open possibilities for other ways of relating even within highly regulated Soviet social 
space? These questions are addressed by contextualizing the work of CA within a broader space 
of contemporaneous Soviet-era experimentation in the fields of environmental psychology.  
 
Chapter 4—“Enstranging” the City: The Art of Being Foreign in Moscow 
This chapter addresses Research Question 3: 
Could engagement with urban interventionism precipitate the development of alternative styles 
of knowledge production, which transcend entrenched disciplinary boundaries? If so, in what 
ways? 
 
Between 2011 and 2013, artist Yevgeniy Fiks collected over 200 official images of African and 
African Americans created in Soviet Russia, between 1920 and 1980. Drawn from propaganda 
posters, paintings and films, the images represented a vision of friendship and brotherhood 
between the Soviet nation and people of color from around the world. The collection is named 
for Wayland Rudd, a little known African American actor who traveled from New York to 
Moscow in 1932, along with other prominent communist members of the Harlem Renaissance, 
to lend his artistic services to the building of the fledgling nation. Unlike his more famous 
companions, such as Paul Robeson and Langston Hughes, Rudd found an affinity with his new 
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city and stayed in Moscow until his death in 1952. While compiling the archive of rare images, 
artist Yevegeniy Fiks began conversations with artists, writers, documentarians and historians, 
asking them to respond to the collection. The full Wayland Rudd collection, along with the newly 
created responsive artworks is currently traveling, from Moscow to New York and on to Harare 
and London. This chapter draws upon theory of self and personhood in psychology and 
anthropology, along with Russian and Soviet art theory, and the author’s own experiences and 
experiments as a black artist living in Moscow, to better understand experiences of “not quite 
filling in,” both in the city and in the academy. 
Notes 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 To take a closer listen to Guattari, it may be helpful to pay special attention to some of the key terms he 
‘deploys’ in the above quote. Terms such as ‘conditions of possibility’, ‘emergence,’ ‘ multiplicity’ and 
‘socius,’ are particular to the  work of those interested in re-thinking subjectivity beyond the subject, and 
re-thinking affect beyond the individual. The use of these terms, as opposed to others makes a difference. 
Take the example of “socius.” Sociologist Bruno Latour (2005) points out that the meaning of the term 
“social” has shrunk from its origins in the Latin “socius,” which indicated a simple and broad notion of 
association (as between companions, for example), to now refer to “what is left after politics, biology, 
economics, law psychology, managements, technology, etc. have taken their own part of the 
associations” between persons, places and things proper to life. In his own usage of the word social, 
Latour seeks to revive the notion of socius, or associations between “heterogeneous elements,” not 
simply limited to the relations between humans. This slight change in emphasis has huge methodological 
implications, as far as Latour is concerned: “it is [now] possible to remain faithful to the original intentions 
of the social sciences by redefining sociology not as the science of the social, but as the tracing of 
associations.” In so doing, sociologists may be able to notice and draw “a type of connection” between 
things that are not necessarily social to begin with (2005:5-6).  
 
2 In his short genealogy of the terms “empirical and the related empiricism,” cultural critic Raymond 
Williams (1985) highlights the (forgotten) relationship between experience and experiment, that is at the 
root of scientific practice: “Experience, in one main sense, was until [the late 18th century] interchangeable 
with experiment (cf. modern French) from the common rw experiri, L – to try, to put to the test. 
Experience, from the present participle, became not only a conscious test or trial but a consciousness of 
what has been tested or tried, and thence a consciousness of an effect or state. From [the 16th century] it 
took on a more general meaning, with more deliberate inclusion of the past (the tried and tested), to 
indicate knowledge derived from real events as from particular observation. Experiment, a noun of action, 
maintained the simple sense of a test or trial” (Williams 1985: 116, emphasis in original). 
 
3 According to Denzin (2003), performance ethnography is a method for creating “an emancipatory 
discourse [connecting] critical pedagogy with new ways of writing and performing culture” (p. 2). This 
methodology draws upon Mills’ critical sociological imagination, and Mead’s model of “the act,” taking the 
ethnographer from and understanding of performance “as imitation, or dramaturgical staging, to an 
emphasis on performance as liminality and construction [citing Turner 1986], then to a view of 
performance as struggle, as intervention, as breaking and remaking, as kinesis, as a sociopolitical act 
[citing Conquergood 1998]” (Denzin 2003: 2). Applications of performance ethnographic method often 
give attention to variations and nuance in participants’ embodied experience, and use participatory 
experiments in poetry, drama and art as practical methodologies for activating embodied experience as 
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an alternative, even subjugated, form of cultural knowledge (Adams & Holman Jones 2008; Denzin 2003; 
Jones 2002). 
 
4 Autoethnography is a method for producing knowledge about cultural experience that takes as primary 
data the researcher’s own experience of the world, combining autobiography with ethnography. As such, 
autoethnography can be thought of as both a process of producing knowledge about the cultural world, 
and its product (Ellis et al. 2011). According to Adams & Holman Jones (2008), “autoethnography, 
whether a practice, a writing form or a particular perspective on knowledge and scholarship, hinges on 
the push and pull between and among analysis and evocation, personal experience and larger social, 
cultural and political concerns” (p. 374). Taking seriously postmodern critiques of the epistemological and 
ontological limitation of the social sciences, autoethnography, like performance ethnography, emerges as 
a “positive response” that would “produce meaningful, accessible, and evocative research grounded in 
personal experience, research that would sensitize readers to issues of identity politics, to experiences 
shrouded in silence, and to forms of representation that deepen our capacity to empathize with people 
who are different from us” (Ellis et al 2011: 2). 
 
5 For a genealogy of this tradition as it pertains to the division and relationship between the human and 
physical sciences, see Gadamer 2004. For a rich discussion of the application of hermeneutics to the 
analysis of human cultures, see Geertz 1973, and for a critique of the hermeneutical paradigm in the 
social sciences, which itself succumbs to the tyranny of textuality, see Derrida 1974 & 1978. 
 
6 For example, film and photography have long been considered archival practices. Urbanist Lewis 
Mumford, in his essay “Death of the Monument” (1937), pointed out the ways that film is like the city 
itself—a jumble of disparate things and sensations—making film and photography forms of mimetic 
preservation, which might connect us to other times and places. Both media are particularly useful for 
thinking about urban experience, especially in an affective register. According to historian Giuliana Bruno 
(2007): “Cinema is a materialization of our psychic life. It makes visibly tangible all psychic phenomena, 
including the work of memory and the imagination, the capacity for attention, the design of depth and 
movement, and the mapping of affects. …Film repeatedly shows that pictures—moving pictures—are the 
current documents of our histories. Indeed, filmic memories–fragile yet enduring–are fragments 


















   






SOCIAL ACTIVISM AS CONTEMPORARY ART IN  
THE EMERGING DISCOURSE OF DIY URBANISM IN RUSSIA  
 
 
The urban interventions considered in this chapter represent points of view that involve them in 
a global discourse about the possibilities of art and design as both social research and social 
activism. The move to question the institutionalization of art and to push art off the museum 
gallery walls and into the streets has been alive since at least the 1960s in cities in Western 
Europe and the Americas, with the rise of Conceptual, Feminist and Sociological Art and 
Situationism, and has seen a resurgence of interest since the mid 1990s, especially through the 
Relational and Street Art movements. Art that eschews gallery walls for more investigative, 
interactive and participatory interventions, which often have an activist bent, is commonly 
described in recent art criticism as “socially engaged art” or “social art.” (Bishop 2012; Bourriaud 
1998; Helguera 2012; Thompson 2012; Reckitt forthcoming; Pinder 2005). The participatory 
approach of socially engaged art is often transdiciplinary, drawing together disparate methods 
and forms of knowing. As artist and educator Pablo Helguera (2012) points out, “socially 
engaged art can’t be produced in a knowledge vaccum:” 
 
Artists who wish to work with communities, for whatever reason, can greatly 
benefit from the knowledge accumulated by various disciplines—such as 
sociology, education, linguistics and ethnography—to make informed decisions 
about how to engage and construct meaningful exchanges and experiences. The 
objective is not to turn into amateur ethnographers, sociologists, or educators but 
to understand the complexities of the fields that have come before us, learn 
some of their tools, and employ them in the fertile territory of art. (Helguera 2012: 
xii-xiv) 
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Active engagement with worlds beyond the traditional boundaries of the artist’s studio leads 
socially engaged art into political terrains, in which the stakes for particular actions rise to the 
possibility of effecting direct social change. Critic Nato Thompson asserts that socially engaged 
art has moved so far afield from traditional art historical discourse, as to no longer be 
categorized as a distinct artistic movement but “rather, these cultural practices indicate a new 
social order—ways of life that emphasize participation, challenge power, and span disciplines 
ranging from urban planning and community work to theater and the visual arts” (2012: 19). 
Aimed at presenting challenges to increasingly privatized and regulated urban public space 
worldwide, the works created by urban activists and socially engaged artists often take the form 
of “insurgent” or “guerilla” actions. (Hou 2010). A large part of this work is concerned with 
creating “self-made urban spaces,” which provide “new expressions of the collective realms in 
the contemporary city” (Hou 2012: 2).  
 
In Russian approaches to DIY urbanism, we can observe this ongoing convergence between 
activism and art. They appear to be following a natural path taken by artists oriented by a desire 
to be useful, to be practical and to explicitly address social and political realities through 
providing design solutions (Bruguera 2011). This is an emergent global discourse, and projects 
like the Delai Sam Urban Festivals are part of growing streams of art becoming activism and 
activism becoming art. However, this mutual becoming draws “activist art” into the powerful 
cultural economy of the global city, raising complex and perplexing questions about the 
autonomy of these “insurgent” actions.  
 
In this chapter notions of art as being about individual expressions of beauty are not addressed. 
Neither will we evaluate the aesthetic merits of the actions described and discussed. Nor will we 
measure the “effectiveness” of these efforts in terms of amounts of viewership or changes in 
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urban policy. Finally, the essay does not purport to give a comprehensive survey of DIY actions 
in Russian cities. Rather, drawing from several closely observed examples, the art of urban 
intervention is considered as a way of making visible and available to public discourse, a variety 
of complex relationships between spatial aesthetic regimes, and sociopolitical norms. The 
argument is that in performing the tricky, and at times antagonistic, operation of revealing latent 
connections between disarticulated problems designed into everyday urban life, contemporary 
art practice intersects with urban activism and thereby intervenes in mainstream urban planning 
and design discourse. This article situates these interventions within their local political and 
aesthetic context, demonstrating the complex ways in which DIY urbanism, as alternative forms 
of knowing the city that encompass art and activist practices, might challenge and expand 
institutionalized methods of producing knowledge about the urban. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY & SCOPE 
This chapter, and much of the arguments in this dissertation, is based upon fieldwork conducted 
in Moscow and Saint Petersburg between October 2011 and July 2012, with additional follow-up 
correspondence and archival research during September and October 2012. In Moscow and 
Saint Petersburg I was invited to collaborate with artists, architects, sociologists, and activists 
recently committed to “Do-it-yourself” (DIY) methods for reclaiming urban development at the 
grassroots level. As an artist, I participated in the Delai Sam Festival for Urban Actions in Saint 
Petersburg by contributing an urban intervention and a workshop. As a social scientist and 
urbanist, I collaborated with and observed three arts and research groups involved in the 
organization and sponsorship of the Delai Sam Festivals in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. My 
engagement with these groups afforded sustained, in-depth conversations with artists, 
architects and social researchers about the motivations and processes underpinning the 
festivals. To gain a better sense of the political context informing the intersection of art and 
activism in DIY urban actions, in addition to the Delai Sam Festivals, I participated in the 
   
   
35 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
planning and implementation of several art-activist actions in Moscow during the winter of 2011-
2012. Additionally, I attended public programs offered by the Moscow Biennale, public protests 
during the winter of 2011-2012, exhibitions and symposia at key galleries central to arts and 
activist efforts during that period in Moscow and meetings of art-activist groups. I also organized 
a public workshop series on community engagement in urban initiatives.  
 
To better understand the public discourse on planning initiatives, I attended neighborhood 
hearings about the local consequences of the municipality’s Moscow 2020 Plan. I also observed 
public presentations of Moscow government officials and planning experts, including the 
Moscow Urban Forum,[1] and was able to engage in discussions with experts involved in the 
debates around preservation and planning in Moscow, including planners and architects 
consulting with the municipal planning department. Finally, I conducted a series of one-on-one 
neighborhood walks with members of the architecture and preservation community, and life long 
residents of Moscow. The purpose of these walks was to have participants guide me through 
the history of their neighborhoods, combining their own memories with knowledge about the 
(often undocumented) effects of major architectural and planning projects on the everyday lived 
experience of Moscow residents.  
Archival research was conducted using the web and print resources of various art activist 
groups, MAPS, the Moscow Urban Forum and the Moscow Biennale. Additional materials were 
gathered through personal correspondence with members of relevant organizations. 
 
THE POLITICS OF URBAN AESTHETICS IN POST-SOCIALIST RUSSIA 
At first glance, urban development in Moscow and Saint Petersburg are on par with what can be 
experienced in most “world cities.” Global trends point to the increasing financialization of urban 
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real estate (Aalbers 2008; Peck et al. 2009; Smart & Lee 2003) and city centers are restructured 
through the indiscriminate deployment of “iconic architecture” and other mega projects in the 
competitive quest for “world city” status (Charney 2007; Ren 2008; Sklair 2010). However, post-
socialist cities have seen especially drastic transformations since the 1990s. Economic 
restructuring in the wake of the Soviet collapse, including the liberalization of trade, increasingly 
fluid movements of capital, the arrival of multinational corporations and the elimination of many 
centralized industries have led to irreversible changes in these cities’ economic foundations and 
labor markets. This restructuring extends to the social level, resulting in increased inequality and 
social differentiation, evident in rising rates of urban poverty in post-socialist cities.[2] And of 
course, all of these institutional, political, economic and social transformations are visible within 
the continuous re-design and reconstruction of the built environment (Tsenkova and Nedovic-
Budic 2006).  
 
In Moscow, vast and complex schemes for the privatization of personal and public lands, along 
with open-armed (or sometimes coerced) embrace of neoliberal policies have led to a culture of 
back-room negotiation between financial and political interests, in which public plans are slowly 
gutted and urban districts restructured without the democratic input of city dwellers (Golubchikov 
and Badyina 2006). The center of Moscow in particular has borne the brunt of gentrification 
efforts: while accounting for only 6.4% of the city’s area, and housing 8% of the population, it 
has received 40% of real estate investment capital (Kolossov and O’Loughlin 2004). The human 
costs of these disproportionate investments have yet to be adequately measured, however 
Golubchikov and Badyina (2005: 125) note that between 1992 and 2004 one gentrifying central 
Moscow neighborhood saw the displacement of 2847 people, or 1518 families, out of an original 
3725 residents, all without significant public input into the process. While Moscow’s general plan 
of 2009 was the first in the city’s history to incorporate mandatory public hearings in order to 
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gather input from local residents into the planning process, the effectiveness of “the public” in 
having its voice reflected in the general plan was questionable at best (Chubara 2012). 
However, one tangible result of the new process is to generate increased media coverage for 
municipality-led urban developments. Such coverage tends to galvanize public protest 
movements, and even before the mass political protests of 2011-2012, successful 
demonstrations against proposed city plans to demolish modernist buildings in central Moscow 
and replace them with “iconic” designs by world-famous architects had already entered the 
urban consciousness (Chubara 2012).  
 
In this newly politicized sphere of Russian urban development, debates about urban design and 
planning take on a particular charge. An example of this charged atmosphere can be observed 
in the grassroots movement organized in protest of the Gazprom corporation’s 2006 proposal 
for a new skyscraper in Saint Petersburg’s historic center (Dixon 2010). As neoliberal incursions 
into the urban landscape increasingly take aesthetic forms, grassroots movements against 
structures like the Gazprom skyscraper reveal residents’ struggles to sustain local rights to the 
globalizing city (Dixon 2010). In his analysis of the controversy surrounding this proposal, 
anthropologist Alexei Yurchak notes that debates about urban design in Russia extend “far 
beyond questions of urban beauty and architectural style to a deeper confrontation over 
power—over who has the power to define and dictate what this city is, how it looks, for whom it 
exists, and who can benefit from living in it—in short, who owns the city” (2011: 3, emphasis in 
original). In an adaptation of the theory of Jacques Ranciere (2004), Yurchak takes the debates 
over the city’s changing skyline as evidence that what is “at issue is not an aesthetic image per 
se, but the right to determine it and interfere in it or, aesthetic politics” (2011: 6). These debates 
then, allow “aesthetics [to] function as a proxy for politics,” where grassroots movements tend to 
gather around shared places, rather than shared ideas (Yurchak 2011: 4). In Russia’s over-
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determined political climate, in which there has been centralized one-party rule firmly 
entrenched for over a decade, until very recently organized political movements were often met 
with skepticism, while the battles to participate in designing the aesthetic futures of the city 
become a fertile and unifying ground for heartfelt exchange between disparate oppositional 
groups (Yurchak 2011).  
 
This volatile convergence of aesthetics and politics is especially visible in today’s Russian cities, 
where recent performances by activist art groups like Pussy Riot have presented direct 
challenges to the political status quo, through short-lived (and severely punished) interventions 
at iconic centers of urban power. The fall 2011 performance of ‘Punk Prayer,’ an original protest 
song, in one of Moscow’s largest and newest churches, the Church of Christ the Savior, led to a 
very public trial followed by a sentence of years of incarceration for at least two of the group’s 
members. Having been destroyed in Stalin’s campaign against religion, and rebuilt in 2000, the 
Church of Christ the Savior is unparalleled as an expression of the absolute “break with the 
principles of modernist/socialist urban aesthetics,” and simultaneous “architectural nostalgia” for 
a decadent imperial past that dominates the urban aesthetic of post-socialist Moscow (Boym 
2001; Hirt 2013). The Pussy Riot performance and ensuing criminal case made audible and 
visible in mainstream public discourse the connection between the church and the sitting 
regime, and at the same time presented a sparse DIY punk aesthetic that challenged the 
aesthetic of imperial nostalgia represented by this particular church.  
 
Any consideration of DIY urbanism in Russia, therefore, must take into account the political 
valence of arguments about, and interventions into, the city’s aesthetics. DIY movements in 
Russian cities operate in an atmosphere of aggressive neoliberal economic restructuring, in 
which the redesign of the city is pushed by mega projects. These mega projects can act as 
   
   
39 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
catalysts for wholesale spatial reconstructions of the city, which usurp urban planning directives 
through opaque partnerships between government and business that undermine public 
participation through official channels. Recent moves to officially include the public in urban 
planning processes by increasing transparency about proposed designs, while invisible in the 
final plans, have created a space for grassroots movements to form and respond with 
alternative city plans. It is into this aestheticized political space that I place the following analysis 
of the rise of DIY urbanism in Russian cities, and its global resonances. 
 
CREATING DIY ROUTES 
Much walking in Moscow takes place in the underground marble and cement passageways 
(perekhod), connecting metro stations, or spanning the length of the 12-, 16-, or 18-lane 
boulevards that circle the city. Walking these halls can be a long, grim affair: nothing but beige 
walls for hundreds of meters, with the odd graffiti here and there, and the only exit out of sight 
for much of the walk. At night they can be a source of fear, as the solitary pedestrian hurries 
along, imagining her assailants lurking in occasional recessions in the long corridor. It is clear 
these passages were designed for expedience, not experience. In February and March 2013, a 
group of young artists appropriated the recessions in passageways surrounding the 
Dobrinskaya and Proletarskaya metro stations and turned them to use for a less utilitarian, and 
marginally less criminal, purpose.  
   




[Figure 1: Making the Passageway Gallery, Metro Proletarskaya, Moscow. Photos 
courtesy Vystavka v perekhode] 
 
Vystavka v perekhode, or “The Passage Gallery Project,” turned the passageways into 
temporary art galleries, exhibiting photographs submitted by local citizens. According to the 
artists’ statement: 
 
Underground crosswalks are for people: We want to make these public spaces 
more interactive and comfortable. This is an experiment as a temporary gallery 
inviting anyone to submit photographs they would like to share with people in the 
city… [W]e want to discuss with a larger audience, the perekhods as an 
overlooked space in Moscow. Question: What do you think of perekhods as 
galleries? What would make the perekhods nicer and more comfortable for you? 
(Vystavka v perekhode, personal communication, April 26, 2013) 
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For the artists, Moscow’s passageways, those most humble of urban affordances, deserve a 
closer look. As an unavoidable feature of everyday life in the city, the grim experience of using 
these passageways are overlooked by official planners and designers, even while they are 
endured by Muscovites as yet another inconvenience programmed into a city notorious for its 
indifference to pedestrians. Appropriating such ‘non-spaces’ for ‘galleries,’ the blank walls are 
plastered with citizens’ photocopied photographs that blend in with the sparse graffiti, while 
acting as crude ‘windows’ out of this everyday trudge, or curious reflections of life aboveground 
caught in the corner of a passing eye. At the same time, this humorous “experiment” brings to 
the surface an affective experience common to almost all Muscovites, and yet rarely articulated 
within public discourse about the city’s aesthetic. This simple intervention contains the ethos of 
much Delai Sam (Do-It-Yourself or DIY) urbanism in Moscow and Saint Petersburg today: There 
is the sense of highlighting the mundane experiences of everyday life, by calling into relief the 
features of the urban landscape that normally blend into the background, often far away from 
the attention given to the skylines and iconic architecture of the global city. In the artists’ 
approach, there is a refusal of what art historian Ekaterina Degot has called the “strange mix of 
overt aesthetics and repressed politics [that] is the defining characteristic of the Moscow art 
scene today” (Degot 2010: 107). Instead, these artists fashion themselves more along the lines 
of what Degot (2010: 110) dubs “‘artist workers,’ who actively seek audiences outside of the art 
world,” using a stripped down ‘punk’ aesthetic, (Darms 2014; Hebidge 1987; Hemphill & 
Leskowitz 2012; O’Hara 2001) in contrast with the opulence that characterizes new 
development. In this self-fashioning we can also see the appropriation or mimicry of “powerful 
knowledge”—officially-produced urbanist discourse, normally deployed within institutionally-
sanctioned social sciences, urban planning and architecture—deployed as a critique of the city’s 
more official design and knowledge-production practices.  Within these parameters, the 
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“Passage Gallery Project” can be read as an artistic, and even activist, intervention into 
institutionalized discourse on planning in Moscow.  
 
 
[Figure 2: Image from the Passageway Gallery, Metro Proletarskaya, Moscow. Photos 
courtesy Vystavka v perekhode] 
 
If we think of urbanism as a multi-sited and transdisciplinary form of producing “powerful” and 
“empirical” knowledge about the city (Kirby 2013), then we can imagine DIY urbanism as forms 
of creative thought and action developed in parallel to official, expert and institutionalized 
knowledge about the city, sometimes for the purposes of intervening into, disrupting, mirroring, 
mocking or otherwise transforming these official discourses. DIY practices may be found in 
many aspects of the everyday lives of many urban citizens in Russia. However, I address only 
those urban-interventionist practices at the intersection of art and activism that specifically aim 
to comment upon, revise, or create alternatives to the institutionalized knowledge about the city, 
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promoted by governmental, corporate or even established non-state organizations. These less 
institutionalized creative practices (often) take the form of public interventions into the practice 
of everyday life in the city, which render “sense-able” previously under-examined aspects of 
urban landscapes and politics (Pinder 2008; Holmes 2007; Aristarkhova 2007).  
 
 
A MOSCOW MANIFESTO 
 
Delai Sam, Russian for “Do it yourself,” as a form of contemporary art, and urban 
interventionism, is a relatively recent phenomenon in post-Soviet Russia, and from its outset 
appears to be deeply engaged with global trends in nongovernmental urban development. 
Spurred on by The Global Day of Action of October 10, 2010, several Moscow-based architects, 
artists and environmental activists developed “Moscow 2020,” a manifesto presenting an 
alternative to the municipal government’s recently released plan for the City of Moscow. The 
Moscow 2020 manifesto opens with the following statement: 
 
Moscow: not the most comfortable city for living. Last year the Moscow 
[municipal] authorities presented a master plan for the city, which ignores a lot of 
its current problems. We want to live in a green city with convenient public 
transport, bicycle lanes, beautiful old and new buildings, tolerant mayor, 
authorities and residents. We must begin to build for ourselves a city in which we 
want to live. 
 
The plan itself was first presented at a roundtable event held at the Strelka Institute for Media, 
Architecture and Design, a newly incorporated nongovernmental think tank providing 
consultation on urban development projects in Moscow. The plan includes twenty suggestions 
for the reorganization of the city’s transport systems, twelve standards and directions for 
architecture and urban design, and several cycling-oriented project ideas. The plan generally 
calls for a reorientation towards “people-centered” public transportation, with the aim of 
addressing Moscow’s notorious traffic congestion by focusing on making movement easier for 
pedestrians and cyclists. The directions for architecture and urban design call for 
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“decentralization” of the city, moving business activities from the historic center into the 
periphery, and the “preservation and development” of cultural centers and tourism-oriented 
activities. The architectural provisions focus heavily on the conservation and restoration of the 
city’s “pre-Soviet and Soviet” heritage, addressing the lack of concern for architectural history 
evident in the municipality’s own plan.[3] Among the most pressing calls the manifesto makes 
are those that specifically demand “integrated design that covers all urban and social issues,” 
and “public discussion of [new buildings] projected on the city.” These last calls articulate 
frustration with the lack of effective municipal mechanisms through which city residents can 
actively and effectively propose and participate in the design and implementation of public 
works. In fact, it is this severe lack of participatory opportunities among the general population 
that makes issues of urban planning and design in Russia particularly fraught. Participatory 
planning trends have barely taken hold among Russia’s urban decision-makers, thus leaving 
wide open a highly charged field of intervention for designers, artists and activists. In fact, the 
Moscow 2020 manifesto goes on to enlist the participation of any sympathetic architects, 
designers, environmentalists and artists, who wish to join the effort to present an alternative 
vision for the city’s development. 
   




[Figure 3: Participants in DIY action in the Voikovskaya district of Moscow creating a 
giant chessboard out of a discarded road barrier; led by Strasbourg-based urban 
hacktivist Florian Riviere, in collaboration with Partizaning, July 2012. Photo credit: Maria 
Semenenko] 
 
As a manifestation of DIY urbanism, Delai Sam and related activities in Moscow and Saint 
Petersburg, can be situated firmly within the “creative” or “cultural” fields of architecture, design, 
art, media and to a lesser extent, social science. With the exception of an environmental activist 
group, sponsors for the first Delai Sam in autumn 2010 were almost all cultural institutions, 
including the Goethe Institut, Strelka Institute for Media, Architecture and Design and cultural 
issues websites The Village and Openspace.ru. According the event website, Delai Sam actions 
“consisted of activities like garbage collection, bike rallies, urban art interventions, and 
architectural presentations all over Moscow.” While these activities were sometimes oriented 
towards practical interventions at the street level, they focused heavily on issues of urban 
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design and planning, including rethinking systems for performing road maintenance and 
creating pedestrian crossings and bike paths. Additionally, the Delai Sam interventions had a 
notably aesthetic orientation, relying heavily upon the participation of street artists who created 
monuments to Soviet history made from the remains of refuse they had collected and painted 
benches shaped like crocodiles and colorful bird houses. 
 
For Moscow-based Partizaning, an organization formed out of collaborations between artists, art 
historians and activists, and central to the creation of the Moscow 2020 manifesto and the Delai 
Sam festival, the distinction between art and non-art or activism is irrelevant. According to a 
statement on the group’s website: 
 
Today's activist urban residents do not think of art [as] a distinct system. They 
use the language of art as a tool to challenge and change their daily reality: from 
DIY urban repair to struggling for new forms of state representation. 
Unsanctioned interventions and interactions in our urban environments, 
combined with mass media connectivity, have become effective transformative 
tactics for a new, alternative vision for the future.  
 
Partizaning is not just the name of our website. It is also a term to define a new 
phenomenon and strategy at the intersection of street art and social activism. We 
devised this term in Russia, where we demonstrate in a revolutionary tradition 
how self-motivated, unauthorized statements and unsolicited action can become 
key drivers of social and cultural change. 
Our goal is to reflect and promote the idea of art-based DIY activism aimed at 
rethinking, restructuring and improving urban environments and communities. 
Partizaning aims to introduce a brand of urban activism that converges with street art, such that 
their interventions into the city’s landscape must be read simultaneously both as art and non-art, 
which has the aim of transforming the city at the aesthetic, political and social levels. The 
group’s projects often reflect these simultaneous ambitions. For example, a map produced by 
Anton “Make” Polsky, a founding member of Partizaning, sets out to mark all the informal 
bicycle paths in Moscow. As part of the participatory mapping process, urban cyclists may 
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download a printable map of the city from Make’s website, mark the map with their own routes, 
and then return the marked maps to selected galleries across the city, from which the artist 
collects and collates them. The project is called USE/LESS and the artist’s statement reads like 
an exultation of the chaos of biking through city streets, aiming to encourage other cyclists to 
reclaim the streets, in direct opposition to the incessant privatization of urban space (Polsky 
2010).  
 
[Figure 4: USE/LESS Bike Map. Photos courtesy Partizaning] 
 
As in Moscow, Saint Petersburg’s approach to Delai Sam urban actions have an artistic 
orientation. Free Space, an architecture and design NGO, which is a hosting organization for 
Delai Sam in Saint Petersburg, emphasizes the importance of art practice to urban activism. 
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Mikhail Klimovsky, an activist, designer, critic and founding member of Free Space, has spoken 
publicly on the political uses of public art: 
 
…We are planning to bend [the] forces [of the gallery] toward social reflection, in 
particular, to make art in the public space of the city, to work with the various 
manifestations of the urban environment. 
 
Art objects housed in an urban environment, in public space, work on an 
unprepared audience, and [then] there is some interest. Any resident has the 
opportunity to interact with a work of art, and sometimes, possibly [engage in a] 
direct act of co-creation. The inclusion of residents in the process of 
implementing an art project, artist's interaction with his audience - residents, 
bystanders, etc. - is the most important task that should be put in front of an artist 
who works in the space of the urban environment. We also plan to implement a 
number of projects directly involving urban residents (and not only), in particular 
to try suburban bedroom communities - Kupchino, for example. (Zhelnina 2011) 
 
The insertion of art practice into social activism within the urban environment has geo-political 
implications beyond aesthetics. In fact, Klimovsky aims to activate an alternative geography for 
the circulation of art outside of its traditional circuits, and even beyond the privileged city center. 
Invoking Kupchino, one of Saint Petersburg’s suburban commuter communities, Klimovsky 
voices the ambition of bringing art beyond the streets and to the very doorsteps of city residents, 
thereby re-organizing an urban hierarchy which privileges actions located within the city’s 
centers of cultural, financial and political power.  
 
 
A BIENNALE FOR URBAN ACTIVISTS?  
The second Delai Sam festival, held in fall 2011, coincided with the 4th Moscow Biennale of 
Contemporary Art and included art exhibitions and workshops in urban interventions, using a re-
purposed shipping container as a mobile headquarters and exhibition space. The container also 
became a mobile studio, hosting a residency program for visiting artists who would contribute to 
Delai Sam activities. The container-gallery was eventually incorporated into the Biennale as part 
of a special program, “Media Impact: International Festival of Activist Art.” As presented on the 
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Biennale website, the curatorial statement for “Media Impact” heralds the birth of a new kind of 
Russian artist: 
 
Today, we witness important changes in Russian contemporary art. Artists come 
out from studios, museums and galleries to make interventions in the streets and 
online social networks. They take part in different forms of social activism from 
political to ecological actions, community work. The new type of artists emerging 
call themselves activists: no analogues to that had been known in Russian art 
before. They refuse to work with institutions, search for their own forms of artistic 
existence, cooperate with subcultures and social movements. 
 
This “new type of artist” operating within the subcultures of the urban realm, as well as online 
through social networks, is presented as a social activist who denies support, and resists co-
optation by established institutions. However, closer examination of the event website reveals 
that the “Media Impact” exhibition itself is “supported by” a variety of well-established local and 
international cultural institutions, such as the Goethe Institut, the European Cultural Foundation, 
the Polish Cultural Institute and the National Center for Contemporary Art (Moscow). 
Additionally the event boasts the sponsorship of corporations such as Artel Hotel Group, 
Samsung and the Double V group. The support and sponsorship scheme undergirding the 
“Media Impact” exhibition of the Moscow Biennale, demonstrates the complexity of relationships 
that surround art-activism in the urban sphere. Biennales and cultural events, like iconic 
architecture and mega projects, have lately been lauded as key assets in the competition for 
global city status. In a discourse which privileges the “creative and cultural sectors” as “soft” or 
“intangible” elements of a global city’s identity, which might act as “attractors” for multinational 
firms, highly skilled workers, students and tourists, thereby raising a city’s global profile and 
chances for economic success, biennales and other “signature cultural events” become 
indispensable to urban development schemes (Sassen 2006; Harvey 2002; Hutton 2007; 
Schilbach 2010; Richards and Palmer 2010). Criticism of these events point to the fact that 
spectacles of art and culture, while themselves generative of gentrification and associated social 
disparities, are often employed as cure-alls for deeper social and economic inequalities 
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generated by neoliberal urban policies (Harvey 2002; Waitt 2008; Askoy 2008). In Moscow, the 
advent of institutions and events promoting contemporary art, and the field of “cultural 
management,” is connected to the exponential rise in concentrated private wealth in recent 
years. As the city’s billionaires increasingly invest in art collections and sponsor art galleries, 
foundations and international cultural events (Ioffe 2010), the profile of the city as a global 
center for contemporary art grows steadily, and the biennale itself becomes evidence of this 
greater “connectivity” in a network of competitive cities (Sassen 2006).  
 
The role of artists and other members of the “creative class” as facilitators in the neoliberal 
restructuring of the city is well documented (Zukin 1989; Deutsche and Ryan 1984; Smith 1996; 
Wallis [1991]1999; Florida 2002). In these stories of gentrification and displacement of one class 
of citizens by another, artists often appear as unwitting participants driven more by their need 
for cheap or inviting space to create than by any explicit recognition of their roles as foot 
soldiers or pioneers in the “revitalization” (Florida 2002) or “gentrification” (Deutsche and Ryan 
1984) of urban areas. Cast within these roles, artists are transformed into “social assets” which 
can be used to leverage the transformation of rundown inner city areas (Lukin 1989). However, 
analysis of urban interventions executed in Russian cities in the past few years complicates any 
easy characterizations of the role of ‘the artist’ within the (global) city. For example, Voina, a 
group operating in Moscow and Saint Petersburg since 2005, whose actions skirt the lines 
between art and criminal activity, clearly refuses the position of artist-as-social-asset, adopting a 
much more antagonistic stance. According to the group’s website: 
 
VOINA. A street collective of actionist artists who engage in political protest art. 
Political orientation: anarchist. Enemies: philistines, cops, the regime. 
Organization type: militant gang, dominated by horizontal ties in everyday life and 
employing vertical relationships during actions. The group preaches renunciation 
of money and disregard towards the law (“the no-whoring way”). 
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Several of the group’s most well known actions targeted iconic locations in Saint Petersburg and 
Moscow, such as the headquarters of the Russian federal security services, or the Kremlin. 
“Dick captured by KGB,” an action executed in June 2010, involved the painting of a 210-foot 
penis on the historic Liteniy drawbridge opposite the headquarters of security services. 
Whenever the drawbridge was raised, an obscene salute could be seen from the windows of the 
government building. The bridge soon became a local tourist attraction, and a global Internet 
sensation. One month prior, the group had staged “Crazy Lenya is Our President,” an action 
designed “to deprive cars with special blue signal flashers of rights to break the regulations of 
road traffic.” The action involved members of the group throwing themselves into oncoming 
traffic in a busy boulevard opposite the Kremlin, with the intention of physically removing blue 
flashing lights from the roofs of cars. These portable emergency lights, issued by the 
government to high-ranking personnel, are generally believed to be a sort of “express pass,” 
used by “VIPs” to avoid Moscow’s notorious traffic jams. Both of these actions are in line with 
the groups goals, stated on their website, to create “expressive art, which is sincere and honest 
[in] provoking observers’ deep emotional experience” while developing a “language, adequate 
for today’s cultural and socio-political context,” and destroying the “conformist Russian art 
market, which is reproducing outdated forms of art.”  Voina’s absurdist actions, which have 
landed some members in prison, and forced others into hiding, point to the difficulty of 
classifying art as part of the “cultural assets” of the city, to be judiciously managed and traded 
upon for global city status. Artists in Russia that take as their goal a direct attack on the urban 
symbols of power, and attempt to act out the simmering frustration that is part of everyday life in 
a city with unevenly distributed conveniences, are treading dangerous ground. 
 
And yet, despite the group’s antagonistic relationship with state authorities, and disdain for the 
art-market that promotes less politically engaged work, in 2011 Voina was nominated for, and 
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won, Russia’s prestigious “Innovation Art Prize.” The prize, sponsored by the Ministry of Culture, 
and awarded by the National Center for Contemporary Art, has become in recent years, “a 
symbol of the adversarial relationship between culture and government in Russia” (Tikhonova 
2011: 46).  While Voina’s nomination caused controversy among the award’s jury members, the 
discussion revolved primarily around the aesthetic merit of the group’s works and not its political 
implications. The argument over the aesthetic merit of Voina’s urban interventions (“But is it 
even art?”), undertaken within the confines of institutionalized art practice, elides the work’s 
merit as a serious critique of the powers that decide what constitutes appropriate uses of urban 
space. Instead of aesthetics standing in for, or catalyzing, arguments about who has the right to 
the city, the group’s nomination for the elite prize and the jury’s subsequent deliberation only 
served to muddy the relationship between the political action and its aesthetic impact, such that 
discussion of ‘rights’ and ‘the city’ was pushed off the table.    
 
CREATING SPACE FOR SOMETHING ELSE TO HAPPEN 
 
It has been one of the decisive processes of the last ten years in Germany 
that a considerable proportion of its productive minds, under the pressure 
of economic conditions, have passed through a revolutionary development 
in their attitudes, without being simultaneously able to rethink their own 
work, their relation to the means of production, or their technique in a 
really revolutionary way.  
--Walter Benjamin (2005[1934]), emphasis added 
   
I have always written according to my convictions—with perhaps a few 
minor exceptions—but I have never made the attempt to express the 
contradictory and mobile whole that my convictions represent in their 
multiplicity. 
  --Walter Benjamin, draft of a letter to Gershom Schloem 
 
[My communism] is absolutely nothing other than the expression of certain 
experiences that I have undergone in my thinking and in my life. That it is a 
drastic, not infertile expression of the fact that the present intellectual 
industry finds it impossible to accommodate my life; that it represents the 
obvious, reasoned attempt on the part of a man who is completely, or 
almost completely deprived of any means of production to proclaim his 
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right to them, both in his thinking and in his life… Is it really necessary to 
say all this to you? 
  --Walter Benjamin, letter to Gershom Schloem justifying his 
communist approach against his friend’s disdain.  
 
 
Russian urban artist-activists at the beginning of the twenty-first century find themselves at a 
comparable moment to that faced by the left-wing intelligentsia of Weimar Germany on the 
verge of its descent into fascism. Their means of producing art in relation to their local and 
global context is undergoing a transformative process, according to loosely-defined criteria of 
“social or political engagement,” at the same time as they search for new spaces and methods 
beyond those imposed by market economies, within a still-volatile and restructuring post-Soviet 
society. Meanwhile, art and “creative” production itself emerges as a strong currency in a 
competition for economic investment in urban areas (Sassen). Amidst the search for new 
(urban) spaces and alternative means for producing art, the position of the artist, and of his or 
her interlocutors, continuously shifts in ways that blur disciplinary boundaries, and demand 
rethinking the relation of the artist to “the social,” and “the urban,” itself. In The Author as 
Producer (1934), written in response to a sojourn in Moscow several years earlier, where he 
had encountered artists willingly enlisted in the project of bringing into existence a new 
communist cultural life (Benjamin 1986), and intended as an address to the Institute for the 
Study of Fascism in Paris, Walter Benjamin raises several questions relevant to analyzing the 
relationship between activism and art today. Chief amongst these is a question that shifts the 
criteria for judging the politics of artistic interventions: “Rather than asking what is the attitude of 
a [literary] work to the relations of production of its time? I would like to ask, ‘What is its position 
in them?’” (Benjamin 1999[1934]: 770). For Benjamin, it is no longer enough to ascertain to 
what extent a work of literature (or art) intentionally expresses particular political views and, 
from there, make judgments about its transformative potential. Rather, the analysis must bypass 
the ‘good intentions’ of the project and proceed from the socioeconomic spaces and methods in 
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which the work itself is produced. Any artwork that would intervene in a broader political struggle 
must first transform the means of its own production.  
 
Reconsidering the interventions of Pussy Riot, Partizaning and Voina, we can see how the 
content of contemporary art potentially “raises questions,” about the conditions within which we 
relate to each other in urban spaces undergoing endless economic restructuring. However, the 
question of how exactly artists as producers are themselves positioned within a broader means 
of production remains uncomfortably unanswered with regard to each art project, or process. 
Whether the new social engagement expresses an explicit politics is not of relevance to my 
analysis. I would rather pay attention to the potential for such art practices to transform both 
their own field and those of other disciplinary spaces. Activist-art exposes itself to non-traditional 
discursive arenas and unusual sites of production and exhibition. Even when they remain in the 
studio, the gallery and the museum, such practices attempt to occupy those spaces in non-
traditional or challenging ways. Through these interventions, the production of art embraces a 
certain liminality, exceeding any social and disciplinary boundaries of aesthetics, and opening 
itself up to becoming non-art—and non-art to becoming art—such that received notions of both 
art and urbanism are relinquished. But how can I, read this movement to introduce new 
methods for producing art and urbanism into the discourse of environmental psychology? What 
does it mean to experience this threshold between disciplines? 
   




[Figure 5: A DIY swing in the Voikovskaya district of Moscow created by Florian Riviere 
in collaboration with Partizaning. Photo credit: Maria Semenenko] 
 
Rethinking the position of art within the means of production (of knowledge about the city), 
necessarily involves engaging with art as the practice of transforming (one’s own) perceptions of 
the environment. Beyond representation of existing environments, the art practices with which I 
have engaged in the course of my research take up the experience of urban social conditions, 
and our perception of such conditions. Each project analyzed herein has taken on liminal 
spaces, spaces of transition between one world into the next—whether Partizaning and its focus 
on side streets, courtyards, and alleys, disused street furniture, placing libraries in abandoned 
bus shelters; or Pussy Riot’s focus on the church as a site of ongoing shadowy transition 
between the socialist regime, and the new Russian power; or Voina’s insertion of their bodies 
and expression into the traffic roundabout or the drawbridge. Intervening in liminal urban spaces 
   
   
56 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
can be seen as part of a larger process of transforming both participants’ perception of the 
urban environment, and the means of production of knowledge about the urban, and is the 
expression of a transdisciplinary process that brings into confrontation official and everyday 
ways of experiencing the urban. Or to put it in Benjamin’s words, these interventionist tactics are 
“drastic, not infertile expression[s] of the fact that the present intellectual industry finds it 
impossible to accommodate [these artists’] lives.” 
 
The transdisciplinary approach of urban interventionists can be compared to the 
interdisciplinarity of environmental psychology, which draws upon the theories and 
methodologies of social psychology, anthropology, sociology, architecture and urban planning. 
The main difference is that the transdisciplinary approach is open to producing something 
entirely other than art, or even disciplined knowledge, while interdisciplinary work very much 
respects and maintains the boundaries of disciplines, with the aim of “constructing a common 
model… based on a process of dialogue between disciplines” (Ramadier 2004:433). Where the 
model of interdisciplinarity seeks a consensus around the explanation of specific phenomena 
between distinct disciplinary methods, transdisciplinarity challenges notions of scientific 
progress based on “the compartmentalization of knowledge into myriad separate disciplines” by 
teasing out the “dynamics of the construction of objects studied on the basis of disciplinary 
knowledge” (Ramadier 2004:432). Often, working with the dynamics of disciplinary 
constructions requires exposing to analysis “opposing, non-overlapping, ‘marginal’ aspects of 
each disciplinary model,” such that different and competing realities of the phenomena may be 
experienced (Ramadier 2004:425). While both interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity depend 
upon the existence of distinct disciplines, the former seeks points of relation, in the form of 
specific concepts and methodologies (e.g. place identity, or mental mapping) that could exist 
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comfortably within several adjacent disciplines, whereas the latter destabilizes disciplinary 
boundaries, adhering to theoretical fault lines, in order to open up paradoxical ways of knowing. 
 
Paradoxically, like much punk and DIY practices of knowing (Hemphill and Leskowitz 2012), 
urban interventionism draws upon various disciplinary expertise, while simultaneously 
subverting the position of ‘the expert.’ The aim of this experimental practice is less to produce 
new knowledge about a pre-determined, unified object, than to make the space of paradox 
available for participants to experience. Both the competing realities that exist alongside each 
other in a given city, and the huge vacuum of knowledge left by the failure official narratives to 
reconcile these multiple realities, become perceptible through the iterative processes of design 
and implementation of the intervention. Writing about the surge in activist architecture in the 
wake of the recent recessions rippling across Europe, Pier Vittorio Aureli (2013), also draws 
upon Benjamin’s writings of the early 1930s to contextualize the ethical implications of these 
trans- and extra-disciplinary interventions: 
 
…we [activist-architects] are no longer expected to do something; rather we 
should make room, we should create the space for something else to happen. 
This act of making space (rather than creating something) requires the gesture of 
stoppage and staring again from scratch. The energy for such a gesture will 
come not from the invocation of some metaphysical void, but from the very sense 
of vacancy that inhabits our postrecession urban landscape. Instead of solving 
this vacancy, we need to invent a new architectural language that… will give 
radical form to this vacancy without filling it. (2013: 126) 
 
Aureli’s formulation of the (new) role of activist architects, in relation to the production of the 
urban landscape, parallels the challenge presented by activist-artistic intervention into the 
production of knowledge about Moscow. Finding, making and occupying liminal spaces, at the 
edges of official discourse has consequences. There might be a loss of voice, an inability to act, 
a sort of paralysis experienced by those caught in the throes of self-transformation, in the 
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moments before the apprehension of a new language. This is the ethos of DIY means of 
knowledge production: perpetually “starting from scratch.”  
 
CONCLUSION 
DIY urbanism, as observed in recent Russian urban interventions, may be thought of as an 
activist form of engaging (with) the city that mirrors, challenges and expands institutionalized 
and “powerful” processes of knowledge production. These actions are generally small and low 
budget, (despite betraying no small amount of media savvy), and make use of play, mimicry and 
humor, combined with a practical emphasis on working with the mundane. From turning bleak 
passageways into impromptu art galleries, and drafting alternative ‘master plans’ for the city, to 
staging provocative performances on symbolic ground, Delai Sam actions are intent upon 
introducing a new urban vocabulary into the language of the Russian city. Discursive inroads 
are made using two main registers: On the one hand such efforts draw from the current climate 
of politics by proxy, in which urban aesthetics is a highly charged site for both advancing and 
opposing ongoing neoliberal restructuring of the city. On the other hand, the actions draw out 
the affective dimension of urban design and planning, making available for public comment 
particular frustrations that are common to the everyday experiences of city dwellers but remain 
unaddressed in official discourse. Considered together, these works point us towards parallel 
urbanisms, in which the city is not simply an object to be studied, dissected, planned and 
designed for a faceless and ideal public, but a medium for making politics-as-art, or art-as-
politics.  
 
Art-activism or activist-art currently ongoing in Russian cities is staking claims to the urban 
aesthetic that disrupt institutional notions of urban planning and design, while providing various 
platforms for the experimental investigation of the actual experiences of citizens. However, 
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despite the potential for these interventions to highlight gaps in urban policy, and to present 
alternative urban aesthetics, DIY urban actions-as-contemporary-art, can become caught in the 
very networks of neoliberal restructuring around which they are organizing. As pawns in 
gentrification efforts or hot commodities at biennales, such art-activists can find themselves 
making bargains that potentially undermine the alternative politics their work anticipates. Rather 
than ignore these entanglements, critical DIY practice works directly with such contradictions. In 
fact it is because of their direct engagements with these complexities, and their ability to deliver 
unexpected yet powerful impacts on the city that DIY actions have particular relevance to the 
fields of architecture, planning and design. How cities look and feel, and how people respond 
creatively to their built environment, are not simply matters of professional technique and best 
practice, but are increasingly central to alternative politics emerging in cities across the globe. 
By politically activating these aesthetic matters, art-activism or activist-art highlights areas of 
everyday life that require closer attention by the professions ostensibly most concerned with 
urban aesthetics.  
 
For those interested in engaging more directly with these overlooked aspects of urban 
experience, or in “people-centered” design practices, there is a lot to be learned from DIY 
urbanism. Could planning become more “ad-hoc” and responsive to the affective register of 
urban experience? Could planning and architecture pay closer attention to the “forgotten 
spaces,” of everyday urban life, not in order to “program” them through design, but to help 
activate free spaces in which new urban aesthetics can be continually created? These 
questions concern the extent to which transdisciplinarity can be embraced in urban studies, in 
such a way as to bring forth serious experiments with the means of producing urban knowledge. 
Lines between official and local knowledge would, of necessity, become blurred, and expert 
positions challenged and relinquished. There is great risk involved in this kind of work, and 
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urban interventionists working in transdisciplinary modes often find themselves in politically 
precarious positions. However, this is the terrain embraced in this dissertation, itself the result of 






1. The Moscow Urban Forum (MUF) is an annual international three-day urbanism 
conference sponsored by the Moscow municipality. Begun in 2010, MUF aims to 
address specific planning and design issues faced by the city by attracting big-name 
international architects, scholars and potential corporate investors to interact with local 
government officials, in order to create and share knowledge about the city. The forum 
can be taken as gauge for the planning and design priorities and concerns of the 
Moscow municipal government, and understood as an important example of the 
government’s recent efforts to increase transparency about its plans for the city. 
 
2. One measure of the perception of social inequality in post-socialist life can be found in a 
survey of Moscow residents conducted in 2001, in which only 11% of respondents rated 
their family’s material condition as “good” or “very good,” and 34% characterized their 
condition as “poor” or “very poor” (Kolossov and O’Loughlin 2004), with remaining 
participants describing their condition as “average.” This is not surprising: despite being 
one of the world’s most expensive cities, Moscow ranks 190 out of 215 large cities in 
terms of quality of life (Hirt and Stanilov 2009: 73). 
 
3.  These provisions reflect an upsurge in preservation activism by local NGOs, like 
Archnadzor, and the Moscow Architectural Preservation Society (MAPS), since the mid-
2000s. From 1992 to 2005 the entire historic center of Moscow was listed as a UNESCO 
World Heritage site (Hirt and Stanilov 2009), currently only the Kremlin and Red Square 
remain on that list, and between 400 and 700 federally and locally designated 
architectural landmarks have been lost since 1989 (MAPS, cited in Hirt and Stanilov 
2009: 78). While Saint Petersburg’s historic center remains on the UNESCO list, about 
32 percent of the residential stock and 18 percent of its non-residential stock remains 












   






UNRAVELING THE CITY 
A PSYCHOGEOGRAPHICAL EXPERIMENT  
AT THE EDGE OF MOSCOW  
 
 
AT THE EDGE OF THE CITY 
Standing huddled together with a few people you know in Kievogorskoe Field, a large park at 
the edge of Moscow, you stare across the pristine snow, towards the dense tree line at the edge 
of your field of vision. You are here on this unusually clear day in February, standing calf-deep 
in the snow at the invitation of Andrei Monastyrski, Nikita Alekseev, Georgy Kizevalter, Igor 
Makarevich, Elena Elagina and Sergei Romashko who call themselves Collective Actions (CA), 
on yet another of their “Trips Out of Town.” This time you’ve been given a piece of thread, 
wound around a nail stuck in a wooden board in the center of the field. You must now unravel 
this spool, while walking away from your nine companions, whose own threads go off at 
different angles, heading towards the trees at the horizon. You are not sure of the length of the 
thread, and how far you will have to walk, but you keep going, until you find yourself quite alone 
in the quiet forest, or until you give up and go home. If you walk until the end of the thread, you 
might decide to retrace your steps and return to the center of the field. As you re-emerge from 
the forest, does someone snap your picture?  
 
Trips out of Town (Poezdki za Gorod), sometimes translated as Journeys out of the City, or 
Trips to the Countryside, can be understood as designed responses to the claustrophobic 
spaces of Soviet Moscow. The trips to parks in the Moscow Region, conducted by the Collective 
Actions group (CA) between the mid 1970s and the late 1980s, were not merely escapes into 
nature, naïve attempts to divorce oneself from the over-planned environment of the city. In fact, 
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according to art historian Octavian Desanu, “out-of-town-ness” (zagorodnosti) is a term specific 
to the art practice of CA, and refers to a space that is neither the city nor the countryside or 
“non-city.” Rather, it is a particular spatial category “missing as a concept in the topographies of 
Western countries,” and encompasses a space beyond suburbia that has all the feature of the 
countryside while still being close to the big city (Desanu 2009: 77). This “no-man’s land,” is 
beyond “the authority of any law – for the city officials it is already country and those of the 
country fear it because it is too close to the city” (Desanu 2009: 77).  So for the Collective 
Actions group, these journeys “out of town” were opportunities for participants to perform social 
and spatial experiments in outdoor laboratories of their own design. In contrast to the politically 
overdetermined space of both the city and the agricultural countryside, parkland and forests at 
the edge of Soviet Moscow were treated as aesthetic “blank space” by the artists, perfect for 
constructing models of parallel forms of (urban) knowledge and community. This chapter makes 
a close reading of one of Collective Actions’ trips out of the city, an action titled Ten Apperances 
held on February 1, 1981, in which ten participants walk through a wintry landscape while 
unraveling a spool of thread as they go. The edge of the city, its very “out-of-town-ness” is read 
as a space of transition, a laboratory or workshop for liminality, in which new spatial 
understandings are generated for and by participants. The “out-of-town” experimentation of the 
Collective Actions group, situated in ambiguous relationship to the city of Moscow, and to the 
official knowledge that governed it, is contextualized by making reference to theory and 
practices of environmental psychology and architecture, then emergent in Tallinn, Estonia, at 
the Baltic outskirts of the Soviet Empire. 
 
The activities of CA constituted a double life for its members and regular interlocutors, most of 
whom were employed by the state as artists, poets, archivists, and researchers. During the 
1970s and 1980s, through a variety of artistic interventions, CA came to be an influential part of 
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the unofficial art scene known as Moscow Conceptualism (Tupitsyn 2009; Groys 2010; Jackson 
2010; Bishop 2012). Despite their unrecognized status, a great amount of systematic planning 
and design went into creating these experiments, (which benefitted from the artists’ access to 
resources through their day jobs), as evidenced by the copious amount of documentation 
created by members of the group, some of which uncannily resemble scientific notes and 
sketches. The great amount of documentation produced by CA was not simply about creating 
practical records of the group’s actions. Rather, documentation was as much a site of practice 
as the trips out of town themselves, and took on “an aesthetic function,” such that “new artistic 
concepts and possibilities emerged,” expanding the scope of Moscow conceptualist discourse in 
the 1970s and 1980s, and contributing the eventual institutionalization of the group (Kalinsky 
2013:105). Additionally, each experiment was followed by various methods of measuring and 
collecting participant reactions, as part of a collective interpretive process, which often led to 
detailed written reports of the group’s findings. It is from within this ritualized process of 
mirroring, mimicking, and sometimes mocking of the procedures of official forms of scientific 
knowledge production that I consider Ten Appearances.  
(How) does this social experiment produce psychogeographical, architectural and behavioral 
knowledge about the relationship between humans and their (urban) environment? If we see 
CA’s experimentation as a response to dominant modes of Soviet social organization, just what 
kind of alternative social relations are being modeled here, within Ten Appearances?  
 
Let us imagine the snowy field of action as a ritual site, an affective alternative to Soviet 
Moscow, in which everyday experiences of endless waiting and constant surveillance are 
explored through (self-)reflexive actions aimed at deepening spatial perception and enacting 
alternative social relationships. In the Forest of Symbols (1967), anthropologist Victor Turner, 
citing the work of ethnologist Arnold van Gennep, defines three phases of the “rites of passage” 
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which define points of transition in the individual’s lives across cultures. 
The first phase of separation comprises symbolic behavior signifying the 
detachment of the individual or group either from an earlier fixed point in the 
social structure or a set of cultural conditions (a “state”); during the [second] 
liminal [phase] the state of the ritual subject (the “passenger”) is ambiguous; he 
passes through a realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or 
coming state; in the third phase [“aggregation” or “incorporation”] the passage 
is consummated. The ritual subject, individual or corporate, is in a stable state 
once more and… has rights and obligations of a clearly defined and “structural” 
type, and is expected to be have in accordance with certain customary norms 
and ethical standards. (Turner 1967:94, emphasis added) 
 
Viewing CA’s Trips out of Town as rites of passage allows us to better understand their effects 
upon the socio-spatial perception of the participants. From this perspective, the Kievogorskoe 
fields appear as a ritual space, in which the participants in the experiment conspire to 
manufacture an exceptional experience, aimed at some kind of psychic self-transformation. In 
keeping with the three phases of rites of passage this chapter is organized in three parts: 
“Walking out, unraveling,” in which the participants are separated from their familiar urban 
contexts; “In the woods, transforming,” in which participants are forced into solitary 
confrontations with the limits of their own perceptions; and finally there is “Winding Up, 
returning,” in which participants decide for themselves whether and how they will rejoin the 
group. 
 
WALKING OUT, UNRAVELING 
 
We found ourselves on that same field where I had been several times before. 
Leaving the road behind, we were immediately plunged into deep snow and had 
to walk in step. This physical hardship of stepping with legs not very fit for the 
task and without the help of skis into deep holes, into these tunnels cut deep into 
the snow, immediately focused the mind on this heaviness and hardship. 
(Kalinsky 2012:63) 
 
Ilya Kabakov, an artist and regular participant in CA’s events, describes how the arduous and 
repetitive exertion required to complete the task induces a meditative focus. The dragging of his 
legs as he moves across the field and into the forest “create[s] a hardship that drove all 
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thoughts from the mind and spirit” (Kalinsky 2012:65). Accordingly, CA describe their journeys 
as “trips in the direction of nothingness, armed with equipment of an aesthetic/psychological 
nature” (Tupitsyn 1999:104). The meandering, often challenging, nature of the journeys was 
intended to help participants “shed their urban orientation in preparation for the action” (Tupitsyn 
1999:105). The difficulty—experienced by Kabakov as the physical and psychological 
“frustration and burden of stepping in this endlessly deep snow, of sinking in each time above 
the knee”—is tied to the landscape itself, and the attempt to shape it by walking, while pulling an 
almost weightless string. Another participant, poet Vsevolod Nekrasov, recalls the challenge of 
walking steadily in one direction through the snow while pulling the thread:  
 
It makes sense why there weren’t skis. Where’s the interest in that? And even 
just visually, graphically, we would have ruined, trampled on, and marked up the 
entire field. And then the tracks would have lost their meaning. But here, each 
step was taken seriously. You had to concentrate—you would not jump an extra 
step in this snow. You had to choose your steps carefully and, where possible, in 
a straight line. It is very amusing to turn back and see that where you thought you 
were walking a straight line turned out not straight at all. Only the little string 
draws out perfectly straight, sketches out into a straight line, while you, for some 
reason, always walk crookedly, from side to side, even when this is not in your 
best interests. And then of course this little string is very beautiful in the forest. 
(Kalinsky 2012:71-72) 
 
The task forces Nekrasov into deep concentration, and in this focused state the string takes on 
aesthetic meaning, its perfect straightness contrasting with the poet’s meandering steps. As with 
the string method used in topographical surveys, in which the forester walks straight ahead at a 
steady pace while unraveling a measured thread, Nekrasov is drawn into observing the details 
of the terrain, “how [the string] snag[s] on all the little curlicues, on every tree trunk” (Kalinsky 
2012:72). As each walker deliberately clears a path through the snowy field, the solitary 
confrontation with the environment—with the string as both catalyst and guide—acts to clear 
cognitive space.   
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Here, it may be helpful to engage with the walkers through theories of perception that 
allow us to see how their meandering bodies, cutting paths through the deep snow, might 
simultaneously be developing a heightened, and possibly altered, perception of the environment 
around them. Typically, studies of perception in modern psychology have defined it primarily as 
a function of the individual “mind” or “brain.” Accepting a distinction between mind and world, 
such studies tend towards conceptualizing perception and sensation as separate events, 
producing different mental facts: 
With few exceptions, the standard use of sensation refers to elementary 
deliverances from the sensory receptors. A corollary to this definition is the claim 
that there is a stage following sensation called perception during which these 
elementary sensations are utilized in the construction of the individual’s 
experience of the world. So, for example, sensations that themselves provide no 
information about space or distance are collated or cross-referenced 
associatively with sensations that do (e.g., tactile sensations) so that a three-
dimensional world is constructed in perception. (Heft 2001: 156, emphasis 
added) 
 
Distinctions between sensation and perception, indicate a particular understanding of the 
environment and the individual, such that the three-dimensional environment appears as not 
only separate from the individual, but as a construction of the individual’s experience. 
Alternative theories of perception, such as presented by William James, view sensation and 
perception as neither discrete nor as separate “stages.” Rather, in The Principles of Psychology 
(1890), James takes sensation and perception as “processes by which we cognize an objective 
world.” Rather than separate events, they are “names for different cognitive functions, not for 
different sorts of mental fact”  (James cited in Heft 2001). The shift that James proposes, from 
thinking of sensation and perception as separate stages in the mental construction of the world, 
towards thinking of sensation and perception as processes for cognizing an objective world, is 
reflected in his distinctly phenomenological, and arguably “artistic,” approach to the study of 
these processes.  
James used analogies and metaphors throughout his works, not simply as ways 
of expressing his ideas, but as ways of constructing them. He often drew on his 
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artistic experiences [his first vocation was painting] in his attempt to pursue 
psychological reflection. In fact, the frequency with which he drew on his artistic 
experience in important, often critical passages [of The Principles of Psychology] 
is noteworthy. Insofar as these passages often have to do with the nature of 
human cognition and understanding, which he conceived from the start on the 
model of artistic experience, this is not surprising. But his use of artistic 
experience as a source of metaphorical referents suggests a basic principle of 
human cognition—that humans tend, naturally enough, to draw their most telling 
analogies from their own experience. In other words, they use what is familiar to 
understand the less familiar. (Leary 1992: 156) 
 
According to James, traditional psychological theories of perception, for example those of 
Helmholz, Berkeley and Reid placed emphasis on the process by which those with “normal” 
ways of seeing select and order the world from out of the “jungle of our optical experiences” by 
choosing, based on habit, to ignore particular sensations over others (James 1983). For James, 
the painter-psychologist-philosopher, sensation and perception often flowed together in complex 
creative activity, in which it was possible to see and represent things as they actually felt. This 
conflation of sensation in spatial perception is illustrated in his discussion of the special 
perceptual training obtained by artists: 
Usually we see a piece of paper as uniformly white, although a part of it may be 
in shadow. But we can in an instant, if we please, notice the shadow as local 
color. A man walking towards us does not usually seem to alter his size; but we 
can, by setting our attention in a peculiar way, make him appear to do so. The 
whole education of the artist consists in his learning to see the presented signs 
as well as the represented things. No matter what the field of view means, he 
sees it also as it feels—that is as a collection of patches of color bounded by 
lines—the whole forming an optical diagram of whose intrinsic proportions one 
who is not an artist has hardly a conscious inkling. The ordinary man’s attention 
passes over them to their import, the artist’s turns back and dwells upon them for 
their own sake. “Don’t draw the thing as it is, but as it looks!” is the endless 
advice of every [art] teacher to his pupil; forgetting what “is” is what it would also 
“look,” provided it were placed in what we have called the “normal” situation for 
vision. In this situation the sensation as sign, and the sensation as object 
coalesce into one, and there is no contrast between them. (James 1983: 874-75). 
 
Taking Ten Appearances as an experiment aimed at disrupting normalized habits of perception, 
we can understand the goal of that disruption as a loosening of perceptual selectivity within the 
participants. In other words, in Kievogorskoe, the jungle—or in this case forest—of optical 
experiences is encountered without the normalizing frames of reference that obtain in urban life, 
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and the participants (many of whom are trained artists) find themselves “seeing” this strange 
snowy world as it “feels.” 
 
INTO THE FOREST, TRANSFORMING 
The organizers’ instructions to unwind the string by walking into the forest becomes a 
cartographic method, and the action itself, a deceptively simple algorithm intended to intervene 
not so much into the physical landscape, as into each participants’ own psychic space. The 
deep footsteps in the snow, taken together with the walker’s wandering mind, could constitute a 
mental map of each pedestrian’s changing relationship to the space, to the action at hand, and 
to his or her companions. Mental or cognitive mapping is a research technique most closely 
associated with the fields of psychogeography, environmental psychology and urban design, 
and is often employed in the course of investigating individuals’ spatial sense or affective 
response to a given environment, usually one to which the individual is accustomed by habit. 
Participants are generally asked to draw and interpret maps depicting their own perception their 
everyday surroundings, such as the spatial relationship between design elements in the built 
environment, or emotional responses to particular areas in a city, or preferences for certain 
places or routes over others (Lynch 1960; Milgram and Jodelet 1970; Gould 1973). In mental 
mapping exercises, the researcher is not usually looking for the participant to accurately depict 
‘real’ spatial positions and locations, but rather to give a representation of his or her mental 
constructs and metaphors for navigating the environment.  The mental map is an attempt by the 
researcher, in collaboration with the participant, to connect psychic “terra incognita” with the 
participant’s own experience of lived space. In addition, the mental map is often used to create 
a picture of the (usually urban) designed environments in which people live. Unlike the cadastral 
map, or the architects plan, the aggregate of individuals’ mental maps can provide “the visual 
quality” of the of the worlds they inhabit (Lynch 1960), or give a sense of a people’s “cultural 
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inheritance,” expressed in their particular spatial perceptions (Gould 1973). In that sense, the 
process of creating a mental map, by making visible the various subjective “terra incognitae,” 
which exist alongside “official” spatial relations, can provide evidence of the existence of 
alternative ways of moving in and through (urban) space, as well as the possibility for 
establishing environmental relations that exceed and subvert prescribed norms.  
 
Recent geographical and artistic research shows how traditional cartographic practice is are 
transformed through artistic uses. Geographer Denis Wood has demonstrated how artists erase 
the discursive lines that separate mapping from other kinds of graphic techniques, such as 
drawing and painting (Wood 2006). Artist Karen O’Rourke has explored how walking becomes 
both a mode of perception and a cartographic practice in artistic practices in Western Europe 
and the US since the 1950s (O’Rourke 2013). In Ten Appearances the cartographic process 
proceeds by walking instead of drawing, and string replaces the pen and paper usually used in 
making mental maps. This sense of the walker-holding-string as a tool for drawing together 
internal thoughts with the experience of the wintry environment (“I am like a pencil, a drawing 
instrument,” says Nekrasov to himself as he tramples the fresh snow) is reiterated in Kabakov’s 
recollections: 
I stopped in this wondrous forest like Ivan Susanin [a Russian folk hero] among 
completely untouched, snow-covered firs, tree trunks and so forth. Then I turned 
and began to pull the string, which had landed on a branch four or five meters 
away. I saw it shimmering like a ray against the snow, and this ray shone in the 
beautiful sunny day… I continued to pull the string, winding it onto my right mitt. It 
wound and wound, but since I was trying to understand what lay ahead, what 
trick I was supposed to discover and what the whole idea [of the action] was 
about anyway, it was as though my imagination was also winding with it, as 
though this winding was also the time of my standing in the forest (Kalinsky 
2012:65). 
 
Designed to work directly within what they called the “Space of Intellectual Evaluation” (SIE), or 
the “spectators’ consciousness,” each of CA’s mysterious actions were thought of not as ends in 
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themselves, but as a means for accessing the inner world of each participant (Monastyrski 
1999). Once accessed, this inner “space” was divided, through the timing of the action itself, into 
“pre-eventful, eventful and post-eventful” consciousness, and activated by the participants’ own 
curiosity and constant attempts to understand or explain the action. Pre-event space was 
characterized by the experience of taking the train out of the city, and the extraordinary sense of 
anticipation aroused en route to the action site: 
During [the pre-eventful phase] the spectators construct a frame of expectation. 
Over the years the artists of this group have worked to prove that a journey is for 
one of their actions what a frame is for a painting. One of the main aesthetical 
concerns of [CA] for decades has been the idea that while journeying to see an 
artwork, one must wait to see what will happen. [CA] owes this idea of “waiting as 
a frame” to the poet Vsevolod Nekrasov, who theorized that the sense of waiting 
for something surrounds or frames that which is about to take place. 
(Monastyrski 1999) 
 
The process of “framing” the action, begun during the pre-event stage of the experiment, 
functions not only in parallel to the traditional artistic practice of framing the art object, but can 
also be understood as a particularly architectural task. The white string, pulled across the white 
snow, soon blends in with the environment, even while its unraveling guides the walker’s 
movement. Deep footprints start to emerge in the pristine snow, radiating in ten directions from 
the field’s center “like stars, like rays” (Kabakov) or like the lines of “the metro map of Moscow” 
(Nekrasov) (Kalinsky 2012). (“Too bad there was no helicopter,” Nekrasov laments, “or else 
[the] best photo [of the action] would have been a bird’s eye view of all these divergent tracks, 
well-lit by the sun”) (Kalinsky 2012). At the moment the participants begin to fill the field with 
their footsteps and their spatial metaphors and projections, the snowy expanse becomes what 
geographers refer to as a cultural landscape, a reflection of the walkers’ imagination activated 
even as they shape the environment around them.  
 
Considering the field of action as a cultural landscape leads to a broader conception of 
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architecture and design. As architect Amos Rapoport observes: 
 
[T]he design of the environment is the organisation of four variables: space, time, 
meaning and communication. These are largely invisible. One can also think of 
environments as being about the relationships between people and people, 
people and things, and things and things. Relationships are also invisible. 
(1994:68) 
 
Rapoport’s notion of design allows for an alternative understanding of Ten Appearances and its 
constant “invisible” transformation of the socio-spatial relationships of the participants, both to 
the landscape and to each other. In this light, the process of “framing” the action becomes an 
invisible architectural practice. The poet Nekrasov expresses this experience most acutely when 
he refers to the event as an “undertaking of the architects [organizers]… who have appropriated 
all of the surrounding space which I am now elaborating, and the entire situation, and myself 
within the situation, as their own text” (Kalinsky 2012:86) In fact, argues philosopher Elizabeth 
Grosz, architecture “does little other than design and construct frames; these are its basic forms 
of expression” (Grosz 2008:13). Framing is the “constitution of territory,” of “the space that is 
one’s own,” and implies the fabrication of “space(s) in which sensations may emerge,” while 
architecture is the “creation of frames as cubes, interconnecting cubes, cubes respected or 
distorted, cubes opened up, inflected or cut open. The frame separates. It cuts into a milieu or 
space” (Grosz 2008: 12-13). For CA, working in the medium of participants’ volunteered time, 
the processes of framing (and later “deframing”) became their method for exploring the SIE, the 
space of spectators’ consciousness. In this process the action itself (which they sometimes 
referred to as “non-actions”, or “non-experiences” because of their negligible importance, and 
because of the uncertainty that anything had actually happened at all) was less important than 
the pre-event anticipation and the post-eventful interpretations: 
 
[T]he action itself, or its scenario, is a decoy and that the mythical or symbolical 
content (which is sometimes itself called the “eventful part”) is not important to 
the organizers. “We have no intention of ‘showing’ anything to the spectator; our 
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task is to preserve the experience of waiting as an important, valuable event.” 
The eventful part of the action serves as mere preparation for opening up and 
activation of a series of empty or undefined psychic processes. The post-eventful 
part of the action relates to the process of interpretation, to writing the 
participants’ reports after attending the actions. (Monastyrski 1999) 
 
The intensive process of discussion after the events, and the copious documentation in the form 
of participants’ interpretive writings, audio recording and photographs, meticulously archived by 
CA, constitute an exploration “of the realm of the psyche,” or “the emotions arising in response 
to what is happening in the participants’ visual field during the performance, and the emotions in 
regards to what precedes and accompanies the action” (Tupitsyn 1999:105). Monastyrski 
elaborates further in the preface to one of CA’s documentary collections:  
Since in our work we are particularly interested in the realm of the psychological, 
‘the interior,’ we are obliged to pay special attention to all kinds of preliminary 
events, to that which takes place as though on the edges of the action’s 
demonstrational ‘field.’ The demonstrational field itself expands and becomes the 
object of observation: on it we try to discover zones that possess certain 
properties and interrelationships. These properties and relationships, as we 
imagine them, act to produce different levels of perception, on one of which can 
be attained an experience of the events as events taking place essentially ‘inside’ 
a liberating consciousness. Such is the overall goal of the actions. In a 
constructive sense, the goal consists of keeping from artificially breaching the 
boundaries of direct perception within which nearly every action begins its 
unfolding. (1980: 102) 
 
Prefacing his discussion of one CA event series, architectural theorist Sergey Sitar notes the 
inherent affinity between architecture and performance art: both are arts of environment and 
event—both “treat the space of experience as their object” (2003:363). However, CA designed 
its events to go beyond the initial space of experience—that is, beyond the “framing”—and 
extend into the realm of archival documentation and ongoing discussion and debate, as part of 
a never-ending process of analysis and interpretation. Through the process of “interpretation,” 
which closely mirrored advanced Soviet systems of surveillance, the event became an 
opportunity to explore and reorganize one’s own psyche—a space left beyond the purview of 
official socialist realist art (Groys 2010). The process of exploration initiated by CA’s events, 
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could be a form of “deframing” psychic space, a task expanding the purview of architecture, and 
located squarely in the province of art. As Grosz argues: 
 
[I]nsofar as its primordial impulse is the creation of territory in both the natural 
and human worlds, art is also capable of that destruction and deformation that 
destroys territory and enables them to revert to the chaos from which they were 
temporarily wrenched. Framing and deframing becomes art's mode of 
territorialization and deterritorialization through sensation… (Grosz 2008:13) 
 
In the Soviet city, what was in short supply went beyond the perennial scarcity produced by the 
planned economy, and its counterpart, the black market. The scarcest real estate was psychic, 
and the dearest prices were paid in the currency of consciousness, transformed and placed in 
service of the collective. It was this scarcity of variety of discursive and experiential space that 
CA sought to address through its psychogeographical exercises. According to Jackson: 
 
Ideally, if the Conceptualist work succeeded, the viewer would emerge on the 
other side… having glimpsed something of himself outside Soviet logic… Instead 
of a total, transforming, exuberant experience, [Collective Actions] events 
furnished total nonexperiences, performance events in which mind and body 
confronted the invisible hollow core of Soviet (modern?) consciousness… 
Reanimating familiar psychological surfaces, these works prodded the spectator, 
if only for a few hours, to submit herself to a wounded sociality and its 
hypertrophy/deficit of meaning. In this interval, a homeopathic “Our Ownness” 
might appear, a moment of collective understanding and solidarity… (Jackson 
2010:167) 
 
At this point, I would like to interrupt the artists’ walk at the outskirts of Moscow, to join the 
efforts of a different group of researchers, working about a thousand miles away. Between the 
early 1970s and the end of the 1980s, at the Baltic edge of the Soviet empire, psychological 
investigations were being conducted which would introduce a novel approach to understanding 
the relationship between humans and their environments in the USSR. At the same time that 
artists were making psychogeographical explorations on the city limits of the Soviet capital, 
scientists at Estonia’s Tartu University, and later Tallinn Pedagogical Institute, were developing 
an alternative to the American version of environmental psychology (psichologija sredy). This 
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group of researchers, inspired by research coming out of the United States, including from the 
newly established program at the City University of New York, began constructing research 
projects, which aimed to articulate and improve the environmental conditions in which Soviet 
people were living and working. This new field emerged in response to the specific needs of 
individuals who had to live, work and play in the often standardized environments of everyday 
Soviet life, with the express aim of going beyond the strictly economic directives set out within 
the state’s planning schemes (Valsiner 1989; Niit, Heidmets and Krussvall 1989). This research 
strove to connect the behavioral sciences with the centralized bureaus of architecture and urban 
planning, which created the design protocols used all across the Soviet Union. More 
importantly, the researchers’ emphasis on understanding how people relate to their 
environments within the socialist context led to particular innovations in psychological theory, 
which, unfortunately, have yet to be widely engaged by spatial disciplines in the English 
speaking world. These theories, developed in response to the conditions of living in the USSR 
both extend and challenge the paradigms of Western environmental psychology, and may allow 
for a more complex analysis of the experiences of Collective Actions in the forest.  
 
Of interest to the current discussion is a particular approach to conceptualizing the place of the 
subject in relationship to the environment developed in the research of the Soviet psychologists.  
In Soviet psychology, the personality, and the process of personalization, emerges through 
creative, productive interaction between the human and the surrounding social world. In his 
paper, “The Phenomenon of Personalization of the Environment,” Tallinn-based psychologist 
Mati Heidmets draws upon the work Soviet personality psychologists, A.V. and V.A. Petrovskii: 
 
Ideas, knowledge, artistic images, a man-made object, resolved tasks, etc., can 
all serve as means of personalization [of the environment]… Activity is the 
principal way, the only effective way, to be a personality; through his activity an 
individual continues himself in others. A produced object—a building built, a 
subtle poetic line, a tree planted, a masterfully crafted detail, a book written, a 
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suite composed or performed, etc.—these things are, on the one hand an object 
of activity and, on the other, a means by which a person asserts himself in the life 
of society. (Petrovskii and Petrovskii, cited in Heidmets 1989) 
 
For Soviet psychologists, the emphasis in understanding subjective environmental relations was 
not placed on the inner life and perceptions of the human subject, but upon the “space of inter-
individual bonds” (Heidmets 1989). This concept of a human subjectivity formed in creative, 
productive activity is extended in the writings of Soviet philosopher, Ewald Il’yenkov, who 
presents a view of embodiment that extends beyond any individual human: 
 …the personality is not within the body of the individual of the species, but within the 
body of an individual person, which cannot be reduced to the body of that particular 
individual, is not confined to it, but is a much more complex and spatially broader body, 
embracing in its morphology all those man-made organs that created and continue to 
create man (tools and machines, words and books, a telephone network, radio and 
television channels, bonds between individuals of the human species, etc.), i.e. all that 
common body within which specific individuals function as its living organs.  
  “The body”… must also be examined to understand each of its organs separately in 
its living functioning and in the totality of its direct relations and feedback with other such 
living organs, in which these are completely objective, corporeally materialized 
connections, not those ephemeral “spiritual” relations in which each and every 
idealistically oriented psychology has eternally attempted and is even now attempting to 
interpret the personality. (Il’yenkov cited in Heidmets 1989) 
 
Il’yenkov’s image of an expanded personhood that extends beyond anyone body into complex 
and completely material bonds, created and recreated in the minute everyday objects and 
actions of our man-made world, is especially potent when applied to Collective Action’s Ten 
Appearances. The string, attached to the wooden board at the center of the field, and leading 
solitary walkers out along ten paths into the forest, can be seen as a visualization, performance 
or reenactment of the material social relations that make each individual an “organ” of “a much 




WINDING UP, RETURNING 
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So far I have addressed the unfolding, or unraveling of Ten Appearances as an exercise in 
cartography and design, albeit a rather ephemeral one. In this next section, I turn my attention 
to the aesthetic experience of this event. It is my contention that the ephemerality of the 
experience engenders a certain affective excess, extending participants beyond the logic and 
habits of everyday life in the Soviet city, while offering them the “gift” of choosing the sort of 
relationship they would like to have with the environment, and with their fellows.  Despite CA’s 
insistence that the actual activity itself—walking and unraveling the string—is a relatively 
negligible portion of the event, a “nonexperience,” and that it is the documentation and 
discursive analysis afterward in which the action’s significance is best sought, from the 
perspective of the participants, the action that day clearly made indelible impressions. Look at 
how Nekrasov describes his delight in participating:  
You walk and see how beautifully, from the center out, these ten different tracks 
extend in ten different directions. You experience an aesthetic pleasure, begin to 
put in some effort, thinking, so what if it is difficult, and good, that’s the way it 
should be. Again, there is a balance of difficulty and attainability. 
In other words, there is a natural difficulty here, which is at once toy-like 
and significant. There is a whole mass, a tangle of allegorical and symbolic 
meanings here that need not even be mentioned. It goes without saying: the 
string, the path—it’s clear as day. But this is not particularly interesting. What is 
interesting is what grows out of it, i.e. real physical action, one that can be 
experienced aesthetically. One that can be experienced as pleasure, a game. 
(Kalinsky 2012: 78) 
 
The aesthetic pleasure expressed above comes in a moment of pause, maybe at the tree line at 
the edge of the field, after the after the activity has gone on for some time, long enough for each 
participant to have made his or her move, left his or her mark in the snow. Nekrasov’s 
enjoyment emerges in recognition of the connectedness of each person’s movement, from the 
sense that all are involved (“toy-like”) in a “game.”  Although Ten Appearances is not explicitly 
presented as a “game,” it is impossible to ignore the elements of play inherent in this scenario. 
In Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture, Johan Huizinga describes play as a 
unique and essential cultural form, having several defining characteristics: First, it is a voluntary 
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or superfluous activity, which can be stopped and started at will, and as such proves a veritable 
expression of freedom. Second, play occurs outside of the boundaries of “ordinary” or “real” life, 
engrossing the player in a parallel, impractical activity, thereby removing him or her from the 
logic of space, time, needs and wants that govern our everyday movements. Third, play 
necessarily occurs within the limits of a specific time and place, having a beginning and an end. 
And finally, play is fun. While Ten Appearances eventually meets all of these basic criteria, it 
possesses an additional aesthetic quality, what Huizinga associates with “the impulse to create 
orderly form,” invoked by some types of play, along with a sense of “tension, poise, balance, 
contrast, variation, solution [or] resolution” (Huizinga 1949:12). In Kabakov’s account of his walk 
he attributes this aesthetic quality to the designs of the action’s organizers: 
They had conceived ahead of time how I would feel after all these trials and 
perturbations: a kind of pleasant and cheerful, terribly harmless, playful and, I 
would even say, tender touching kind of game or a toy that had not only brought 
no harm, no mockery, but instead brought nothing but delight. It is a familiar 
situation from childhood when playing, for example, hide-and-seek: someone 
devises a scheme, someone deals the slips of paper, somebody hides. But no ill 
follows: nobody boxed you in the ear, stuffed shit down your collar, or tripped you 
with a stick. On the contrary, it all concluded with much merriment and 
amusement. In other words we are dealing with some kind of happy games, 
which, apart from goodness and unity, leave nothing behind. (Kalinsky 2012: 68-
69) 
 
What is remarkable about Kabakov’s comments is the surprise that seems to contribute to his 
delight. His own experience of the walk into the forest had been particularly fraught with fearful 
thoughts: worry at his physical inability to complete the task, the feeling that it might be never-
ending, a cruel trick played by the organizers at his expense. His eventual delight in the 
exercise comes with the realization of its game-like qualities, and in particular, in the moment 
that he accepts the truly voluntary nature of his own participation in a community of play. The 
“play-community,” founded on “the feeing of being ‘apart together’ in an exceptional situation, of 
sharing something important, of mutually withdrawing from the rest of the world and rejecting 
the usual norms,” may outlast the game itself (Huizinga 1949:12). 
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So far, I have read the ten-string walk that February afternoon primarily in one direction, 
following only the tracks in the snow that lead us from the center of the field into the forest. But 
what happens after each walker gets out of sight of the others, and his or her string is 
completely unspooled? The individuality of each journey is most characterized by this time when 
each participant, completely alone with his or her thoughts, at the end of his or her unraveled 
thread and with no further instructions, must make the decision of whether to return to the 
starting point or not. Why does the participant choose to return or to keep on walking?  
 
We can see the small group of artists and their ten participants playing with strings on the 
outskirts of Moscow, like children unable to resist loose threads hanging from a sweater’s 
fraying seams. They pull these threads until they release themselves from the city, unraveled, if 
only for an afternoon. With the string in hand, they create a small space for choice: the choice of 
whether or not to rejoin the group, whether or not to weave themselves back into the city. Is this 
choice “artificial,” possible only within the game world? That is not important. Focus instead on 
the solitude, the space for choice, because that is the “gift” that comes with playing the game. 
Here is how the moment reveals itself to Kabakov in the forest: 
My fear increased when I began to watch for knots in the string and looked in 
horror when a knot with additional string did actually appear. But then after a 
while, I felt the tension on the string grow slacker, and suddenly, I remember, I 
could see the tension of the string weaken and the length shorten in my hand. 
And then suddenly, I saw something that looked like a little marble appear on the 
branch that I had been watching, along which that little ray of string had been 
gliding, and this was the end of the string. I had never in my life experienced 
anything as incredibly gratifying and joyful as this. I had been alone, and then at 
the end of this event of mine, there appeared a sign, a gift, and even a message 
in the mystical sense. (Kalinsky 2012:66-67)  
 
And this is how Nekrasov reached the end of his string: 
Having [wound up the string and] pulled out and read the note, I took it as an 
ending, as “regards.” As saying, there you go, comrades so-and-so are 
concluding this activity, of which they are informing you; they salute you and wish 
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you well on your way… The point was to go in [to the forest] and then to act 
according to the circumstances. For me, it turned out that I came upon a road 
and wound my string perhaps not as energetically as expected, and thus I 
walked so far that I no longer saw the field but instead saw the other end of the 
forest…  
There is [an] image here, a powerful one: the image of centrifugal motion, 
of the force that swings from the center circularly (and the circle itself, actually), 
and sends one out as far as possible, like Huck Finn with the dead rat on a 
string, or like a hammer thrower. Actually, the end of the string… is not so much 
the umbilicus (I have never seen an umbilicus in my life), as a kind of tail trailing 
the movement, and also a little crack of a whip to spur you on, as if to say, hello, 
fly on farther. Did you wind the all the string up? Now wind yourself up and away. 
(Kalinsky 2012:72,80)  
 
Both Kabakov and Nekrasov distinctly recall this moment of choice, and recognize the gift being 
offered. For both there is the experience of expansiveness, of personal liberty—a sense that the 
next action they take, whatever it may be, will be theirs, and theirs alone. The effect of the 
organizers’ arbitrary instruction has been to create a tension within the participant that 
eventually must end with equal randomness, thereby allowing the participant to experience all at 
once the entire openness of the field and the forest, and their own ability to respond to this 
situation exactly as they please. Faced with the gift of decision, Kabakov chooses to return to 
the starting point, retracing his footsteps like a map leading back to the group, while Nekrasov 
continues walking, away from the center of the field, away from the group, and back into the 
city. In some ways the very personal experiences of our wanderers at the end of their string 
echo the discoveries of the Estonian environmental psychologists. By engaging with people 
involved in specific and assigned goal-oriented behaviors, in their homes and workplaces, the 
researchers found that “the environmental context [performs] the function of psychological 
mediation of the person’s intra- and inter-personal psychological processes” (Valsiner 
1989:211). For the researchers, the extent to which people were able to personalize their 
environments, through adding in special objects, or otherwise shaping the institutional spaces in 
which they found themselves, affected both their psychic states and their relationships with 
others.  
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Through personalization of one’s immediate environment, the person largely 
determines the range of possible behavior by others toward him or her: Who can 
enter the personalized territory, what one may do on that territory, and so forth. 
Personalization gives stable, material form to the social relationships, which are 
made explicit through their projection into the surrounding environment. 
(Heidmets, 1985 p. 223) 
 
As most Soviet citizens lived in housing uniformly designed according to centralized protocols, 
this process of personalization took on special significance as an essential site of choice, 
creativity and contestation for residents—a way of determining the details of how social 
relations, both within the home and beyond, could be performed and (re-)structured through 
interventions into the micro-environments of everyday life (Kurg 2012). In CA’s Ten 
Appearances, with its string, deployed as a cartographic tool for shaping psychic space, we find 
a parallel topic of investigation and research methodology. In fact, CA’s experiments and 
subsequent theorization of its actions, can be read as having come, by different means, to a 
similar conclusion: By performing assigned, seemingly arbitrary, but deeply personal tasks in 
“controlled environments” (the “blank space” of fields and forests at the outskirts of the city), 
which modify their relationships to the environmental context, participants find their intra- and 
inter-personal relationships simultaneously transformed. There is one more parallel between 
these artists and the psychologists: the “fun” factor. Just as the sense of play permeated CA’s 
expeditions, the activities of the Tallinn psychologists were permeated with a sense of irreverent 
exploration. According to one Estonian pioneer of environmental psychology, the fledgling 
discipline was a “not so much a departure from or confrontation with the rest of [Soviet 
psychological research], but more an interesting hobby of strange people,” who organized into 
an informal network of researchers across the USSR, and held conferences, get-togethers and 
“very funny evening sessions” including architects, designers, psychologists, sociologists and 
other kindred spirits (personal communication with Mati Heidmets, August 2014). 
 
* * * * 
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In Marcel Mauss’ classic of ethnology, The Gift, he devotes several pages to the gesture of 
offering things to others in Maori culture. Anything worth giving contains within it the spirit of the 
giver, his clan, and the earth to which all three are tied.  The relationship between giver, group 
and environment are experienced as a force, known as “hau” or “spirit,” which is contained 
within, or travels with, every object of worth (taonga). The hau has one main tendency: it must 
travel, and it must return to its home—it is a centrifugal force, that prompts its maker to send it 
far, to give it away freely like the hammer is thrown, or like Huck’s rat on a string.  Whomever 
receives such a forceful object feels the pressure to return it, even if by a circuitous route. Until 
the taonga finds its way back home, whosoever is holding it is tied to the original giver, as by a 
thread, or a bond, which cannot easily be broken or disavowed. According to Mauss, it is just 
these sorts of bonds that link individuals and clans in social relationships of varying strength and 
flexibility, for generations (Mauss 1990: 10-13). Taking the string in Ten Appearances as a kind 
of taonga, or ritual item, with its mysterious marble-note-package attached at the end for 
participants to discover, we might be able to understand Kabakov’s overwhelming feelings of 
“goodness and unity,” and “gratitude” which produced in him a desire to return to the starting 
point, and “to the bosom of the group:”  
It should be said that here was achieved one of the most pleasant and practically 
unknown forms of society, which is today so agonizing. Here society does not 
appear hostile, but benign, vouchsafed and sympathetic to the highest degree. 
This is such an untried, unknown feeling, that it not only restores lost forms, but 
itself seems to serve as a gift against the background of everything that exists 
today (Kalinsky 2012:69) 
 
If Kabakov, like another seven of his fellow participants, feels something akin to the Maori hau, 
the string pulling them back to the center of the field of action, back into the safety and comfort 
of the group, how can we explain Nekrasov’s (and one other’s participant’s) failure to return?   
And why did I not return? It was with full sincerity that I did not. All of the steps 
turned out to have been calculated in ideal proportion to pull me out… calculated 
for unidirectional movement, for vectorness… [Y]ou discover that this road does 
not go where you need it to. But to return (in the snow) is simply unthinkable. 
You’ve already cleaned your coat tails and shaken out your boots… If only you 
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had known it earlier… Just like in real life, in other words. And it is always thus. 
There is of course, also a bit of torment here, but then the question is: whose is 
it? Is it not my own, since we have all gathered here together, we conceptualists? 
... 
You can quarrel with this, but this is my opinion, and it was mine to walk. 
(Kalinsky 2012:86). 
 
In Nekrasov’s explanation of his failure to return, there is the key to the participant experience of 
the action’s design. By gathering together, “appearing” for each other, submitting to the play of 
being led into the forest by the string, the participants find themselves in a liminal space in which 
the obligatory communalism of city life is temporarily suspended, and they must each decide 
how it is they would like to be related to the other. In this laboratory, or ritual site, of social 
experience, the current that pulls the majority of participants wholeheartedly into the group is 
found to be equal to the force that pushes two lone wolves away from the pack. Here is a 
parallel society—neither Soviet, nor Maori, for the duration of the game—in which there is no 
punishment and no reward for participating. There is only the gift of choice. 
* * * * 
Walking in Moscow today, one is confronted with the flickering lights of electronic displays 
flashing the latest exchange rates between the ruble, the dollar and the euro; or might pass by 
banks advertising their services using images of hundred dollar bills stacked high on golden 
serving platters, or trussed up like holiday gifts with glittering ribbons. From the ashes of a vast 
Soviet empire, closed to the capitalistic world, Moscow launched itself in just a few years to 
“world city” status, boasting headquarters of major international business services firms, and 
actively entering into competition with other global cities for foreign investment. The outskirts of 
the city where CA once held its walks are no longer open fields, but office parks and housing 
developments. Tallinn is no longer an outpost of a vast Soviet empire, but the capital city of a 
thriving economy of the new Europe. Despite the disappearance of the forms of life and the 
social realities in which their experiments were conducted, both the CA experiments, and the 
discoveries of the Estonian environmental pscyhologists, highlight a need for “stringiness” in the 
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experience of the post-Soviet city—a willingness to participate in the play of weaving alternative 
spaces from which one can choose how to engage with and against the harshness of the city. 
Necessary for these Soviet-era artists, with some thought and practice, such string-games might 
be re-played in response to the post-Soviet ascent of financial rationales for urban growth, 
which advertise choice, while seamlessly integrating implacable design aesthetics that eerily 




















   






“ENSTRANGING” THE CITY 




The city is on its guard against him, masks itself, flees, intrigues, lures him 
to wander its circles to the point of exhaustion. 
                  --Walter Benjamin, “Moscow” 
 
The black unicorn is greedy. 
The black unicorn is impatient. 
The black unicorn is mistaken 
for a shadow 
or symbol 
and taken 
through a cold country 
where mist painted mockeries 
of my fury. 
It is not on her lap where the horn rests 
but deep in her moonpit 
Growing. 
 
The black unicorn is restless 
the black unicorn is unrelenting 
the black unicorn is not 
free. 
 
                     --Audre Lorde, “The Black Unicorn” 
   
 
 
Walking at sunset along the bustling avenue, I hear it: FUCKING NIGGER!  
 
FUCKING NIGGER sails up above the sinewy beats pumping into my ears through my 
headphones. I take a few steps forward, stop and turn around. A young couple passes me 
head-on and continues walking. The young man wears sweatpants and trainers, his companion 
in tight jeans and colorful windbreaker, her blond hair pulled into a slick ponytail. I take my 
headphones off.  
   




I’m sorry did you say something to me? 
Yes, she said, You are a fucking nigger.  
She is smiling and facing me. Her friend chuckles, resting his arm on her shoulder.  
Why would you say that, I ask, mirroring her smile. Now I am more curious than shocked.  
Because: You. Are. A. Fuck-ing. Nigger.  
 
The clarity of her enunciation, the unusual confidence of her Russian-accented English, the 
irony of these very American words floating down a Russian street, headed right for me, set me 
laughing. This phrase, repeated so deliberately, is somehow more absurd than the usual 
sidewalk taunts, monkey noises, jungle sounds as I pass in the street. Catching my breath, 
through giggles comes my retort: 
 
Well, then, that settles it. You. Are. A. Fuck-ing. Bitch. 
I turn and, with a wave, continue on down the street. Over my shoulder I glimpse her face as 
she lunges towards me. The young man restrains her. 
 
The constant hateful comments, stares and surprised, furtive glances, the monkey noises: all 
are addressing a distorted reflection of me, as in a sinister fun house mirror, a version of my 
body with which I cannot identify. I feel myself moving through streets that cannot accommodate 
this body—streets that respond to my presence, but yet cannot receive me. 
 
In my daily walks from my apartment to the studio—half an hour almost everyday for ten 
months—I notice only one image of a black body projected over the wide boulevard. It is on a 
billboard made of mechanical slats, which change every minute showing first one advertisement 
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and then another. This is how, waiting for the traffic light, I see the shattering face of 
international supermodel Naomi Campbell flash exactly two times in the grey sky. When my 
friends in New York ask me how I am doing in Moscow, through grainy Skype windows, I 
answer: I feel like a unicorn, a black unicorn, a mythical creature, every time I leave the house. I 
must move slowly and carefully, and learn not to balk when the people reach out to touch my 
hair. 
 
Walking in Moscow feels more like an artistic performance, than simple urban locomotion. I am 
aware of being onstage, of the arresting nature of some character, created by the city around 
me, and projected on to my physical being. This projection is strong, alive and has absolutely 
nothing to with me, and yet it hovers around me like a force field, defining the parameters of my 
experience of the city. 
 
American artist and philosopher Adrian Piper has dedicated much of her art and research to 
investigating the construction of the self, especially the racialized self, in the context of everyday 
urban interactions (Piper 1996; Bowles 2006). Early public works involved Piper donning a 
variety of odd or provocative get-ups and walking through the streets of 1970s Manhattan, 
performing everyday actions. In 1973, Piper undertook one of her better-known projects, “The 
Mythic Being,” for which she developed an alter ego, a “militant” black man who wanders the 
city repeating particular personal “mantras,” taken from Piper’s own diaries (Piper 1996). 
Walking the streets in drag was a way to bring terrifying tangibility to a particularly enduring and 
hostile myth of black masculinity, which forms a lynchpin of American urban folklore (Bowles 
2007). As a black woman who could easily pass for white, and in fact, had often been mistaken 
for white within the exclusive art and academic circles in which she moved, Piper’s notion of 
selfhood and identity was particularly fluid, subject to the vagaries of her appearance and the 
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willful ignorance of others. In donning the “mask” of black masculinity, her depersonalization 
became complete. 
 
As autobiography, my words are completely familiar and transparent, infused 
with the intimacy of my own past. As chanted mantra they become meaningless 
sounds, depersonalized expressions ascribable to anyone and everyone: They 
are common property. As self-expressing utterances of the Mythic Being, they 
regain their specificity, their significance, their mystery for me: They are signs of 
someone else’s experience to which I have only partial access. (Piper 1996: 112) 
 
Piper’s “autobiographical” performance, her transformation of ambiguously racialized “Self” into 
ambiguously racialized “Mythic Being” could be taken as a form of “rhythmanalysis,” in which 
elements of her own intimate experience in the city are made available for both personal and 
public reflection. Knowledge sedimented within daily routines is released for examination 
through the creation of a recognizable, but unstable character that takes a meditative walk while 
chanting. According to urban theorist Henri Lefebvre, rhythmanalysis is an embodied form of 
urban research, in which everyday experience is investigated and understood through an 
autoethnographic investigation of the habits and routines that structure time in a given place 
(Lefebvre 2004). For Lefebvre, this researcher is not a fixed entity, firmly ensconced within the 
boundaries of a particular discsipline, or discrete method. Rather, the rhythmanalyst is a figure 
of perpetual becoming, who is present, but does not have “presence:” (“Is it possible to do a 
portrait of one who does not yet exist, and which one would have to help bring about his 
existence?”) (Lefebvre 2004:19). As the psychoanalyst listens to the client, the rhythmanalyst 
listens to city, but not only to its words: 
 
He will be attentive, not only to the words or pieces of information, the 
confessions and confidences of a partner or client. He will listen to the world, and 
above all to what are disdainfully called noises, which are said without meaning, 
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The rhythmanalyst is an odd kind of researcher, brought into existence by the very practice of 
listening, both to noises and to silence. And the first act of listening begins with the body of the 
researcher itself:  “He learns rhythm from it, in order consequently to appreciate external 
rhythms. His body serves him as a metronome” (Lefebvre 2004:19). This act of listening goes 
beyond the basic instincts developed in the course of a life lived in the city. Lefebvre is calling 
for a multi-sensual, almost mythical listening, an extreme and heightened attention to the 
present of the research, (as opposed to the presence of the researcher): 
 
The rhythmanalyst calls on all his senses. He draws on his breathing, the 
circulation of his blood, the beatings of his heart and the delivery of his speech as 
landmarks. Without privileging any one of these sensations, raised by him in the 
perception of rhythms, to the detriment of any other. He thinks with his body, not 
in the abstract, but in lived temporality. He does not neglect, therefore…, smell, 
scents, the impressions that are so strong on the child and on other living beings, 
which society atrophies, neutralizes in order to arrive at the colourless, the 
odourless and the insensible…The rhythmanalyst observes and retains smells as 
traces that mark out rhythms. He garbs himself in the tissue of the lived, of the 
everyday. (2004:21) 
 
This almost extra-human sensory capability by nature carries with it a self-alienating awareness, 
in which the rhythmanalyst is both sensing the world around with extreme alertness, and 
observing him- or herself in the moment of perception. Lefebvre hints at the difficulty in 
achieving such a state: one would have to experience something like an accident, in which 
normally confused or integrated rhythms are suddenly halted, disrupted—made strange or 
foreign—and thereby made available to perception for the keen researcher (2004: 21). 
However, Lefebvre stops short of asking the researcher to create an actual accident in order to 
make sensible the hidden rhythms of everyday life in a given city. This limitation, however, no 
longer applies when one’s very appearance in the city is already a kind of “accident” – 
something that disrupts the casual effects of time in the street. This is the ideal research 
condition created when Adrian Piper’s Mythic Being, a characterization of vague yet powerful 
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American imaginations of a “dangerous” or “inscrutable” black male, walks the streets of New 
York. This is also the research condition created when I walk the streets of Moscow as a woman 
who may easily, and unexpectedly, transform into a “nigger.”  
 
 
AN ARCHIVE OF NIGGERS IN MOSCOW  
 
Around the time that I was in Russia, in New York artist Yevgeniy Fiks got the idea to collect all 
the images he could find of Africans and African Americans, created by Soviet artists between 
the 1920s and the 1980s. As a young artist in Moscow, Fiks was trained in social realist 
painting, and has turned that skill to documenting the communist world that, despite all odds, 
continues to exist in the United States. Upon visiting the New York headquarters of the 
Communist Party USA (CPUSA) on a mission to paint portraits of the group’s contemporary 
members, Fiks was surprised to find that artists Langston Hughes, Ralph Ellison, Paul Robeson 
and Richard Wright, among others, had all been card-carrying members. He began to 
investigate the relationship between black political struggles and social movements, the CPUSA 
and the Soviet Union. His investigations uncovered long histories of mutual political support 
between black Americans and the Soviet Union, from its early years and into its decline. His 
original project, of painting members of the CPUSA in an anachronistic Soviet social realist 
style, gave way to a search for representations of black Americans made by other Soviet 
painters. The archive of over 200 images is named for Wayland Rudd, a Philadelphia-born actor 
who traveled from New York to Moscow in 1932 as part of a delegation of black artists and 
never returned to the States. Taken as a whole, the Wayland Rudd Collection represents the 
possibility of an alternative experience of black-Americaness, constructed in a country that no 
longer exists.  
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Of particular interest in the collection are the sketches and paintings of Aleksandr Deineka, a 
Kursk-born painter who, in the 1920s and 30s, contributed to the invention of the social realism 
that became the stylistic stamp of Soviet art and propaganda. In late 1934, Deineka traveled 
from Moscow to New York on a three-month art residency sponsored by the Union of Soviet 
Artists. He spent time in Harlem, making sketches of everyday (and night) life. His pictures of 
people just going about their business resemble, in their attention to normalcy, strains of 
modernism arising in the Harlem Renaissance. These new forms of writing, dance, music and 
image-making sought, in the rhythms of regular folks’ speech and gestures, the poetic humanity 
denied black people in mainstream “primitivist” representations and appropriations of blackness. 
Deneika’s figures—women attending a lecture, a thoughtful young man with downcast eyes, an 
elegant singer and his accompanist at the piano, a pair of clubbers with their skirts hiked up—
could be drawn directly from Nella Larsen’s stories of middle class Harlem moderns, who went 
from ladies’ lunches to sweaty speakeasies in a single day. Women like the heroine of 
Quicksand: 
 
For the while Helga was oblivious to the reek of flesh, smoke, and alcohol, 
oblivious of the oblivion of other gyrating pairs, oblivious of the color, the noise, 
and the grand distorted childishness of it all. She was drugged, lifted, sustained, 
by the extraordinary music, blown out, ripped out, beaten out, by the joyous, wild, 
murky orchestra. The essence of life seemed bodily motion. And when suddenly 
the music died, she dragged herself back to the present with a conscious effort; 
and a shameful certainty that not only had she been in the jungle, but that she 
had enjoyed it, began to taunt her. (Larsen 2001:89) 
 
Deineka’s depictions of particular black lives bear marks of what early Soviet art theorists called 
“zhizhnestronie,” or “life-building.” Life-building was a critical area of design for the young nation, 
by which the novy byt, the new way of living, would be created, and artists were asked to lead 
the effort (Bershtein 2006: 223). According to Art in Production, a collection of essays published 
in Moscow in 1921, the purpose of art is “the introduction of artistic elements into the life of 
production,” and to bring about both the “transformation of the form of the production process 
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and the form of everyday life.” Art would no longer be, as art writer Nikolai Punin put it at the 
time, “a holy temple where the lazy only contemplate.” Instead, the new art would be a joint 
project of social activists and “art-makers,” committed to creating “a future consciousness” 
(Punin quoted in Chuzhak 2009/1923). Playwright Sergei Tret’iakov was even more specific: the 
new “art worker” would be a “psycho-engineer, a psychological constructor,” working to 
“reorganize the human psyche with the goal of achieving the commune” (Sergei Tret’iakov 
quoted in Bershtein 2006: 223). Transforming the means by which art was produced was key to 
developing art forms in solidarity with the nascent proletariat society. Art could no longer be a 
method for “raising questions” and “understanding life,” but would have to create entirely new 
lives. Art would need to work in the streets, and not merely in the studios, galleries and 
museums. It would eventually have to be no different from any other kind of work—“a temporary 
activity, which in future will be dissolved into life” (Chuzhak 2009/1923). Art historian Christina 
Kiaer describes Deineka’s way of making pictures as a kind of “supercharged mimesis,” which 
“infects” the viewer, such that he or she can “imagine other affective possibilities under 
socialism” (Kiaer 2012:248). It is possible that Deineka’s pictures express co-feeling for Harlem 
and its residents, many of whom were part of the decades-long Great Migration of black people 
fleeing terrible conditions in the South. Maybe he saw in the neighborhood the energy of a 
proletariat struggling to recognize itself through new art forms, to re-build life in its own image.  
 
The diversity of images that came to form the Wayland Rudd archive, from racist caricatures 
and propaganda posters, to children’s book illustrations and the humanist internationalism 
expressed in work like Deineka’s, overwhelmed Fiks. The images were so far reaching as to 
exhaust his own knowledge and memory of the exact relation between the nation of his birth 
and its black interlocutors. Confronted with this archive, Fiks became “disoriented,” as the 
images “enstranged” and exceeded his own ability to make historical meaning of them (private 
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correspondence with Fiks). Having grown up in the officially anti-racist yet totalitarian Soviet 
Union, he was shocked to find out about the existence some of the more derogatory images, but 
skeptical about whether or not the humanist images had been created out authentic solidarity 
with Africans, or were a product of the coercive conditions under which Soviet artists worked. 
How quickly, one wonders, can a nigger turn into a symbol of global liberation from capitalist 
domination? Flipping through such a collection of images is enough to give a person whiplash. 
This experience of disorientation caused him to open the archive to reactions and interpretation 
by other artists and academics both in Moscow and New York, in order to gather alternative 
imaginations of what this collection of images might possibly mean today. He extended 
invitations to artists and academics whose work addressed otherness in Moscow, and New 
York-based artists dealing with representations of race, migration and difference. Over a period 
of two years, Fiks held meetings among artists and academics in his apartment in New York, 
and over Skype with participants in Moscow, to discuss the images, and to develop ways of 
both responding and adding to the collection. This research collaboration led to an exhibition of 
images from the archive and the contemporary artists responses to it, in a New York art gallery 
in January and February of 2014. The exhibition was accompanied by public events in which 
Fiks and historians of African and African-American experience in Russia attempted to work out 
the significance of the images contained in the archive. 
 
In the process of investigating the possible significance of these images, Fiks presented his 
archive to surviving members of the Black Arts movement at a meeting in Harlem. These elderly 
artists had participated in struggles for Black Liberation and self-determination in the 1960s and 
70s, and had engaged in political artistic actions aimed at generating new images and new 
futures for African Americans. Unlike Fiks, these artists were neither overwhelmed by the 
diversity of images and points of view contained in the collection, nor skeptical about the true 
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sentiments and working conditions of the artists who had created them. Instead they focused on 
the images that represented black people with dignity and as equals to all races. They 
recognized some of these images from the 1960s movements, and considered them uplifting, 
inspirational evidence of the continued solidarity between the Soviet Union and Black Liberation 
struggles across the globe. For these black artists, the racist imagery contained among the 
collection was simply to be ignored. After all, what did the ignorance expressed in caricatures of 
little black sambos advertising soap in the 1920s have to do with the propagandistic posters 
depicting strong black men tearing off their chains and facing down their white American 
oppressors? After all, they told him, one has to seize whatever weapons are made available to 
fight one’s battles, even if they be the propaganda of a failing totalitarian state, and even if the 
images are produced under coercive or inauthentic conditions. I listen to Yevgeniy speak about 
his encounter with these artists, and his struggles with the archive, and I cannot help but reflect 
upon my own recent experience of life in Russia. Searching through the Wayland Rudd archive, 
between the cartoons and the heroes, I cannot find among these pictures any that help me 
understand what it means to be a real live black lady walking in Moscow. And so I am writing 
now, in order to place an index of my experience into, and against, this archive. 
 
ART AS A DEVICE FOR “ENSTRANGING” BOTH SELF AND CITY 
 
Each day, on my walk from my apartment to my studio, I pass the statue of Friedrich Engels, 
near Kropotkinskaya Square. Engels’ statue now looks out over Ostozhenka Street, onto some 
of the most coveted and expensive real estate in the exclusive center of Moscow, for which 
thousands of communal households were displaced (Badinya & Golubchikov 2005; Gdaniec 
1997). I marvel at how solid and present he seems, stoic under the weight of endless pigeon 
shit. In his anachronistic presence, I find an odd parallel with my own experience as a “social 
practice” artist, on a residency sponsored by an oligarch to work creatively with internationally 
renowned architects, who are at that very moment, unbeknownst to me, concocting a plan 
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intended to displace millions of the city’s residents, in favor of luxury real estate and “iconic” 
urban designs. Like Engels, himself a stranger to Moscow, I stand out, both as a foreigner and 
as a black woman often traveling around the city alone, and on foot.  
 
During this period in Moscow, I am reading Viktor Shklovsky’s essay, “Art as Device,” in which 
he introduces the neologism, “ostraniene,” translated into English as another neologism, 
“enstrangement” (Shklovsky 1990). This term emerges from Shklovsky’s studies of poetic 
writing, and describes “the process or act of endowing an object or image with strangeness by 
‘removing’ it from the network of conventional, formulaic, stereotypical perceptions and linguistic 
expressions” (Shklovsky 1990:xix). Enstrangment is the task of the artist, and requires skill and 
imagination. It is a way of addressing and expanding the foundations of perception, of 
questioning not only what we perceive, but how we perceive. According to Shklovsky, “the 
artistic quality of something, its relationship to poetry, is a result of our mode of perception. In a 
narrow sense we shall call a work artistic if it has been created by special devices whose 
purpose is to see to it that these artifacts are interpreted artistically as much as possible” (p.2). I 
find Shklovsky’s definition of art particularly relevant to psychological discourse, since it points 
out the experiential dimensions of art, focusing neither upon value judgments of “beauty,” nor on 
placing works within disciplined art histories, but rather upon the practical technique of 
manipulating perception. “Art” is art because it is designed to be perceived as artistically as 
possible. As such, art is not so much in the eye of the beholder, as it is an intersubjective, or 
transpersonal exchange, in which devices that play with the participants’ perception are 
released to varying, often unpredictable and immeasurable effect. Art, therefore, is less about 
the production of any specific objective quality or symbolic meaning, as it is about some 
process, or experience (of making, doing, thinking, seeing or acting), itself. 
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In this city I feel welcome in few places. While I am not shat upon by pigeons, police and other 
gatekeepers do often attempt to engage me, and I take to carrying my passport like a talisman. I 
find queer and queer-friendly spaces to be the most relaxing spaces. In such spaces, a kind of 
détente, or respite from the war outside, can be achieved. After a typical night of “rest and 
relaxation,” I am returning home alone, on the first metro trains of the weekday morning. It 
seems I am the only traveler changing trains at Okhotny Ryad, unusual for this large city. In my 
slightly hazy state, I step on to the long escalator linking the red and blue lines. As I near the 
middle of my ascent, I look up to see a phalanx of about thirty or so young metro policemen 
beginning their descent on the opposite escalator. They file on two-by-two and I fix my eyes on 
their impeccable green military-style frock coats. A slow fear fills my stomach. I realize just how 
suspicious I must appear to them. In this moment, with nothing else to lose, I raise my open 
hand to my temple, resolving to salute each and every one of these young police officers, the 
way I have often observed them do their superiors. And so, arm raised, I make direct eye 
contact with each soldier as we pass each other on the escalators, and to my great surprise, 
they all, to a man, salute back. 
 
If we follow Shklovsky in considering art as a device for working with, or transforming how and 
what we are able to experience, we must ask: Why fiddle with what or how we perceive? Why 
go beyond thinking of art as merely the practice of making beautiful, appealing, shocking or 
entertaining images? For Shklovsky, the answer begins with the notion of “automatization,” 
adopted from the research of influential nineteenth-century social theorist Herbert Spencer. 
Automatization refers to a certain “algebraic method of thinking,” in which “objects are grasped 
spatially, in the blink of an eye. We do not see them, we merely recognize them by their 
characteristics” (Shklovsky 1990:5). This perceptual “algebra,” allows us to note the existence of 
an object in space and, without truly looking at it, unconsciously classify it as some type of 
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object or another. “Gradually, under the influence of this generalizing perception, the object 
fades away” (Shklovsky 1990:5). Analyzing a passage from Tolstoi’s diary, Shklovsky makes 
the further point that this generalizing perception is a reductive force, bent towards the 
annihilation of experience itself, and as such must be directly addressed by the tools provided 
by art.  
And so, held accountable for nothing, life fades into nothingness. 
Automatization eats away at things, at clothes, at furniture, at our wives, and at 
our fear of war. 
If the complex life of so many people takes place entirely on the level of 
the unconscious, then it is as if this life had never been. 
And so, in order to return sensation to our limbs, in order to make us feel 
objects, to make a stone feel stony, man has been given the tool of art. The 
purpose of art, then, is to lead us to a knowledge of a thing through the organ of 
sight instead of recognition. By ‘enstranging’ objects and complicating form, the 
device of art makes perception long and ‘laborious.’ The perceptual process in 
art has a purpose all its own and ought to be extended to the fullest. Art is a 
means of experiencing the process of creativity. The artifact itself is quite 
unimportant. (Shklovsky 1990:5-6 emphasis in original) 
 
 
My gesture of salute slows the escalator ride for all of us, police and foreign civilian, and 
extends the moment of our encounter. Instead of following my “automatic” response to Moscow 
police—casting my glance down, hurrying along with some exaggerated sense of purpose—I 
now direct their gaze, demanding that they look at me, each and everyone. Our mutual 
perception is now “long and laborious.” We must formally recognize each other, and this 
recognition is at the heart of the risk I am taking in extending the moment. Will I leave this 
particular encounter a nigger, or a comrade? The uncertainty in my decision to decontextualize 
the police’s own salute, and to insert myself into their ranks, is only one of many experiences of 
the creative process of “enstrangement,” the hostile streets of Moscow make available to me. 
 
ON FRACTAL PERSONS AND ELASTIC SELVES 
 
How is it possible, in a scholarly exercise, for me to examine my self, or rather the images, 
memories and projections that accrue around me as I simply walk a city’s streets? The first step 
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is to place my “walkings” into conversation with other art works, and to trace a series of 
aesthetic comings and goings from New York to Moscow, which may throw into greater relief 
the significance of my simple daily walks. Now one more step remains, and that is to re-read 
this entire conversation about artistic experiments, and urban walking experiences from the 
margins of the social science disciplines in which I have been trained. At the center of this 
artistic conversation is a question about what happens to the self, or the person, in movement—
in interaction with a politically-charged environment—when one is able to sense the after- and 
before- images very palpably scattering around a presumably “integrated” subject.  This 
aesthetic experience of “enstrangement” leads me now into a short genealogy of self and 
personhood, as they have been treated within anthropology and (environmental) psychology. 
Both disciplines treat the construction of self and personhood as a complex interplay between 
environment, collective and subjective experience, never taking for granted the apparent 
“solidity” of the subject. In the following genealogies, the subject is rendered as particularly 
unstable, persistently troubled, especially by issues of race, culture and sex. 
 
Of all the social sciences, anthropology has been among the most concerned with defining, 
refining and even challenging the category of the person. Applying the empirical and 
hermeneutic approaches developed within the field, anthropologists, from Marcel Mauss to 
Catherine Lutz, have taken comparative looks at the self, personage, and persona across 
cultures in attempts to expand the naturalized phenomena of “the person.” In 1938, Marcel 
Mauss, heir apparent to Emile Durkheim’s legacy of social research, gave a lecture that 
represented a paradigmatic shift in the social scientific consideration of the individual human 
being. While Durkheim painstakingly developed an approach that aimed at apprehending the 
category of the social, in which individual persons exist as mental containers for its 
constructions, Mauss began by questioning the cohesion of the person, previously imagined as 
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a base unit upon and within which the social resided. The lecture, reprinted as an essay, aims to 
historicize this category, focusing on cross-cultural notions of self, mind and person. The unified 
self, imagined to be “innate,” is in fact, according to Mauss, “imprecise, delicate and fragile,” 
open to shifts in consciousness and morality.  Avoiding questions of psychology, Mauss turns 
towards social history of the category of ‘self,’ highlighting a distinction between the social 
persona or “mask” assumed for ceremonial or public purposes, and the intimate self, or soul. 
After a cross-cultural survey of native Australian and American cultures, Mauss concludes that 
while all people appear “have arrived at the notion of ‘role’ (personnage), of the role played by 
the individual in sacred dramas [and] family life,” none have developed, to the extent of Western 
cultures derived from “the Romans”, the metaphysical concept of ‘the person’ (personne), both 
as moral character under the law, and as a “rational substance, indivisible and individual” 
(Mauss 1985:12,20). For Mauss the category of the person, is by no means an inherent 
property attributable to every human being, but rather a historically specific concept, naturalized 
over time and through contingent processes: 
 
Far from existing as the primordial innate idea, clearly engraved since Adam in 
the innermost depths of our being, it continues here slowly, and almost right up to 
our own time, to be built upon, to be made clearer and more specific, becoming 
identified with self-knowledge and the psychological consciousness. (Mauss 
1985:20) 
 
Mauss’ definition of the concept of the person as a historically malleable and socially 
constructed entity, while limited to Western societies, and focusing on a universal juridical and 
religious (read: male) subject, opens the door for subsequent fruitful explorations into the 
category. Mauss helps us to see that we have all not always been “persons,” and under the right 
social conditions, we could fall into or out of this slippery category. 
 
Sherry Ortner in an essay that has entered the canon of feminist anthropology, if such a thing 
exists, undertakes a similar exercise (Ortner 1974). In her quest to “expose the underlying logic 
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of cultural thinking that assumes the inferiority of women,” she carefully considers the 
“universal” exclusion of women persons from realms of cultural thought and action available to 
men-persons (Ortner 1974: 68). Ortner problematizes the position of man as the universal 
subject, by closely examining what she takes to be the inferior positioning of women within all 
cultural systems, be they symbolic and implicit, explicitly ideological, or structural. In the process 
of establishing her argument for women’s oppression as universal fact, Ortner reinforces rigid 
distinctions between nature and culture, and male and female: 
 
Specifically, my thesis is that every woman is being identified with—or, if you will, 
seems to be a symbol of—something that every culture devalues, something that 
every culture defines as being of a lower order of existence than itself… Every 
culture, or, generically, “culture” is engaged in the process of generating and 
sustaining systems of meaningful forms (symbols, artifact, etc.) by means of 
which humanity transcends the givens of natural existence, bends them to its 
purposes, controls them in its interest. (Ortner 1974:71-72) 
 
For Ortner, culture is equated with human consciousness and its products, such as technology, 
and woman, as a category, resides at the border between nature and culture. The 
consciousness of woman, or her special brand of personhood, stems from a physiological 
difference, which, much like the boundary between nature and culture, is insurmountable. Just 
as Mauss’ notions of the distinction between persona/personnage and self/personne, the 
existence of which determines the categorical difference between the West and the rest, 
Ortner’s conception of the physiological differences between the male and female is the source 
of the dichotomy between the masculine and feminine personalities. It is this physiological 
difference that allows for woman’s association with domestic spheres, and her exclusion from 
the realms of “universalistic” cultural production. It is this physiology, which causes the negative 
cultural associations that lead to what is described as the dominant and universal aspects of the 
feminine psyche: 
 
One relevant dimension that does seem pan-culturally applicable is that of 
relative abstractness: the feminine personality tends to be involved with concrete 
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feelings, things and people, rather than with abstract entities; it tends towards 
personalism and particularism. (Ortner 1974: 81) 
 
Females, according to Ortner, are unable to partake in the “experiences of self, others, space 
and time in individualistic, objective, and distant ways” in which males experience personhood. 
Rather females “represent experiences in relatively interpersonal, subjective and immediate 
ways,” a distinct aspect of feminine personhood that is engendered in the process of 
socialization (Ortner 1974: 81). While Ortner’s work troubles the of the category of the person as 
outlined by Mauss by expanding it to include women, it also assumes the generality and 
biological rigidity of gendered categories, and subscribes to the insurmountablity of the 
distinctions between male and female, nature and culture, a common Western theoretical 
stance. 
 
In the 1980’s Western theories of self, which posit distinctions between mind and body and self 
and other, especially as these assumptions have manifested in the anthropological imagination 
of non-Western peoples, came under fire from anthropologists of emotion. Growing out of 
feminist approaches to ethnopsychology, the works of Michelle Rosaldo and Catherine Lutz, 
levy bold challenges to Maussian conceptions of the person: 
 
Anthropologists, following such diverse thinkers as the Frenchman Marcel Mauss 
and the American G.H. Mead, have held to a distinction between the “me” and 
the “I”—between the social person characterized by ideas about the body, soul, 
or role and a more intimate and private self… In challenging this standard view… 
I want to argue that an analytical framework that equates “self/individual” with 
such things as spontaneity, genuine feeling, privacy, uniqueness, constancy, the 
“inner life”, and then opposes those to the “persons” or “personae” shaped 
mask… is a reflection of dichotomies that constitute the modern Western self. 
(Rosaldo 1984) 
 
To trouble this dichotomy, Rosaldo proposes a reading of Ilongot culture that posits a world in 
which “our notions of a constant ‘I’” cannot be found. According to Rosaldo, Ilongot people 
inhabit a universe in which “kinship and identity are forever things to be negotiated,” and there is 
no gap between ‘self’ and ‘presentation’ (Rosaldo 1984). She avoids universal descriptions of 
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personhood, emphasizing instead the notion that “what we call ‘real feelings’ or the inner self 
are simply silences discerned, given our analytical discourse, silences that do not necessarily 
help us to grasp the ways that culture shapes and is shaped by human experience” (Rosaldo 
1984, emphasis in original). Rosaldo reveals a space at the center of the universal Western “I”, 
an emptiness that reveals itself in comparison with other conceptions of human experience in 
which the distances between Self and Other, person and persona, are not quite so great.  
 
Catherine Lutz provides another challenge to Western dualisms in her analysis of Ifaluk 
conceptions of self: 
 
At the core of Ifaluk ethnopsychology is a set of beliefs about the structure of 
persons which portrays them as basically undivided entities. In marked contrast 
to Western ethnopsychology, sharp distinctions are not made between thought 
and emotion, between the head and the heart, or between a conscious and 
unconscious mind. (Lutz 1988) 
 
In Lutz’s observation of Ifaluk practices of self and emotion, the taken-for-granted dichotomies 
between inner and outer, thought and emotion, body and mind, dissolve to reveal an alternative 
conception of personhood. The Ifaluk conception of self is formed and supported through social 
interaction, so much so that, according to Lutz, “their emotional lives are their social lives.”6 In a 
sense the Ifaluk cultivate “emotional minds,” which apprehend the world in a manner that is 
“simultaneously cognitive and affective” (Lutz 1988). Both Rosaldo’s and Lutz’s rethinking of the 
category of the person indicate the instability inherent in rigidly universal conceptions of self. 
Maintaining dichotomies in anthropological considerations of personhood may come at the 
expense of breakthroughs in understanding the worlds in which we live, that is, the potential for 
slippages, or transformations, to occur between person and thing, object and environment.  
 
The relationship between “the self,” “objects” or “things” and “the environment,” is complex, as 
each category is constantly (re)defined and (re)shaped in relation to the others.  Recognition of 
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the mutually constitutive nature of the relationship between “self,” “object” or “thing” and 
“environment” is one of the defining features of environmental psychology’s transactional 
approach to human-environment interactions. Within this approach, each category is neither 
fixed, nor essential, and remains open to theoretical consideration on a situational basis. This 
next section of the genealogy addresses the writings of theorists whose work in present key 
insights into this complexity.  
 
Humans display the intriguing characteristic of making and using objects. The 
things with which people interact are not simply tools for survival, or for making 
survival easier and more comfortable. Things embody goals, make skills 
manifest, and shape the identities of their users. Man is not only homo sapiens or 
homo ludens, he is also homo faber, the maker and user of objects, his self to a 
large extent a reflection of things with which he interacts. (Csikszentmihalyi & 
Rochberg-Halton 1981:1) 
 
In their book The Meaning of Things: Domestic Symbols and the Self, Csikszentmihalyi and 
Rochberg-Halton consider the role of objects and things in the shaping of the human self. For 
the authors, thinking about “things” requires a definition that emphasizes their capacity to 
embody and manifest features of personhood through human interaction with them. In 
particular, the authors distinguish the human species not just by their tendency towards knowing 
and consciousness (homo sapiens) or their capacity for play (homo ludens), but by their skill in 
making and using objects (homo faber). It is this skill that transforms members of the species 
into “reflection[s] of things with which [they] interact.” In this formulation, objects are not simply 
passive receptors of human will, but have material impetus of their own. As the authors go on to 
assert, “[t]o understand what people are and what they might become, one must understand 
what goes on between people and things” (C & R-H 1981:1).  
  
In their formulation of people—thing relations Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton present a 
specific conception of the person and/or self, (terms which they use interchangeably): 
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From our perspective, the most basic fact about persons is that they are not only 
aware of their own existence but can assume control of that existence, directing it 
toward certain purposes. This then will be our starting point for a model of the 
self. How self-awareness came about is not relevant here. Thus we shall take 
self-awareness and self-control as givens. (C & R-H 1981:2) 
 
Persons are defined as those who are “aware,” and who have “control” over their existence. 
This is a particularly curious position to take for theorists interested in highlighting the materiality 
of the relation between people and things—a materiality that emphasizes the tactile and 
mutually constitutive nature of the interaction. In defining selfhood as dependent upon 
awareness and control, the authors present autonomy and interiority as valued characteristics of 
personhood. This view would appear contradictory to the authors’ earlier statements about the 
role of things in shaping the self. In this conception, there could not exist an autonomous “self,” 
prior to its interaction with things, and the environment in, and through which both things and 
humans formed. For Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg- Halton, self-awareness is a defining 
feature of personhood, to the extent that it is connected to self-control. “Self awareness occurs 
when the self becomes the object of reflection—that is, the self takes itself as its own object” 
(1981:3). Self-control appears as the process by which the self is objectified, and manipulated, 
through the transformation of “feelings, memories, thoughts” and experience itself into “signs 
[which] become objects of interpretation” (C & R-H 1981:3). In a departure from the authors’ 
earlier statements, the role of “the object” in the formulation of this autonomous “self” becomes 
quite passive. Homo faber is not simply the man who makes and uses things—he is the man 
who is able to make objects (or signs) out of his experiences, in order to “use” them in the 
construction of his own “self.” What of the things that are not and cannot be “made” by homo 
faber? What of the experiences that resist objectification? What of the people who have neither 
the desire, nor the ability, to domesticate, shape, or ‘tame’ their experiences into a coherent 
narrative of the self? How might we make a more nuanced consideration of the relationship 
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between “self”, “object” and “environment”—one that begins from the destabilization of each 
category, without taking their apparent coherence for granted?  
 
One point of departure for addressing these questions can be taken from Nikolas Rose’s 
arguments in his book, Inventing Ourselves: Psychology, Power and Personhood (1998). Rose 
begins by rejecting a view of human being that takes for granted the existence of “the” human 
being as a universal, timeless entity.  
 
The human being is not the eternal basis of human history and human culture but 
a historical and cultural artifact. This is the message of studies from a variety of 
disciplines, which have pointed in different ways to the specificity of our modern 
Western conception of the person. In such societies, it is suggested, the person 
is construed as a self, a naturally unique and discrete entity, the boundaries of 
the body enclosing, as if by definition, an inner life of the psyche, in which are 
inscribed the experiences of an individual biography. But modern Western 
societies are unusual in construing the person as such a natural locus of beliefs 
and desires, with inherent capacities, as the self-evident origin of actions and 
decisions, as a stable phenomenon exhibiting consistency across different 
contexts and times. (Rose 1998:22) 
 
In outlining the specificity of a “modern Western” conception of the self, Rose sets the stage for 
an exploration of the ways in which such a conception achieves currency. He proposes a 
“history of this contemporary ‘regime of the self’?” which he refers to as “genealogy of 
subjectification” (Rose 1998:23).  Following Foucault, Rose distinguishes a genealogy of 
subjectification from a history of ideas. A genealogy investigates “practices and techniques, of 
thought as it seeks to make itself technical” (1998:23). Rather than accepting a priori the 
existence of “the human being,” or the (psychologized) notion of “the autonomous self” Rose is 
interested in exploring the “historical moment” and the “limited and localized geographical 
spaces” in which “human being is understood in terms of individuals and selves, each equipped 
with an inner domain, a ‘psychology’” (1998:23). Problematizing “the individual” in this manner 
implies noticing the ways “the self” acts as a regulatory ideal, by which diverse practices and 
techniques are organized.  
   




The focus of such a genealogy, therefore, is not ‘the history of the person’ but the 
genealogy of the relations that human beings have established with 
themselves—in which they have come to relate to themselves as selves. These 
relations are constructed and historical, but they are not to be understood by 
locating them in some amorphous domain of culture. On the contrary, they are 
addressed from the perspective of ‘government.’ Our relation with ourselves, that 
is to say, has assumed the form it has because it has been the object of a whole 
variety of more or less rationalized schemes, which have sought to shape our 
ways of understanding and enacting our existence as human beings in the name 
of certain objectives—manliness, femininity, honor, modesty, propriety, civility, 
discipline, distinction, efficiency, harmony, fulfillment, virtue, pleasure—the list is 
as diverse and heterogeneous as it is interminable. (Rose 1998:24) 
 
In his interpretation of Foucault’s notions of genealogy and problematization as methods, Rose 
aims to highlight the power-inflected and –defined processes by which what appear to be whole, 
autonomous, and differentiated selves, assume such forms, distinguished from each other by 
particular goals such as “masculinity” and “femininity,” “discipline” and “pleasure.” It is these 
particular “regimes of personhood,” or “devices of meaning production” that are the targets of a 
genealogy of subjectification, which focuses on accounting for the “diversity of the languages of 
personhood.”  
  
Considering “personhood” itself as a product of human technologies, a more complex 
understanding of the relationship between self, thing and environment emerges. If self is a 
product, then the category cannot exist prior to the encounter with other things, or human 
technologies. The definition of these technologies for the production of selves is broad, 
extending beyond traditional definitions of “object” or “thing”: 
 
…[O]ur very experience of ourselves as certain sorts of persons—creatures of 
freedom, of liberty, of personal powers, of self-realization—is the outcome of a 
range of human technologies, technologies that take modes of being human as 
their object. Technology, here, refers to any assembly structured by a practical 
rationality governed by a more or less conscious goal. Human technologies are 
hybrid assemblages of knowledges, instruments, persons, systems of 
government, buildings and spaces, underpinned at the programmatic level by 
certain presuppositions and objectives about human beings. (Rose 1998:26) 
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For Rose, technologies are complex things. They are “hybrid assemblages” which include a 
variety of living and non-living things, expertise and know-how, acting in tandem and at odds to 
shape humans into governable selves. In this way Rose might be read as taking up 
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton’s earlier injunction to recognize that humans cannot be 
understood apart from the objects with which they engage. However, in Rose’s formulation (by 
way of Foucault and Deleuze), the engagement with such assemblages both challenges and 
reinforces categories of “self” and “thing,” through complex regimes of power and 
governmentality. Technologies are not simply “objects” made and used by “man”—they are also 
places, spaces, or environments that are shaped by and shaping of relations, practices and 
techniques of power. As Rose points out, “one can regard the school, the prison [and] the 
asylum as examples of such technologies” (1998:26). This nuanced consideration of 
“technologies” expands Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton’s conception of the relationship 
between persons and things, by emphasizing how persons, things and environment are 
mutually constitutive, shaping each other through particular, ever-shifting, regimes of power.  
 
 
THE STRANGENESS OF WRITING 
 
 
All this discussion of how unstable the category of the person and of the self, or subject, can be 
leads back to the question of who, or what “I” am in Moscow. Around my walking body there 
float all of these cultural, social and political historical projections, just as “real” as I am, which 
take shape in looks, words and gestures. There is an absurdity inherent in even writing about 
this experience. How can these shadows be captured and stilled under “scholarly” or 
“academic” or “disciplined” analysis? In this next section I wish to think through the process of 
writing itself. I consider this writing a key part of an operation, which I (and others before me) 
have found necessary in order to transform me from a simple street “nigger” into a “Self.” It is 
also simultaneously a way of undoing the integrity of this scholarly “Self,” and it’s (un)natural 
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habitat, the “City.” In short, writing, in the way that I consider it here, is the ultimate act of 
enstrangement.  
 
My early training as an anthropologist encouraged me to take for granted the necessity of 
writing as a method of social research, in which the ethnography is its most exalted form. If early 
anthropologists could write into existence whole peoples as “ethnos,” then surely, this scholarly 
work could provide me a stable identity. In Structural Anthropology (1963), Levi-Strauss 
presents language itself as “a social phenomenon” with “two fundamental characteristics” that 
make it susceptible to scientific study (56). First, much of linguistic behavior, for Levi-Strauss, is 
located at the level of unconscious thought. Unconscious thought, in this formulation, implies the 
“absence of consciousness” or lack of awareness in speaking (1963: 56-7). Unlike Freud’s 
unconscious, the unconscious of Levi-Strauss is not a living place. Rather it is a condition that 
may be overcome by the conscientious and properly trained scholar of linguistic structure. 
Second, in accordance with semiotician Ferdinand de Saussure’s langue/parole distinction, 
language may be studied scientifically only through written texts and not speech, as only texts 
are able to hold and preserve language and its history (Levi-Strauss 1963:57). Through writing, 
language becomes a clean and clear system, the noise of speech banished from its structure. 
The process of writing and reading language, therefore, becomes an integral part of the 
scientific practice.  
 
For the structuralist, then, language exists as a construction of men, an object of scientific study, 
and a jungle of raw materials, waiting for extraction and use. Language, in this understanding, 
exists neither as force, nor as embodied experience. Rather, language is universal law. That 
societies (especially those based on oral and not written language) may be transformed into 
languages (through the “objective” observer’s writing), and reduced to universal units, is 
essential to structuralist thought. In fact, it is this notion of the commensurability of all cultures 
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and languages that exposes the folly of ethnocentric, chauvinistic thought, against which the 
liberal project of structuralism is oriented: Under the universal, unbiased gaze of the structural 
anthropologist, difference is dissolved at the same time that it is necessarily re-created. As 
ethnocentric privilege is effaced, it is necessarily re-inscribed in the structuralist’s perception of 
a “system of oppositions” (between modern and primitive, civilized and savage, rich and poor, 
normal and abnormal, black and white and so on).  This critique is best formed and articulated 
within the work of Jacques Derrida. 
 
Perhaps something has occurred in the history of the concept of structure that 
could be called an “event”… What would this event be then? Its exterior form 
would be that of a rupture and a redoubling (Derrida 1978:278). 
 
In this statement, Derrida calls into question the soundness of structure, as it is built and rebuilt 
within the history of Western writing-as-thought, in which Levi-Strauss and Saussure are 
formidably implicated. Derrida posits the possibility of a ‘rupture,’ appearing as soon as “the 
structurality of the structure had to begin to be thought, that is to say, repeated…” (1978:280). 
Structures, Derrida proposes, are built from their very inception upon the opposition of center 
and periphery, in which the center is fixed, “organizing the coherence of the system,” and 
“permitting the play of its elements inside the total form.” This play is the play of structure itself. 
It is best demonstrated in Levi-Strauss’ theory of the bricoleur, who continually rearranges the 
elements of his cultural mythology in ways that, while being novel and creative, can never fully 
transform the basic cosmology of his society, but instead, reinforces its underlying coherence. 
Through Derrida’s analysis we can see how the presence and fixity of the center appears to be 
a given, as it is the pivot around which the structure itself is built. But this center, by definition, 
must remain outside of the structure as well, an absent presence. In the creation of academic 
knowledge about Others beyond the academy, for example, the social researcher must maintain 
a “center” position: she becomes an absent presence—erasing her own embodied positionality, 
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even as she inscribes the raced, gendered, classed, or sexualized bodies of her “human 
subjects,” or objects of study.   
 
The center is the position of “presence,” the metaphysical place of being a subject. For Derrida, 
the only event that can precipitate a challenge to the subject is the emergence of an 
unanticipated desire, which forces a moment of self-recognition. A rupture in the structure 
occurs when one recognizes the “center is not the center,” the “the center could not be thought 
in the form of a present being that the center has no natural site” (Derrida 1978:280): 
 
The center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not 
belong to the totality, (is not part of the totality), the totality has its center 
elsewhere. The center is not the center. The concept of centered structure—
although it represents coherence itself, the condition of the episteme as 
philosophy or science—is contradictorily coherent. And as always, coherence in 
contradiction expresses the force of a desire (1978:279). 
 
What is this desire at the heart of the contradiction of the centered structure or centered 
subject? The translator’s footnote tells us that Derrida is here referring to Freudian dream 
interpretation, in which a symbol is understood as both the desire to fulfill and suppress a wish, 
a dual, warring desire which may de-center the whole, rational European subject. Within the 
context of the work of structural anthropology—the work of Levi-Strauss—I might read 
differently, this force of desire at the center of structure, this absent presence. As the 
anthropologist travels into the field, into the jungle, the desire to hold, to apprehend, to perhaps 
understand the native, motivates the writing of culture, the construction that would enclose and 
preserve the native world. On the other hand, the completion of the written construction, the 
work of the anthropologist, must take place elsewhere, back in the hallowed halls of academia, 
far from the native, who becomes the desire that must be felt from afar, the necessarily absent, 
silent force that holds the structure in place. A desire frustrated. (In my own case, I cannot 
perform such a smooth effacement of the native. In my own fieldwork, though I traveled quite far 
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away, I carried with me some archetypal jungle, evidenced by the monkey noises I heard 
everyday. It seems I am both the native and the anthropologist, wherever it is I find myself. Try 
as I might, I cannot quite frustrate this anonymous desire to preserve in my presence in the 
academy some “native” tendency. While I do not quite hear monkey calls in the halls of 
American academe, I can say I have remained as foreign there as I was in Moscow. And yet, 
here I am, still at it, still writing.)  
 
The realization that the center has no natural site, that the center is never “here” but always 
“elsewhere,” that this distance must be maintained for the structure to work, opens the structure 
to a different kind of movement, to a different sort of play. In this sort of play, the structure can 
no longer maintain its integrity. The structure becomes vulnerable to a double reading, a play-ful 
reading: 
 
Play is the disruption of presence. The presence of an element is always a 
signifying and substitutive reference inscribed in a system of differences and the 
movement of a chain. Play is always a play of absence and presence, but if it is 
to be thought radically, play must be  conceived of before the alternative of 
presence and absence. Being must be conceived of as presence or absence on 
the basis of the possibility of play and not the other way around. If  Levi-Strauss, 
better than any other has brought to light the play of repetition and the repetition 
of play, one no less perceives in his work a sort of ethic of presence, an ethic of 
nostalgia for origins, an ethic of archaic and natural innocence, of a purity of 
presence and self-presence in speech—an ethic, nostalgia and even remorse, 
which he often presents as the motivation of the ethnological project when he 
moves toward the archaic societies which are exemplary societies in his eyes. 
These texts are well known. 
… There are thus two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of 
play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which 
escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of 
interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, 
affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism… (292). 
 
Derrida’s double reading implies a close reading of the canonical texts of Western philosophy in 
order to tease out the binary oppositions at the basis of structure (such as center/periphery, 
presence/absence, nature/culture, normal/pathological) and in order to show the ways in which 
such “oppositions” might actually contain each other, merge into each other. The key to 
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undermining such structures is always contained within the canonical text itself, within the play 
of opposites. The double interpretation of interpretation must go on simultaneously—for Derrida 
there is no choice. 
 
Revisiting Levi-Strauss, opportunities for double readings present themselves. Within the 
binarism of Self and Other, primitive and modern, there lies the privileging of a particular gaze, 
of a specific positionality. For Levi-Strauss, magical thought, or myth, is the primary mode in 
which the primitive mind operates (as opposed to the scientific mind of the modern). According 
to Levi-Strauss, this mode of thought is not to be construed as an evolutionary moment, rather it 
is to be seen as a complete system in itself: 
 
One deprives oneself of all means of understanding magical thought if one tries 
to reduce it to  a moment or stage in technical and scientific evolution. Like a 
shadow moving ahead of its owner it is in a sense complete in itself, and as 
finished and coherent in its immateriality as the substantial being which it 
precedes. Magical thought is not to be regarded as a beginning, a  rudiment, a 
sketch, a part of a whole which has not yet materialized. It forms a well 
articulated system, and is in this respect independent of that other system which 
constitutes science… (Levi-Strauss 1966:13) 
 
What might be the meaning of this curious analogy Levi-Strauss draws between the shadow 
and the primitive mind? What is a shadow if not a projection of an already-exiting object, a 
stand-in for a more-present thing? One cannot have a shadow without its ‘owner.’ The shadow 
is owned by another: it does not indicate a pre-historic moment, but neither does it stand 
autonomous from the existence of another, more present subject. Primitive thought is 
constructed as a dark space open to examination—a moonlit pool, in which a concentrated gaze 
might see itself reflected. (In this framing, the anthropological project is necessarily violent. 
Derrida describes this anthropological project as one of “penetration,” in his critique of Levi-
Strauss’ Tristes Tropiques.)!This innocuous analogy, erases the history, agency and subjectivity 
of the primitive, in order to privilege the presence of a presumably modern, Western Self: in 
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Derrida’s words, “an ethnocentrism thinking itself as an anti-ethnocentrism” (1974:120). This is 
the sort of ethnocentric anti-ethnocentrism that places non-White and non-Euro-American 
authors, for example, together on the last day of the course syllabus. In an attempt to “give them 
voice,” their position as other to the mainstream or the canon, is cemented. Their value to the 
syllabus, and to the academy lies expressly within their racial or cultural otherness. 
 
Derrida traces this ethnocentric anti-ethnocentrism to the influence of Saussure’s exclusion of 
writing: “a profound ethnocentrism privileging the model of phonetic writing, a model that makes 
the exclusion of the graphie easier and more legitimate” (1974:120). Instead of describing the 
Other as “primitive,” which implies an ethnocentric evolutionism, Levi-Strauss settles upon the 
label “without writing.” For Derrida, such an analogy, in which a shadow is made to stand-in for 
something else, something more-present, indicates the play of structure itself—the never-ending 
chain of supplements. The “entire history of the concept of structure,” Derrida argues, “must be 
thought of as a series of substitutions of center for center as a linked chain of determinations of 
the center” (1978: 279). In fact, Derrida argues that the history Western thought is “the history of 
these metaphors and metonymies” (279). However is not the notion of “the chain of 
supplements” itself a metaphor which reproduces the very history it hopes to expose and 
possibly even efface through such exposure?  
 
Although it is born out of “needs of a different kind” and according to 
circumstances entirely “independent of the duration of the people,” and according 
to circumstances entirely independent of the duration of the people, although 
these needs might “never have occurred,” the irruption of this absolute 
contingency determined the interior unity of a life, literally infected it. It is the 
strange essence of the supplement not to have essentiality: it may always not 
have taken place. Moreover, literally, it has never taken place: it is never present, 
here and now. If it were it would not be what it is, a supplement, taking and 
keeping the place of the other. What alters for the worse the living nerve of 
language (“Writing which would seem to crystallize language, is precisely what 
alters it; it changes not the words but the spirit of the language…”) has therefore 
above all not taken place. Less than nothing and yet, to judge by its effects, 
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much more than nothing. The supplement is neither presence nor an absence. 
No ontology can think its operation (1974: 314). 
  
In Derrida’s discussion of Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Essay on the 
Origin of Languages, writing emerges as the ultimate supplement. By exposing Rousseau’s 
philosophical aversion and denigration of writing, as a dangerous supplement “taking and 
keeping the place of the other,” Derrida aims to show how the opposition maintained between 
speech and writing in Western traditions could be thought as more fluid. Derrida’s critique 
demonstrates that writing is “neither presence nor absence,” neither interiority nor exteriority, 
and therefore should not be subject to the ethical judgment and distinction implied in the works 
of Rousseau, Saussure and Levi-Strauss: 
 
But am I saying anything else? Yes, in as much as I show the interiority of 
exteriority, which amounts to annulling the ethical qualification and to thinking of 
writing beyond good and evil; yes above all, in as much as we designate the 
impossibility of formulating the movement of supplementarity within the classical 
logos, within the logic of identity… if at least one determines it as spiritualistic or 
materialistic metaphysics has always done, within the horizon of presence and 
reappropriation… For the rest, it must borrow its resources from the logic it 
deconstructs. And by doing so, finds it very foothold there (Derrida, 1974:314) 
 
In Derrida’s effort to think writing beyond good and evil, could we see a de-contexualization of 
writing-as-supplement to a non-place, neither present nor absent: writing theorized as a practice 
that is never situated, except within this Western metaphysical history of judgment and 
distinction? Does this liberation of writing assume or re-inscribe the very differences between 
langue and parole that it attempts to efface? If the supplement is less than nothing and yet 
much more than nothing, then the supplement remains the shadow of another, more present 
being. It is possible to read parallels between Levi-Strauss and Derrida in this method of 
redemptive writing, in which primitive thought, or writing itself must be “freed” from the 
constraints of Western metaphysics. Shadows and supplements flit through the work of Levi-
Strauss and Derrida respectively, and in this play of movement, we catch glimpses of those 
without names, without place in the structure—all those “Mythical Beings.”  
   




* * * * 
 
What I have tried to convey in this chapter is a certain ambivalence about the process of 
“embodied” social research and writing, especially if one’s body, one’s personhood and one’s 
socio-political positionality are experienced as simultaneously unstable and overdetermined. 
What kind of work can be produced in out of a state of enstrangement from self, city and even 
academy? For me, the answer to this question is not a specific form or product, but a process, 
in which a certain space can be sensed, or created, at the very center of taken-for-granted 
subjects and objects of study. In my case the potential for an experience of enstrangement was 
built both into my experience as a foreign artist and researcher in Moscow, and into my 
experience as a black student in a very culturally and politically white academy. This built-in 
ambivalence to the whole enterprise, have rendered me ironically both an anthropologist a la 
Levi-Strauss (a stranger in a strange land), and a shadow, or supplement, a la Derrida, flitting 
through the centers of knowledge. From this ever-shifting position I am able to produce in a 
variety of languages and disciplinary styles, to “code-switch” as required, but I can still find 
myself, at the most unexpected moment, a “nigger!”  
 
But we must leave that word as the last one. Let us give thanks to that powerful spoken word, 
sailing down that Russian city street on a sunny day. It allowed me to experience the space at 
the absolute center of myself—this abysmal space Derrida writes about—in which all of the 






   






During the defense of this dissertation, several members of my committee demanded an 
epilogue—one that would tie together various “strings” of the dissertation, provide a sense of 
“closure,” and explain “what this all means” for urbanist practice. In reflecting on what “closure” 
might mean for my dissertation, I am drawn to the very specific and practice-oriented questions 
raised by Maureen Connor, an artist, and member of my dissertation committee. 
 
Responding to my dissertation, she asks questions about the ethical, theoretical and practical 
implications of the work. These questions have prompted me to reflect upon my process in 
doing the research and writing for this project, as well as the project’s implications for future 




Several weeks ago while working toward a project for a film festival in Columbia, 
South Carolina I found myself using Archiving the City for both inspiration and 
practical advice. As the capital of South Carolina since the 18th Century, 
Columbia, like Moscow, is an archive that documents its history of conflict and 
inequality. For example its statehouse is surrounded by monuments most of 
which represent and even honor Confederate soldiers as well as their ideological 
descendants. When visiting Columbia on a research trip last month it was made 
clear to me that what they called my “Northerner’s approach” to what I might view 
as their problems would not be welcomed.  
 
I consider my art practice trans disciplinary in the sense that I use processes and 
techniques from the social sciences to conduct research for my projects. 
Although I have read widely about social science theory and practice and also 
write essays on the work of other artists who work in similar ways, unlike 
Enigbokan, I have not undertaken any formal study outside my field.  
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While I feel closely aligned with the goals from the 1921 Soviet essays quoted 
above, and I believe that artists have the capacity to help create “new lives” I am 
often aware that I lack certain ‘conventional’ skills and knowledge that could help 
make my research better and more usefuls. For this reason Archiving the City is 
an invaluable contribution not just to my work but to the many artists who are 
seeking more direct ways to develop “life building” rather than simply ‘raising 
questions.’ 
 
I am now in Columbia, South Carolina just about to complete the installation of 
my project and Archiving the City has become a manual and guide. I find both 
consolation (for the resistance and difficulties I face here) and deeply useful 
information throughout. I refer back almost daily to Chapter 4, in my efforts to 
better understand what rules and technologies govern the various subjectivities I 
come in contact with. And in Chapter 3 the description, discussion and post 
mortem interviews for the project Ten Appearances reminds me again and again 
of the value of presenting situations in which experience is ‘made strange’ but 
also the importance of following up with a discussion of the experience. I believe 
every artist interested in the creation of “new lives” must read Archiving the City. 





Are you saying the academy as it exists today is condemned to deny the 
personhood of the other? What, if anything could have made you feel more 
welcome in the academy? Can it be changed and still exist? 
 
What are your goals as a hybrid trans-disciplinary artist and social scientist? 
What would you like to accomplish? 
 
Columbia, South Carolina is a city in decline. I had no idea things were so bad 
there. I think there must be many US cities in similar conditions. We know about 
Detroit and Cleveland and now St. Louis and smaller cites in Missouri. I don’t 
understand why we are not more aware of the conditions of these cities. It seems 
like our dirty little secret. During a discussion I had about this with several people 
down here one person mentioned the essay The Case for Reparations by Ta-Nehisi 
Coates The Atlantic June 2014 as discussing the unresolved legacy of slavery, 
Jim Crow and racist policies.  
What do you think your practice (and other hybrid art practices) can do to: 
a. Help make a case for Reparations 
b. Help address urban decline 
c. Address and change racists practices in other ways in addition to 
Reparations 
Here’s the heading for the essay:Two hundred fifty years of slavery. Ninety years 
of Jim Crow. Sixty years of separate but equal. Thirty-five years of racist housing 
policy. Until we reckon with our compounding moral debts, America will never be 
whole. 
 
   







In her discussion of her ongoing project in Columbia, South Carolina, Connor presents this 
dissertation as a practical guide for artists working in the field, in politically charged urban 
environments, and on sensitive matters of people’s experience of history in everyday life. 
Beyond being flattering, this invocation of my work as an aid to practice for a working artist, 
demonstrates the work’s viability in its present form. It was always intended as a guide (an 
earlier title for this work was Archiving the City: A Guide to the Art of Urban Interventions, and I 
just may return to this title). The dissertation was written in such a way as to be accessible and 
useful to practitioners and not only to academics. The voice(s) of the dissertation, which pass 
between reportage, ethnography, philosophical reflection and memoir, allow for multiple points 
of entry for practitioners from a variety of fields, from art and architecture, to psychology, 
geography and anthropology. The dissertation was not intended to exclude lay people by 
establishing my own expertise, but rather to mark out various inspirational paths in the practice 
of creative urban research. It is this variation in voice and style that allows the work to be useful 
to an artist such as Connor, as she develops an urban intervention in the field. 
  
Through her experience applying my text in the field, Connor is moved to reflect upon my own 
experience in researching and writing this dissertation in the context of the academy. She asks 
for my thoughts on the propensity of the academy to deny the personhood of the other. This is a 
very useful question, because it reaches to the very heart of how I believe urban research ought 
to be approached, in terms of the ethics of creating new knowledge about our fellow urban 
citizens. Early in my graduate school experience, I understood that the creation of academic 
knowledge in the social sciences would require researchers to assume subject positions that 
would distance them from their “subjects.” No matter the approach to research—qualitative or 
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quantitative, positivist or action-based—the researcher would appear as somehow separate 
from the experience of the researched. This process became clear in my experience with the 
requirements for the protection of “Human Subjects,” required for all dissertations in Psychology 
and other social and behavioral sciences. This convention constructs the participant in the 
research as “subject” to the stewardship of the researcher, who is regarded as a foreign force, 
focused on extracting data.  
 
In this process of professionalization, students are turned into professional researcher as they 
literally subject others to their own theories about knowledge-making. Often this process is done 
in and through the conventions of scientific writing. Coming from classes of people historically 
and currently made (colonial) subject to the (scientific) techniques of social control, I have never 
become completely comfortable with this academic ethic of taking a certain kind of 
“responsibility” for the “protection” of others. Maintaining good ethical relationships have always 
meant to me that one ought simply to avoid engaging in activities, or creating scenarios, from 
which others might need protection. With this in mind, I conceived this dissertation in 
Environmental Psychology to be one that would not create or hold human subjects. Instead I 
chose to take my interlocutors, both in person and on the page, as equals, as experts in their 
own lives and their own fields, and to find commonalities through creative practice. To my mind, 
this approach to research is key to a future transdisciplinary urban research that aims to 
intervene into the everyday lives of city dwellers. I sincerely hope that the academy, especially 
the socio-spatial sciences like Environmental Psychology, will find ways to accommodate and 
embrace a greater variety of researchers’ subject positions. However, this level of inclusiveness 
will be hard to achieve without enthusiastic, non-tokenizing support and acknowledgement 
(financial, intellectual, collegial) for the researchers wish to create alternative forms of 
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knowledge without making others into “human subjects,” and who themselves are regularly 
denied full personhood in everyday life, both in the city streets and in the halls of academe.  
 
My own goals as an ‘urban research-artist’ are primarily ethical ones. This dissertation, and all 
my work are fueled by the same question: How to create experiences and experiments in 
everyday life that are expressive of our best potentials for living together in cities? The true test 
for ethics is that they can be followed out in in everyday life. What cannot be tested and enacted 
in day-to-day social reality, cannot be called ethical. For example, our political tenets, such as 
“all men are created equal,” inscribed in our legal documents, and at the center of struggles for 
civil rights for black American men and all women, for people with disabilities, for migrants and 
for workers, are clearly not borne out in everyday interactions say, between teachers and 
students, between police and members of the public, between doctors and patients, between 
bosses and employees, or even between parents and children. Therefore, the concept of 
“equality under law” remains a very useful political abstraction: something around which we can 
mobilize, opinionate, and legislate.  But until equality is practiced here and now, everyday, 
within person-to-person interactions, it cannot be truly ethical. This is because our quotidian 
interactions provide the true ground for ethics: the messy, often unspoken or unspeakable, 
exchanges between friends, family, lovers, coworkers and (maybe especially) strangers on the 
train. In other words, we cannot honestly say that we are all created equal if, in our very real 
experiences as artists, academics, curators, activists, philanthropists, and so on, we do not 
enact equality as lived truth. Unfortunately, in many of our interactions, (we behave as though) 
we are under siege. This tense, desperate condition is not necessarily a bad thing, not 
necessarily something to try and escape. It is in fact in the crucible of war—under the real or 
imagined threat of annihilation—that ethical action takes on its true value and importance. 
Everyday we are at war and thus, everyday we have the opportunity to be ethical.  
   




This notion of ethics, as appearing mainly in the realm of everyday life, and existing in a more 
“grounded” reality than that of political (or utopian) abstraction, was instilled in me by my 
teacher, Uday Mehta. Professor Mehta is a political scientist who teaches at the Graduate 
Center, City University of New York. His work has probed and exposed the close relationship 
that formed between liberalism and imperialism in the British discourse justifying holding India 
as a colony, and lately he has been writing and teaching about Mahatma Gandhi as an “anti-
political” thinker, expanding ideas of Gandhi’s contribution to political and ethical philosophy with 
a deep interrogation of satyagraha or the practice of truth and nonviolence (Mehta 1999; Mehta 
2010). My interest in Mehta’s and Gandhi’s teachings are not only intellectual: I have tried to 
make my own “experiments in truth” in order to better integrate the ethics of my everyday life 
into my adventures in artistic practices (Gandhi 1993).  
 
In this dissertation I have given examples of experiments I have studied, which have helped me 
to understand the role of ethical action in the everyday ways that we intervene into urban life as 
artists, architects and social researchers. In my work I have focused on understanding the 
creative potentials in encounters with institutional authority. My approach continues to be 
informed by the traditions of institutional critique that have emerged in Western art and social 
activist practices since 1968, but it is not beholden to the utopian visions contained in the 
various strands of that movement. Rather, I am motivated by a simple need to find ways to 
interact with dignity and decency in situations in which I feel at a disadvantage, and in which I 
might ordinarily think I have no choice. My experiences working both in Russia and at the CUNY 
Graduate Center gave me ample opportunity to observe and to practice transforming 
encounters with arbitrary authorities into opportunities for the release of subjugated knowledge. 
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In the future I hope to continue working in this mode in a variety of settings, institutional and 
non-institutional, across the globe. 
 
In commenting on my dissertation, Connor mentions her ongoing project in Columbia, South 
Carolina. The project, commissioned as part of a local independent film festival, is entitled: Can 
People With a Temporary Disruption of Our Normally Linear Perception of Time Consider More 
Creative Approaches to Our Future? An Experiment in Community Coloring Book Creation with 
a Film Festival Audience. Produced by Connor’s artist collective, The Institute for Wishful 
Thinking, the project involves asking film festival goers to participate in coloring black and white 
drawings of local monuments to the city’s confederate past, along with buildings of significance 
to those who would (re)imagine the city’s present and potential futures. The goal of the project is 
to “give participants the opportunity to build, un-build, shape and reshape regional space 
according to whatever time (past, present, future) frame they choose” (artist statement, personal 
communication with Maureen Connor). This experimental method of engaging a local public in 
reimagining difficult pasts is exactly the sort of practice that Archiving the City was written to 
address. Based on her experience as an outsider in South Carolina, addressing sensitive 
histories surrounding local sites, while creating a space for imaginations of the future, Connor 
raises a question about the ethics of artists working in the often heavily racialized spaces of 
American cities in decline. This question, of what artists, and other urban interventionists’ roles 
might be in restoring balance to cities that have suffered years of injustice, goes to the heart of 
my own practice. All of our urban everyday urban routines are shot through with historically 
patterned imbalances of arbitrarily exercised power. Addressing these patterns, unmaking them, 
unraveling them, or “deframing” them is exactly the work of interventionist experiments that I 
admire. From Voina and Pussy Riot's urban disturbances, to Estonian environmental 
psychologists research into the ways people reclaimed their living spaces; from Adrian Piper’s 
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Mythic Being walks around New York, to Yevgeniy Fiks’ archive of representations of Africans 
and African Americans created by Soviet artists, all of the examples featured in my dissertation 
represent the various ways in which urban interventionists might call into question existing 
spatial orderings, and help to redress, or repair wounds in our urban landscapes through small 
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